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Abstract 
This thesis examines Anglo-Greek relations during 1947-1952; the era of the 
Greek civil war from the British announcement to withdraw aid from Greece until the 
end of the civil war and Greece's entry into NATO. A comprehensive treatment of the 
crisis of the civil war focuses on British imperial defence, the politics and society of 
Greece and bilateral relations as formulated by Cold War needs. During the rift between 
the Rigbt and the Left in Greece, the main issue addressed by this work is the 
continuation of British influence in Greek affairs and the extension of British interest in 
bolstering the a nti-Communist fight of the Greek government. In 1947 Britain, being 
itself on the verge of economic collapse, opted to discontinue financial support to the 
Greek right-wing government, which boosted the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 
March 1947. In t he w ake ofA merican i nterference inG reece, A nglo-Greek r elations 
remained close and intense, as the Greek governments maintained their trust in the 
British. For the British, Greece remained a destitute country, in need of assistance to 
defeat the communists. 
This study emphasises the diplomatic and military co-operation between the 
British, the American and the Greek governments in trying to defeat the communist 
forces, while attention is given to the policy and aims of the Greek Communist Party. 
The communist attempts to take over power along with the policies of the Greek 
governments and their allies are examined, with particular emphasis on the 
counterinsurgency operations of the Greek government developed from 1947 until the 
final defeat of the communist forces in 1949. The British role in these operations is 
considered to be important and influential in training and equipping the Greek armed 
forces. 
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In the first post-civil war period of 1950-1952, the main issues examined are the 
attempts made by the Greek governments and the allies to establish a strong democratic 
cabinet and to strengthen the security of Greece within the context of international Cold 
War policies. Due to anti-Communist perceptions, precipitated by the Korean War, 
Greece became a quasi NATO member in 1950 and full member in 1952, which 
brought the withdrawal of the British Military Mission from Greece. 
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Note on Transliteration 
The transliteration of Greek characters is based on an attempt to balance the 
literal and spelling elements as well as please the eye. Greek names have been rendered 
in the simplest or most familiar manner, often following the modem and commonly seen 
orthography in contemporary English texts. It is assumed, however, that this modem 
version of names and regional place names would serve the articulation and aesthetics of 
the Greek language as well. Conventions such as ph or kh have been simplified tof and 
h for reasons of convenience to the non-Greek reader. So Sophoules and Zakhariades 
have been given as Sofoulis and Zahariadis. 
xi 
Chronological Table 
1940 
Italy declares war on Greece (28 October). 
1941 
Prime Minister 1. Metaxas dies (26 January). Germans invade Greece (6 April). British 
troops land in Greece but too weak to oppose German invasion (21 April). Armistice 
between the Greek forces and the Germans signed by Gen. Gcorge Tsolakoglou (23 
April). Athens falls to the Germans (27 April). King George and cabinet headed by 
Premier Tsouderos went from Crete to Cairo (May). German airborne invasion of Crete 
(20 May). Allied evacuation of Crete (1 June). KKE forms EAM (21 September). 
1942 
KKE forms ELAS (10 April). Col Eddie Myers and British SOE team arrives in Greece. 
BMM established (September). Zervas forms EDES (September). Konstantine 
Logothetopoulos replaces Gen. George Tsolakoglou as PM of Greek collaborationist 
government (December). 
1943 
Ioannis Rallis becomes PM of Greek collaborationist government (April). Operation 
Animals-support of Allied invasion of Sicily (July). Cairo Conference (9 August). Italy 
surrenders to Allies. Italian army in Greece begins surrender to Germans and strengthen 
ELAS and EDES (September). Clashes between the resistant movements start (12 
October) 'first round'. 
1944 
ELAS, EDES, BMM meet at Plaka Bridge in Epirus to settle peace between themselves 
(12 February). 'Plaka Agreement' ends 'first round' (29 February). EAM forms PEEA 
(10 March). Mutiny in the Greek forces in the Middle East begins (31 March). Army 
insurgent in M. East suppressed (23 April). Lebanon Conference (17-20 May). George 
Papandreou becomes PM of the Government of National Unity. Soviet mission to 
guerrillas under Col. Popov (28 July). EAM agrees to join government in exile 
(August). Greek government moved to Italy (September). 'Caserta Agreement' (26 
September). Churchill-Stalin 'Percentage Agreement' (9 October). Germans evacuate 
Athens (12 October). Greek Government and British return to Greece (17 October). The 
'second round' b egins (November). E AM ministers resign from the government over 
the issue of demobilisation of ELAS (2 December). Bloody KKE-EAM demonstration 
in Athens, 'December Events' (3 December). Outbreak of civil war, British army 
support Papandreou (December). Churchill flies to Athens (25 December). Archbishop 
Damaskinos appointed Regent (31 December). 
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1945 
Plastiras becomes Prime Minister (11 January). Yalta Conference (4-11 February). 
Warkiza Agreement', end of 'second round', 'third round' begins (12 February). 
Plastiras resignes (April). Voulgaris takes over to resign in October. Zahariadis returns 
from Dachaou and reassumes leadership of the KKE (May). Velouhiotis murdered (16 
June). Regent Premier for a few days, succeeded by Kanellopoulos (November) and 
Sofoulis (November 1945- March 1946). Preparation for elections. 
1946 
Second Plenum of Central Committee of the KKE, second phase of the 'third round' 
begins (12 February). General Election-KKE, EAM and Left abstained (31 March). 
Tsaldaris becomes PM. 'White Terror' intensifies. Marcos Vafeiadis organises the 
Communist military forces in the mountains (July). Plebiscite results in return of King 
George 11 to Greece from London (I September). KKE forms the 'Democratic Army of 
Greece' under Marcos (28 October). Allied Mission for the Observation of the Greek 
Elections (AMFOGE) arrived in Athens (27 November). 
1947 
Fall of Tsaldaris government, Maximos forms cabinet (2 January). KKE decides to form 
a conventional military force (February). British government notifies the Truman 
administration that its aid to Greece would cease on 31 March 1947 (24 February). 
Greek government formally requests United States support (3 March). 'Truman 
Doctrine' (12 March). King George H dies (I April), succeeded by his brother Paul (22 
April). Operation Terminus to clear Roumeli south and north (9 April). USAAG 
established (14 April). UN Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier 
Incidents renders its report to the UN Security Council (27 June). Third Plenum of the 
KKE (12-15 September). Sofoulis forms new cabinet (7 September). Creation of 
Cominform (5 October). UNSCOB establishes its headquarters at Salonika (I 
December). KKE forms Provisional Democratic Government (24 December). Battle of 
Konitsa begins (25 December). KKE outlawed (28 December). JUSMAPG established 
(31 December). 
1948 
Battle of Konitsa ends (I January). Stalin expresses desire to Yugoslavs to end rebellion 
in Greece (9-10 February). Re-organisation of the NA and the DA (February). Lt. Gen. 
James Van Fleet arrives in Greece as Commander of the Joint US Military Advisory and 
Planning Group (24 February). Operation Dawn (15 April -3 May). Tito-Stalin break 
and expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform (28 June). Strasbourg Congress of 
French Communist Party (June). Increase of American assistance to the national forces. 
Enlargement of the NA. BMM operations. Operation Crown to clear Grammos (20 June 
- 21 August). Operation Vitsi (August - October). DA reorganisation along conventional lines intensifies (15 November). Papagos becomes Field Marshal (October). 
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1949 
General Papagos reassumes command of the national forces (21 January). Fifth Plenum 
of KKE Central Committee (30 January). DA mop-up in Peloponnese (April-June). 
Further enlargement of the NA. Allied equipment against the DA. Operation Rocket in 
south-central Greece (25 April -31 July). PM Sofoulis dies (24 June), succeeded by 
Diomidis. KKE sides with Moscow against Tito. Yugoslavia closes its border with 
Greece (11 September). Operation Torch A in Grammos (5-10 August). Torch B in 
Vitsi (10-16 August). Torch C in Grammos (24-31 August). Hoxha announces 
disarmament and detention of DA defenders in Albania (26 August). End of civil war 
(16 October). 
1950 
Alexandros Diomidis caretaker government dissolves. John Theotokis caretaker 
government (6 January). Nicolaos Plastiras and Emmanuel Tsouderos create EPEK (14 
January). Elections (5 March). Coalition government of the Centre (12 March). Sofocles 
Venizelos government (22 M arch). P lastiras g overnment ( 15 A pril). K orean W ar (26 
June). Plastiras government resigns (19 September). Venizelos-Papandreou government 
(21- 23 September). Venizelos-Tsaldaris-Papandreou takes the oath (13 September). 
New cabinet Venizelos-Papandreou (3 November). 
1951 
Creation of Populist Unity Party -LEK (6 January). Papagos resigns from the position of 
the C-in-C (29 May). Papagos sets up Greek Rally (6 July). General election (9 
September). EPEK-Liberals form government (18 September). NATO admits Greece 
and Turkey (20 September). Anglo-Iranian Oil conflict (October). New Plastiras- 
Venizelos g overnment (27 0 ctober). C hurchill g overnment (27 0 ctober). New Greek 
constitution (21 December). 
1952 
Accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO as full members (18.2). American 
intervention towards simple majority electoral system (14 March). The Parliament votes 
for simple majority (12 September). The Parliament dissolves, new elections (10 
October). Caretaker government Dimitris Kiousopoulos (I I October). Eisenhower wins 
the elections (2 November). General elections-Greek Rally wins (16 November). 
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Introduction 
This work is a study of Anglo-Greek relations during the period 1947-1952. The 
thesis surveys British policy during the resistance years and the immediate post-war 
period. Its main focus, however, is the climax of the civil war and the post-civil war 
years. The post-civil war period ended when Greece joined NATO in 1952; the thesis 
too terminates at that pivotal moment. 
The aims of this study are threefold. Firstly, to examine British policy towards 
Greece during the crucial years of 1947-1952. Secondly, to understand the Greek 
domestic developments which influenced policy-making. Thirdly, to analyse Greek 
foreign policy and the demands Greece made on Britain. The purpose of this thesis is to 
contribute to a better understanding of both British and Greek foreign policies. The 
study also aims at providing a framework for the understanding of diplomatic and 
military developments in civil war and post-civil war Greece. 
Most works on Anglo-Greek relations have suggested that the relationship 
disintegrated after 1947.1 This thesis demonstrates that bilateral relations remained close 
throughout the whole period under examination. A combination of Greek and British 
sources are deployed to support this argument. One of the most important aspects of this 
thesis is the variety of sources upon which it is built. On the Greek side, the records of 
the Service of Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ynilpecia 
IuTopucol) ApXeiou, YIA) and the General Staff/ Directorate of History of the Anny 
1 According to the traditionalist historians of Greece, after 1947 the United States took over the fight 
against the Soviet Union's plan for global domination. See: St. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 
1944-1947 (Thessalokini, 1963). Revisionist historians of Greece emphasise the financial limitations of 
Britain, which led to British withdrawal and American involvement in Greece. D. Eudes, The Kapetanios 
(London, 1972). Other historians of Greece stress that 1947 signified 'the changing of the guard from 
Britain to the United States' in Greece. Th. Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics (London, 1997), p. 
15 1. Vlavianos argues that Britain decided 'to end its own military and financial support to Greece' in 
February 1947. H. Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949 (Oxford, 1992), p. 236. 
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(I'mm E7rtTF, 4io Zrparof)/Atcf)Oi)vaij I(; TOpia; ETPaTOf), ]FEVAIE) are used for the 
first time. These records were released under Greece's fifty-year rule just as research for 
this thesis began. When combined with the more familiar British primary sources these 
records furnish insights into both diplomatic and military relations. Thus, the thesis 
contains the first detailed analytical coverage of the battles of 1947-1949 and the 
operations of the British Military Mission in Greece. In particular, new light is shed on 
Greek counter-insurgency operations carried out with British and American support. 
The interrelation of diplomatic and military components is an important element in 
determining relations, which is underplayed by the existing literature. 
In addition to the newly available Greek government archives, memoirs, 
monographs and Greek newspapers from various political backgrounds have also been 
consulted. The analysis of British policy is based upon official British papers and 
documents regarding Greece. Research has been conducted on documents from the 
Foreign Office, the War Office, the Ministry of Air, the Admiralty, the Ministry of 
Defence, the Treasury and the Cabinet. The papers of Anthony Eden, Winston 
Churchill, Brigadier Godfrey Pennington Hobbs, General Harold English Pyrnan, 
Admiral Robert Kirk Dickson and Admiral William Halford. Selby regarding Greece 
have also been consulted, the last four for the first time in this context. British 
parliamentary debates and press records have also been used. One of the most difficult 
challenges in studying both the public and official documents of the period is the critical 
evaluation of their unspoken assumptions. An attempt has been made to examine and 
evaluate sources from all sides of the polarised political debate in and on Greece in 
order to cut through the prejudices and propaganda which bedevils the proper study of 
this subject. 
The chronological definition of the subject is straightforward: February 1947 
marked the British note to the Americans announcing British intention to withdraw aid 
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from Greece. In March 1947 the American government announced that it intended to 
keep Greece within the western sphere. In February 1952 Greece joined NATO and 
began its integration into the system of western collective security. In the same year the 
acute political instability that had haunted Greece since 1944 was brought to an end by 
the election of a strong conservative government. It was in 1952 that the British Military 
Mission concluded its activities in Greece. 
The evolution of the Greek civil war and the impact it had in both Britain and 
Greece is examined. Special attention is paid to conflicting interests and attitudes. At 
various times, on the British side, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the Treasury 
and the War Office had differing policies towards Greece. The issue of the timing of the 
withdrawal of British troops from Greece constituted a typical example of friction. 
Within American circles, there was often a considerable variance between the views of 
the President and the State Department; as the case was over the dispatch of American 
army toG reece. T he Greek Communist Party (KKE) followed a series of conflicting 
policies. Whilst members of the KKE were serving in governments of national unity, the 
KKE Politburo was planning military operations to topple those governments. On the 
Greek government side, personal ambitions, party friction, power politics and 
international Cold War developments each played ar ole inap rocess of rn aking a nd 
dissolving goverranents. An understanding of these internal differences is essential to an 
explanation of how policy was developed and of the difficulties in its implementation. 
In these years intervention was the central issue in Greek history. Both the Greek 
government and the Greek communists called for foreign intervention. The former was 
privileged in that its allies were ready to fight communism. The latter was less fortunate. 
Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria provided limited source of assistance. The Kremlin 
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was not interested in the fight of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Intervention was 
also the constant theme of Anglo-Greek relations. 3 What the Greek Communist Party 
denounced as 'monarcho-fascist intervention A was also the central pillar of both 
Churchill and Labour's Cold War policy. Intervention was instrumental in furthering 
Britain's two main objectives in Greece: the security of routes to and from the Middle 
East and the contaimnent of CommuniSM. 5 Yet intervention has all too often been 
interpreted as the sole determinant in developments in Greece. 6 The form and degree of 
British intervention oscillated in the post-war. 7 It was constant neither in form nor in 
intensity. Intervention was a complex phenomenon. 
Not only do many accounts of Anglo-Greek relations fail to take the complexity 
of intervention into account but also they fail to note that foreign intervention was far 
from being the sole determinant of developments in Greece. The very fact that 
intervention occurred unevenly in time, location and form gave Greek participants in the 
2 Chiclet claims that Stalin used the KKE as his Cold War strategy. Ch. Chiclet, Les Communistes Grecs 
dans la Guerre-Histoire du Parti Communiste de GrOce de 19410 1949 (Paris, 1987). Iatrides, on the 
contrary although a left-wing sympathiser, puts the blame on the KKE itself for the way it has interpreted 
Soviet policy. latrides, 'Perceptions of Soviet Involvement in the Greek Civil War 1945-1949', in L. 
Baerentzen, J. 0. Iatrides, 0. L. Smith (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War (Copenhagen, 
1987), pp. 225-248; Similarly, in 0. Smith, 'The Greek Communist Party, 1945-1949', in D. Close (ed), 
The Greek Civil War, pp. 129-155. A detailed account of the KKE's policy is of P. J. Stavrakis, Moscow 
and Communists, 1944-1949 (London, 1989). 
3 For a left-wing account on foreign intervention in Greece see: H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece: 
From Varkiza to Civil War. February 1945 to August 1946 (London, 1985); B. Kontis, Anglo-American 
Policy and the Greek problem 1945-1949-HAy7Ao-Aycpwaviký HoAmK4 Kai To EUqVIK6 ffp6fl2qya- 
(Thessaloniki, 1984); J. 0. Iatrides, 'Britain, the United States, and Greece, 1945-1949', in D. H. Close, 
(ed. ), The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950 (London, 1993); J. 0. Iatrides, 'Civil War, 1945-1949: National 
and International Aspects', in J. 0. Iatrides (ed), Greece in 1940s, pp. 195-219; J. Iatrides, 'Britain, the 
United States and Greece', in D. Close (ed), The Greek Civil War, pp. 190-213. For non pro-KKE 
accounts: L. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago, 1952); L. S. Wittner, 
American Intervention in Greece 1943-1949 (New York, 1982). Hereafter cited as American Intervention. 
A. Nachmani, 'Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-1949', Journal of Contemporary 
History 25 (1990), pp. 489-522; R. Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States and the European Cold War, 
1945-19481, History 67 (1987), pp. 217-236. 4 KKE Official Documents -E7r! aqua KE[pcvavol. 6 (Athens, 1987). 5 F. Northedge, British Foreign Policy (London, 1962); E. Bullock, The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin, 
vol. II (London, 1967); T. Howarth, Prospects and Reality. Great Britain 1945-1955 (London, 19 8 5). 6 For a right-wing view see Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers. For the left-wing orthodoxy, History of 
the KKE 1918-1949-, 40KIUIO Iaroplaq Tov KKE- (Athens, 1996). ' On the contrary, historian Eudes interprets the civil war as a monolithic political and social conflict with 
no change of character throughout. Eudes, Les Kapetanios. La guerre civile grecque de 1943-1949 
(Paris, 1970). 
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post-war events a wide d egree of latitude. This study is based on the perception that 
Greek political forces were responsible for developments in Greece. Quite often, 
however, accounts of Greek relations with a foreign power are based on a series of a 
priori, over-simplified value judgements, whose purpose is to condemn or exonerate the 
policy of a great power or one of the Greek political parties. Although the literature on 
the period of the occupation and the civil war is extensive, the great majority of these 
studies are violently prejudiced and disappointingly unwilling to comprehend the 
interests or rationale of the 'other' side. 8 These conspiracy or one-sided accounts ascribe 
primary responsibility for developments in Greece to the foreign factor - thus turning 
Greek internal forces into powerless puppets. Developments in Greece, to a large extent, 
should be explained on the basis of power relations within Greece itself. In other words, 
at various points, such as the outbreak of the civil war or the prolonged political 
instability of 1950-1952, the conflicting Greek forces are to be blamed. Consequently, 
internal politics must also be taken into account whenever foreign intervention is 
judged. 
The i nterpretation oft he G reek c ivil w ar a nd f oreign i nvolvement h as b een a 
matter of dispute between the schools of thought from 1950s onwards. The excesses of 
the Cold War led both right-wing and left-wing traditionalist historians of Greece to 
argue that Stalin instigated the KKE insurgency as part of his plan for global 
domination. The role of the foreign powers has been emphasised, as well as American 
predominance after March 1947. Traditionalist historians of the Right of Greece tended 
to focus on the KKE and the 'bandit' war and sought to blame the civil war on the threat 
8 For a right-wing view see Averoff, By Fire and Axe; Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers. In these 
accounts it is claimed that the KKE was preparing a revolution by the occupation years. From the opposite 
perspective is Psyroukis who puts the blame of the Greek civil war on Britain and the United States. N. Psyroukis, History of Contemporary Greece, 1940-1967- Iaropia Tqq Ev7Xpovqq EU66aq, 1940-1967 (Athens, 1970); Richter writes that 'the civil war did not come as a result of the decision or the acts of the KKE, it was rather the outcome of a process set in motion by the terrorist acts of the extreme right'. H. 
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of 'EAM-Bulgarians'. The Left denounced the 'white terror' measures applied by the 
Greek government to defeat the Communists or British and American 'monarch-fascist' 
policy-makers. 9 A serious drawback of this school of thought is the lack of academic 
proof in their accounts. British back to the 'white terror' was also the main argument of 
the revisionist historians of Greece developed during the 1970s. 10 
By the 1980s, however, some historians of Greece had reached a more critical 
analysis of the Greek govenunent, the role of the allies and the Left. John latrides 
underlined both the KKE's commitment to revolution as well as the provocative effect 
of the 'white terror'. David Close stressed the responsibility of the Right, which gave 
rise to an apparatus of terror and repression, whilst praising the decisive role of British 
and American intervention. " According to these historians, the civil war resulted from a 
domestic struggle for power aggravated by Cold War conflict. 
These accounts were based upon American and British primary sources. 
Unavoidably, h owever, t hey s uffered from aI ack ofp rimary s ources d rawn from the 
archives of either the Greek government or the Greek Communist Party. For instance, 
the British determination to maintain Greece within its sphere of influence is very well 
examined by Procopis Papastratis. The author provides a scholarly account of British 
policy in Greece and British strategies to contain the Communist threat. However, the 
Richter, 'Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Greek Civil War', in J. 0. Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 
1940s (London, 198 1), p. 179. 
9 Among the right-wing historians see: E. Averoff, By Fire and Axe-ocoTld Kai TacKo6pi (Athens, 1974); 
D. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat (London, 195 6). For an account of left-wing historians see: the 
publications of the Greek Communist Party; J. Meynaud, Les Forces Politiques En GrOce (Etudes De 
Science Politique, 1965). White terror is the term used by the Left to defline the government measures to 
defeat the communists. 
10 Eudes, The Kapetanios (London, 1972); 0. L. Smith, 'Self Defence and Communist Policy 1945-1947', 
in L. Baerentzen, J. 0. Iatrides, 0. L. Smith (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 
(Copenhagen, 1987), pp. 159-179; N. Alivizatos, 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil Liberties, 1946- 
1949', in Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 220-228; latrides, 'Civil War 1945-1949', in H. 0. L. 
Smith, 'Self Defence and Communist Policy 1945-1947, in L. Baerentzen, J. 0. latrides, 0. L. Smith 
(eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War (Copenhagen, 1987), pp. 159-179. H. Fleischer, 
Crown and Swastika: Greece under Occupation and Resistance-ETtypa Kai EP60TIKa: H F-UMa KaTic 
Tjv Karqý Kai &TIoTao-q, vols. 1- 2, (Athens, 1988,1995). 
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author relies mainly on Foreign Office documents to analyse British and Greek policy. 12 
The 'December Events' and the Warkiza Agreement' are analysed in great detail by 
Heinz Richter. The author's interpretation is based on Foreign Office files, Greek 
newspapers and KKE official publications. The author condemns British policy makers 
'Tories as well as Labourites' for the prolongation of the civil war because they did not 
prevent the Greek government from 'white terror' practises. 13 George Alexander's study 
of British policy in Greece takes the opposite view. Alexander provides a thorough 
analysis of British policy and its struggle to contain communists' attempts to take over 
power. Like Richter, however, Alexander's primary sources on decision-making are 
almost exclusively Foreign Office documents. As a result, his analysis is limited mainly 
to the British point of view. 14 Lawrence Wittner's important study, American 
Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York, 1982), is based mainly on American 
governmental sources and British Foreign Office documents. Wittner thoroughly 
examined American policy regarding Greece on the eve of the Cold. He himself 
acknowledges, however, the limitations imposed on him by lack of work in Greek 
archives. Robert Frazier casts his net wide to write his seminal study Anglo-American 
Relations with Greece. Frazier's book was based on sources from the Foreign Office, 
the Ministry of Defence, the Treasury, the office of the Prime Minister and private 
papers of Hugh Dalton, Myers and Woodhouse. The author also reads widely in the US 
National Archives and a variety of American private papers. Perhaps as a result of this 
wide coverage Frazier became convinced of the pivotal importance of the British role in 
11 Iatrides, 'Perceptions of Soviet Involvement in the Greek Civil War 1945-1949', in Baerentzen, 
Iatrides, Smith (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, pp. 225-249; D. Close 
(ed. ), The Greek Civil War, pp. 156-185. 
12 p. Papastratis, British Foreign Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 
(London, 1984). 
13 H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War, February 1945 to August 1946 
(London, 1986); H. Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', in Iatrides (ed. ), 
Greece in the 1940s, pp. 176-177. 
14 G. M. Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944-1947 (Oxford, 
1982). 
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the Cold War and developments in Greece. He argues that 'the only motivation for the 
British withdrawal from Greece was Bevin's fervent desire to bring the United States to 
the defence of Europe in the face of a Soviet threat'. Frazier stresses that mutual Anglo- 
American perception of a Soviet threat to world peace 'gave a new basis for joint 
15 Anglo-American policies'. The book was once again based solely on British and 
American documents. 
In drawing attention to the shortcomings of previous studies, one acknowledges 
how much historians have been impeded by the lack of Greek sources. Even though this 
thesis marks a step forward in integrating Greek and British sources, archival 
impediments a re s till e xtant. A Ithough t he I ong I asting p roblem. oft he f ifty-year rule 
restriction regarding documents on the Greek civil war was solved in 1999 it is, even 
now, still applied to the post-civil war era and documents referring to NATO. An 
additional obstacle is the underdeveloped state of the Service of Historical Archive of 
the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ynqpcciu la'ropticoi) ApXct'Oi), YIA) that renders 
research extremely slow. As a result of cataloguing and filing there are still many 
restrictions on viewing even those documents that should be made available. Similar 
difficulties hamper research in the Greek General Staff/ Directorate of History of the 
Army (]Fcvtic6 Earrekdo l'rpaTol)/AtF, -60i)vaTj laropia; Drpam-6, ]FEE/AIE) archive. The 
lack of an organised archival service results in serious restrictions on documents 
available to research. The problem is slightly eased in the case of the military archive 
due to the availability the official publications of the Greek General Staff, cited as 
GES/DIS to underline the distinction between the military primary documents cited as 
FEVAIE. Access to the archive of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) is still forbidden 
to researchers rendering the assessment of the policy of the KKE during the civil war 
years both dangerous and difficult. Although there are published official collections of 
15 R. Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece (London, 1991), p. 180. 
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documents of the Party that present the official party line, as well as memoirs written by 
Party members, these should be treated with great caution. 16 
The literature on the Cold War and power relations between the actors is a 
matter of debate for years. An interpretation that dominated for the last twenty years- the 
height of the Cold War animosities-broadly accepted the positions taken by western 
literature. An orthodox or traditional point of view developed the basic argument of the 
influential Soviet expansionism. The orthodox western interpretation puts the blame for 
the Cold War on the USSR whereas the Cold War remained only between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The revisionist critique of this interpretation led into a 
reassessment of the United States involvement in the making of the Cold War. 
American economic imperialism is brought the ccntrc stage. A post-rcvisionist 
interpretation was developed in the 1970s to avoid polarities of the above debate. Both 
previous views were criticised for being too simplistic in their adherence to one 
particular side of the argument. " Thus a typical post-revisionist conclusion states that 
The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and 
internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The external situation-circumstances beyond the control of 
either power- left the Americans and Russians facing one another 
across a prostrate Europe. " 
However, this post-revisionist conclusion from Gaddis shares bi-polar assumptions 
along with both the orthodox and revisionist writers. Thus, the Cold War literature 
either o rthodox, r evisionist orp ost-revisionist b lames ore xonerates e ither the United 
States or the USSR for any contest. Both the origins and the first Cold War years seem 
to be a matter of interaction between only the two superpowers where there is no 
16 One example of secondary literature based on research in the KKE's primary sources is the work 
written by Gr. Farakos. Farakos had been archivist of the KKE for more than thirty years and an active 
KKE member for more than forty. Gr. Farakos, December 1944-JcKtyflp? 7q 1944 (Athens, 1996); Gr. 
Farakos, ELAS and Power -EAAE Kai Eýovuia (Athens, 2000). 
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mention of smaller powers involved and especially Britain. The initial stimulus to re- 
evaluate Britain's role came from Deighton who argues that all such writing is 
profoundly 'unhistorical' and that 'Britain carried out the responsibility for the Cold 
War as much as Russia and America'. ` Deighton's argument is based on the premise 
that three main victors emerged from the Second World War and that the 'Big Three' 
constituted of three superpowers: The United States, Soviet Union and Britain. Hence, 
in this period Britain was as active and war victor as the other two partners in tying to 
reconstruct world order and geopolitical balance of power. 
This latest deconstruction requires a critical re-evaluation of the whole bipolar 
nature of the Cold War. If follows that all bi-polar accounts of the origins of the Cold 
War are 'fundamentally deficient"' and from this perspective this is indeed true. Such a 
complex reality as the Cold War is not a matter of interaction between only two powers 
but a multi-dimensional issue with more actors involved. In an even more 'Anglocentric 
view of the early Cold War"' Frazier suggests that Britain played an important role in 
dragging the United States to the international affairs. " Ryan also asserts that the 
preoccupation of the Foreign Office was to 'maintaining Great Britain in the first rank 
of power' and this made the Cold War its 'secondary objective'. " Smith has 
summarised this new tendency in historiography as a significant response, which 'has 
overtumed the bi-polarity of the Cold War' and sees the Cold War as the result of post- 
17 W. Loth, The Division of the World (London, 1988), p. 9. 
" J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), p. 361. 
19 A. Deighton, 'The "frozen fronf': The Labour government, the division of Germany and the origins of 
the cold war, 1945-17', International Affairs 63 (1987), 449-465. On the role of smaller powers in the 
formation of the Cold War consider also: S. Ball, The Cold War. An International History, 1947-1991 
(London, 1998). 
20 R. H. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York, 1981), p. 1; T. 
H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947 (Columbia, 1981), p. viii. 21 D. Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American relations', International Affairs 65 (1989), 89-111. 22 Frazier, Anglo-American Policy towards Greece. The coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947(London, 
199 1); R. Frazier, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine, The Historical 
Journal 27,3 (1984), 715-727. 
23 H. B. Ryan, The Vision ofAnglo-America (Cambridge, 1982), p. 9. 
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war interaction between all three power-actors of the wartime Grand Alliance. " 
Although Britain did not remain a great power throughout the Cold War era it played a 
significant role in the making and formation of the early period and this makes the 
British argument valid. 
This new assumption of British significance in the first Cold War period 
enriches British Cold War policy. The argument is that British first priority was to 
secure British sphere of influence with American backing. Both Anderson and 
Hathaway focus on a 1944 Foreign Office Memorandum, which reads that 'it must be 
our purpose not to balance our power against that of America, but to make use of 
American power for the purpose which we regard as good. "' As the argument goes, if 
Britain wanted to maintain its role as a world power, it should secure political, financial 
and military American assistance. For British historian Ryan British power crisis could 
be overcome by a close association with the United States. " Hence Churchill's Anglo- 
American 'special relationship' was followed by a co-ordinated foreign policy. On the 
same principle the Labour foreign policy continued after Churchill's defeat in the 1945 
election. Bevin's role in the origins of the Cold War is that of another 'Cold Warrior'. 
Bevin followed the policy of having the US as the means to shore up the British 
Empire. " Deighton also writes that the overriding aim of the British government was to 
ssecure a continuing American commitment to harmony and a balance of power in 
Europe that would not favour Communism. "' 
24 R. Smith, 'A climate of opinion: British officials and the development of British Soviet policy, 1943- 
1947', International Affairs 65 (1989), 631-47. 
25 Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947, pp. 12-13; Hathaway, 
Ambiguous Partnership: Britain andAmerica, 1944-1947, p. 52. This is also the main theme in A. 
Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London, 1983). Although the argument goes back to the First 
World War years, it acquires special importance during the early Cold War years within the context of 
British decline. 
26 Ryan, ne Vision ofAnglo-America, p. 2. 27 Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London, 1983); Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with 
Greece, The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947. 
28 Deighton, 'The "frozen fronf': The Labour government, the division of Germany and the origins of the 
Cold War, 1945-17', International Affairs 63 (1987), 449-465. 
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Regarding British role in the Cold War origins, Frazier assumes that British 
policy of manoeuvring the Americans eventually produced the Cold War and Ryan that 
the confrontation of the Cold War was the result of hard work by the British and 
especially Churchill. " Rothwell also notes the importance of British post-war policy and 
argues that the Foreign Office did not point towards an east-west confrontation. " This 
work does not consider that British policy of manoeuvring the US eventually produced 
the Cold War, but that Britain was powerful enough to influence policy-making and 
subsequently Cold War developments. Hence, British role as 'Cold Warrior', the role of 
smaller powers and a multi polar assumption to understand the Cold War is a more 
balanced interpretation to the traditional Cold War perceptions. 
Although both the Truman Doctrine and NATO creation committed the US to 
the defence of Western Europe against Soviet aggression, Britain did not succeed to 
remain ag reat p ower f or long. However, in the process of the power struggle of the 
early Cold War years it had contributed to the making of the Cold War geopolitical 
order. As Reynolds put it, the British argument 'offers a healthy antidote to an 
excessively American dominated account of western policy in the Cold War'. ` This 
thesis is built on the promise that Britain played a formative role in the early Cold War 
years. 
The detailed analyses of British and American policy written since the I 980s 
form the starting point for the present thesis. By using new Greek sources and delving in 
archives of British agencies other than the Foreign Office, it is able to go beyond them 
and suggest that relations between Britain and Greece were close throughout the whole 
period under examination, despite the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the 
29 Frazier, Anglo-American policy towards Greece. The coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947; Ryan, The 
Vision ofAnglo-America, p. 2. 30 V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947 (London, 1982). 31 Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American relations', International Affairs 65 (1989), 108. 
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more interventionist stance taken by the United States government. 32 In particular, it 
argues that the post-1947 situation was dynamic and fluid. It was marked by constant 
military and political manoeuvre as the British, the Greek government and the KKE 
constantly reassessed their interests and their tactics. British military influence remained 
a vital element in Greek politics not only in the final years of the civil war but also until 
Greece's entry into NATO in 1952. 
The structure of this study is both chronological and thematic. The work is 
divided into six chapters presented in chronological order. Chapter one gives a general 
picture of the driving forces that influenced the course of events and the key 
participants. It considers the reasons for the dramatic rise in communist strength during 
the occupation and the aims of EAM/ELAS; the communist political and military 
resistance organisation. The significance of British involvement in Greece and its 
policies to secure a broadly based post-war goverranent are also assessed. The chapter 
refutes the traditionalist argument of historians of Greece that the civil war broke out as 
a result of a monolithic c ommunist p Ian tos eize p ower. 33 Similarly, it dismisses the 
view that the British provoked the Left into hostilities and caused the civil war. 34 It also 
softens the leftist argument that the Warkiza Agreement' became, in the hands of the 
35 
government, an instrument of revenge. 
32 In the present work there is no discussion about economic relations between Greece, Britain and the 
United States, which is an issue explored by the unpublished thesis of J. Stefanidis, The United States, 
Great Britain and Greece, 1949-1952 (University of London, 1992). Stefanidis focuses on American- 
backed recovery programmes in Greece between the end of the civil war and the inauguration of Papagos' 
premiership. From this perspective he argues that after 1947 America was undoubtedly the dominant 
foreign power in Greece. Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, 1949-1952, p. 5 8. This 
work however is still based on American and British documents. On the American policy consult: L. 
Wittner, 'American Policy toward Greece, 1946-1949', in J. Iatrides (ed), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 229- 
238. 
33 This is the main theme in A. Averoff, By Fire and Axe-OCOTid Kai TacKobpi (Athens, 1974); K. 
Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969). 
34 See: Th. Mosxatos, The Kapetanios Meeting in Lamia-HE6myll raw Karcravalow M Aapla 
(Athens, 1985). 
35 H. Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', in J. 0. Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in 
the 1940s, pp. 167-18 1. 
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Chapter two examines British policy towards Greece in 1947 and assesses the 
British role in the American policy that turned into the Tnmian Doctrine. The 
significance of the British note of February 1947 on Greece is analysed and its effects 
within the Cold War context are evaluated. The chapter traces the evolution of Greek 
expectations of Britain during the period of the escalation of the civil war and outlines 
the importance the Greek government attributed to British aid and assistance. The 
chapter examines in detail Greek counter-insurgency operations (COIN) in 1947 and 
outlines the gradual change in the practises of the National Anny (NA). The role of the 
British Military Mission (BMM) in the re-organisation of the national forces is analysed. 
American missions also had as hare int he r e-organisation oft he n ational f orces a nd 
therefore an evaluation of British and American co-operation is attempted. Thirdly, the 
policies of the KKE and EAM are examined and the responsibility of the party for the 
civil war is assessed. Zahariadis and the KKE Politburo's policy in the spring 1947 is 
analysed. The aims of the Democratic Army (DA) and the subsequent transformation of 
the civil war from guerrilla fighting to conventional warfare are also outlined. The 
chapter refutes the view of the right-wing traditionalist historians of Greece that the 
British supported right-wing governments appointed by the Palace. 36 It is demonstrated 
that British policy supported moderate governments of the Centre in an attempt to soften 
the political extremes. It also refutes the orthodox left-wing view that British 
imperialism had turned Greek politicians into puppets. 37 The Greek government, it is 
suggested, was mainly responsible for its own weaknesses and disabilities. Moreover, 
the orthodox view that the Soviet Union and its communist satellites fomented the civil 
war in Greece and that the KKE was acting as their agent is also refuted. 38 The 
36 S. Markezinis, Contemporary Political History of Greece-E67 ov? l IZoAiT JoTopla Tqq a, , Xp xý 
EUM q 
vol. 2, (Athens, 1994). Hereafter cited as Markezinis, Political History- ffob=4 IoTopla 37 This is the argument put forward in the official history of the KKE. History of the KKE-, JOKfuiO 
Iaropfaq Tot) KKE (Athens, 1996). 
38 G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (Oxford, 1965). 
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revisionist view that the communists were fighting only in response to the aggression of 
the Greek government is also dismissed . 
39 Like the government, the KKE was pursuing 
its own aims with considerable success. 
The chapter dissents from the view that British involvement in Greek affair came 
40 to a deliberate end in February 1947 as a result of British financial problems. Instead, 
it offers an account of how Greece remained within the strategic sphere of Britain after 
February 1947. The American presence is explained in terms of supporting British 
policy. Regardless of the Truman Doctrine, the Greek government continued to expect 
support and assistance from Britain, especially in the form of British Military Mission 
training the Greek National Army. British assistance in the organisation of Greek 
counterinsurgency operation after spring 1947 further demonstrates the British intention 
to continue support for the governmental fight against the Democratic Army. 
Chapter three examines in depth the development of Greek counter-insurgency 
operations and the evolution of the Greek national forces into an effective and self- 
sufficient machine. Although the Democratic Army evolved into a sophisticated and 
complex force, capable of challenging the National Army the governmental military 
machine gradually managed to defeat the Communist forces. The chapter refutes the 
contention of the orthodox view that the KKE lost the war because of lack of support 
from the Soviet Union and the closure of the Yugoslav borders. 41 The left-wing claim of 
the historians of Greece that the western allies defeated the communist army is also 
dismissed. 42 Instead, the chapter demonstrates that a combination of factors brought 
bout the victory of the National Army over the Democratic Army. The fighting 
39 Alivizatos, 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949', in Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 
1940s, pp. 221-228. 
40 Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949, p. 236; Eudes, The Kapetanios, p. 279. 41 See: Averoff, By Fire and Axe; S. Vukmanovic, How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of 
Greece Met With Defeat (London, 1985). 
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efficiency of the National Army, the western allies' assistance, the KKE's inability to 
cope with conventional warfare and the lack of communist foreign support all finally 
brought the defeat of the Democratic Army. The British role in this process is examined, 
with the aim of defining the true extent of British involvement in the civil war and the 
British share of responsibility for the defeat of the KKE. In particular, the evolution of 
air power is analysed in detail, because it was a decisive factor in the defeat of the 
communist forces. The Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) supported, trained and 
equipped by the Royal Air Force (RAF) added a new dimension to governmental 
supremacy. The co-operation between the British Military Mission and the Joint United 
States Military Aid Planning Greece (JUSMAPG) is analysed, with the aim of offering a 
realistic account of the allies' relationship. The chapter deconstructs the view that 
British and American policies were identical and their co-operation straightforward and 
undisrupted. 43 The revisionist view that complete American domination prevailed on the 
Greek scene of operation, following the British withdrawal, is also dismissed. 44 Instead, 
the chapter offers a more complex and balanced interpretation of the situation in Greece. 
Chapter four revolves around the issues of the post-civil war search for domestic 
reconciliation and stability. The character of the Greek politicians within the process of 
cabinet making and dissolution is e xamined. The failure of the Greek government to 
forrn a long-lasting administration is analysed. The failure of the Greek political world 
to embrace national reconciliation measures due to the pressure of the Cold War 
exaggeration is described. The chapter suggests that instability and extremism occurred 
not because of but despite British intervention. Although British support for King Paul 
and moderate cabinets played a role in Greece's political development, Britain exercised 
42 See: N. Psyroukis, History of Contemporary Greece, 1940-1967-IoTopla Tjq rbyxpovq,; E'u6zaq, 1940- 
1967 (Athens, 1975). S. Grigoriadis, History of Contemporary Greece, 1941-1974- Io-ropla inq E6yxPovlq 
E, U6&aq 1941-1974 (Athens, 1978). 
43 Averoff, By Fire and Axe-Owud Kai TucKo6pi, p. 267. 44 O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 173-175. 
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a light touch with regard to Greek domestic affairs. Partly as a result of this relation, 
Anglo-Greek amity in the foreign policy field was maintained. The relative importance 
of the Cyprus issue in the early 1950s bears testament to these good relations. 
Chapter five analyses the failure of the Centre experiment in Greek politics. The 
role of the Palace and the royal solution to the parliamentary deadlock is examined as 
well as the nature of royal politics. Foreign intervention in Greek affairs is also 
examined. The response of the Greek political world to the Papagos solution put into 
question the kind of government the Greeks wanted for themselves. Both the palace and 
the government looked to Britain for support and the British thus became an integral 
part of Greek political machinations. The chapter discusses also the American share of 
responsibility and the United States' objectives in the new system. This discussion 
reveals the essential unity of aims maintained by Britain and America. Both chapters 
four and five examine in detail the domestic aspect of Greek politics. These chapters 
refute the traditional claim of historians of Greece that the Palace enjoyed the Foreign 
Office's full support and that Britain was obsessed with imposing a right-wing 
monarchical government. 45 Instead, British aims are analysed in the light of British 
pursuit ofas trong a nd d emocratically e lected g overnment oft he Centre to moderate 
polarisation. The failure of the Greek government to fonn a strong and self-sufficient 
cabinet is explained, therefore, in terms of Greek internal developments. 
Chapter six examines the evolution of Greece's entry into NATO as a full 
member. The chapter attempts to moderate over-exaggerated claims regarding Greece's 
importance to NATO. 46 Instead, the chapter suggests that there were variety of reasons 
that convinced NATO's members to accept Greece into the North Atlantic Alliance. 
None was decisive in itself, rather it was the accumulation of perceived advantages that 
45 Markezinis, Political History-ffobriký Icropla, pp. 295-300. 46 A. Siapkaras, 'The Importance of Greece to NATO', Military Review (August 1961), 90-97. 
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led to the decision. The chapter also challenges the view that Greece's entry into NATO 
was solely an American objective. Instead, it gives a more rounded interpretation by 
analysing t he B ritish r ole int his d ecision-making. C ontrary tot he c ontention of left- 
wing historians, who portray Greece as capitulating to 'imperial interests', Anglo-Greek 
relations are explained in the light of mutual interests. 
19 
I Setting the Stage: 1941-1946 
From Resistance to Civil War 
In May 1941 the Gennans defeated Greek forces and their British allies. King 
George H accompanied by Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos, the cabinet, and the 
great bulk of the British and Greek forces were obliged to withdraw to Egypt. ' The 
government-in-exile established itself in Cairo, while the King removed himself to 
London. In occupied Greece a series of collaborationist cabinets -quisling- functioned 
under the Axis authorities, however the de jure Greek government recognised by the 
Allies was King George's H government-in-exile. 2 
Within a short time resistance began in occupied Greece. The Greek Communist 
Party - the KKE - was the first group to organise resistance. The Sixth Plenum of the 
Central Committee of the KKE in July 1941 endorsed a national front policy and called 
upon 'the Greeks, the parties and their organisations'to fonn a national liberation front 
to fight against any imperialistic power'. 3 As a result of its resistance activities the KKE 
gained considerable political influence among the Greeks. The National Liberation 
Front (EAM) was founded by the KKE on 27 September 1941. The declared aims of 
EAM included the I iberation of the nation from foreign elements; the formation of a 
provisional government by EAM after the liberation; and the safeguarding of 'the 
fundamental right' of the Greek people to decide upon the forin of their future 
government themselves. 4 Resistance to the Germans, however, was the priority that 
1 For an account of Greek-British relations during the pre-war period see, J. Koliopoulos, Greece and the 
British Connection 1935-1941 (Oxford, 1977). 
2 The Greek government, together with an army of 58,000 British, who had assisted the Greek Army 
against the Axis, were transferred to Cairo. Prime Minister was E. Tsouderos, a former Governor of the 
Bank of Greece and liberal by conviction, who also enjoyed the confidence of the conservative party. 3 KKE Official Documents 1940-1945-KKE Eximlya KElyeva, vol. 5 (Athens, 198 1), p. 39. For a map of 
Greece see: D. 1 p. 187. 
4 KKE Official Documents 1940-1945-KKE Exim7ya Kelyeva, vol. 5 (Athens, 198 1), p. 39. 
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swelled the numbers of EAM, appealing to members from diverse political 
backgrounds. 5 
Other resistance movements followed. Yet none managed to mobilise large 
segments of the urban and rural population as effectively as had EAM. General 
Napoleon Zervas created the National Republican Greek League (EDES) on 9 
6 September 1941. Although the republican General Nicolaos Plastiras nominally headed 
EDES the right-winger Zervas was its true leader. EDES was second only to EAM in 
members, although far less popular. Colonel Psarros founded the National and Social 
7 Liberation (EKKA). This was a third and even weaker organisation. To some extent a 
resistance movement represented each major political party. Yet despite the number of 
resistance groups, EAM was the most popular and powerful. Although exact numbers 
are lacking, it has been claimed that EAM had up to some two million members - 
8 
almost thirty per cent of the population. 
EAM's mass appeal was the result of its nation-wide operations. The other 
groups were purely regional in their activities. EDES operated in Epirus and EKKA in 
Rourneli. EAM developed a full political programme and established numerous 
subsidiary organisations, designed to enlist the support of all sections of the population, 
5 L. S. Stavrianos, 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A study in Resistance Organisation and 
Administration', Journal of Modern History 24 (1952), 42-54; History of the KKE-JOKI'pw IaroplacrOv 
KKE, pp. 387-89. 
6 General Nicolaos Plastiras had distinguished himself in the 1909 and 1922 military coups for his 
republicanisrn. He was in self-exile in Paris following a failed putsch in 1933. After the end of the civil 
war he created National Progressive Centre Union Party (EPEK). In the period 1950-52 he headed 
coalition governments of the Centre and advocated measures of leniency towards the communists. Zervas 
was a soldier and politician as well. In 1941 he founded EDES and in 1945 he resigned from the army to 
become a politician. He served as Minister of Public Order in 1947, in which he was noted for his harsh 
anti-Communist measures. In 1950 he joined the Liberal Party and served as Minister of Public Works in 
1950-51. 
7 K. Pyromaglou, National Resistance. EAM-EL4S-EDES-EKKA-E6vixý AvTlo-rauq. EAM-ELAS-EDES- 
EKKA (Athens, 1975); For an account of EKKA, K. Pyromaglou, George Kartalis and his Period 1934- 
195 7-0 r KapTaqq Kai H ExqX4 TOV, Vol. I (Athens, 1965). 8 Stavrianos, 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organisation and 
Administration', Journal ofModern History 24 (1952), 44. 
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whilst the other groups were primarily military in character. 9 EAM's appeal was 
strengthened by the fon-nation of the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), in 
March 1942.10 The KKE, therefore, through EAM/ELAS established itself as a 
dominant resistance power. A military Commander, or Kapetanios, was in charge. 
Thanassis Klaras, under the name of Aris Velouhiotis, became the political and military 
adviser to the first guerrilla band to go to the mountains to fight! 1 Thus the KKE by 
1942 had taken the lead as the most sophisticated force operating in Greece. 
Greece remained within the British zone of interest during the war years. British 
policy inG reece focused u pon m aintaining i ts i nfluence int he c ountry soastoh elp 
secure the 'traditionally British area' of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the 
long-term. In the short-term the presence of King George in London and the Greek 
government in exile under British protection also served to keep interest alive. One of 
the principle supply lines from Germany to Field Marshal Rommel in North Africa ran 
through Greece. As a result the British were keen to become involved in the direction of 
resistance activities in Greece. The Special Operation Executive (SOE) war organisation 
devoted its attention to the possibilities post-occupation resistance and sabotage. 12 
British contacts with the resistance organisations became more intense in 
October 1942, when SOE-Cairo decided to launch Operation Harling. Its objective was 
9 G. M. Alexander, The Prelude to the Tmman Doctrine (Oxford, 1982), p. 13. For a scholar account Of 
Greek occupation years: J. Hondros, Occupation and Resistance. The Greek, 4gony 1941-1944 (New 
York, 1983). 
10 EAM claimed that its members up until October 1944 rose to 1,500,000 members; the number is over 
exaggerated, however, there is no doubt that EAM was the most widespread Organisation in terms of 
members and sympathisers. N. Svoronos, 'The Main Problems of the Period 1940-1950 in Greek 
History', in Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 1-16. The dramatic rise of communist strength is dual 
to its double political and military nature. 11 From March 1943, Stefanos Sarafis was an ELAS commander, together with Velouhiotis and an EAM's 
political conu-nissar. S. Sarafis, ELAS (London, 1980), pp. 50,100,272. EAM representatives were taking 
part in ELAS's command dealing exclusively with political affairs. The position of the EAM 
representative was abolished in March 1944 when EAM and the KKE founded PEEA-its provincial 
government in the mountains. 
12 For an account of SOE activities in Greece see: R. Clogg, 'The Special Operation Executive in Greece', 
in latrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 109-111; B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', in Ph. Auty 
and R. Clogg (eds. ), British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London, 
1975) p. 7. Thereafter cited as British Policy; R. Clogg, 'Pearls from Swine', in British Policy, p. 192. 
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to blow up the Athens-Salonika railway and thus prevent the dispatch of Axis re- 
inforcements to North Africa. Three British commando teams - nine officers and three 
non-commissioned officers - led by Colonel Edward C. W. 'Eddie' Myers, with Major 
Christopher M. Woodhouse, as second-in-command, parachuted into central Greece. 
The operation was to be accomplished by Colonel Myers, ELAS guerrillas under 
Velouhiotis, EDES guerrillas under Zervas and other minor resistance groups. 13 On the 
night of 25-26 November 1942, they blew up the Gorgopotamos viaduct. This operation 
was SOE's greatest success in 1942. Initially, the intention had been for Myers' team to 
evacuate Greece thereafter. However, Myers received orders to remain in Greece to co- 
ordinate the activities of the various resistance movements. Keeping a general eye on 
political forces in Greece was also one of Myers' assigned tasks. Subsequently the 
British resistance and intelligence group became the British Military Mission in 
Greece. 14 The mission controlled the distribution of money, arms, and other supplies. 
Management of the British Military Mission was entrusted to the British SOE-Cairo. 
Although resistance activities continued, however, there was to be no other spectacular 
act of resistance organised by British and Greek forces. The amount of supplies and 
assistance that was provided by the British to ELAS to fight the Gennans was actually 
very limited. The reason for this was that the British did not intend to boost the 
communist forces. 
15 
13 For early resistance activities between the British and EAM see, E. W. Myers, Greek Entanglement 
(London, 1955); C. M. Woodhouse, 'Early British Contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942', Balkan 
Studies 12, no. 2, (1971), 347-354; R. Clogg, 'Pearls from Swine': the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and 
the Greek Resistance', in Ph. Auty and R. Clogg (eds), British Policy, pp. 167-208. C. Woodhouse, 'The 
National Liberation Front and the British Connection', in J. Iatrides (ed), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 81 -101. 14 E. W. C. Myers, Greek Entanglement (London, 1955), pp. 13-96; C. M. Woodhouse, 'Early British 
Contacts with the Greek Resistance in 1942', Balkan Studies 12, no. 2 (1971), 347-354. 
15 O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 56-57. E. Barker argues that British policy towards the various 
resistance movements in Greece 'seemed a matter of conflict' provoking civil war, in Barker, British 
Policy, p. 148; Sfikas also emphasises the negative effect of British assistance towards ELAS, for 
simultaneously challenging the Greek established order. Th. Sfikas, The British Labour Government and 
the Greek Civil War -01 A7yAoi EpyaTIK01 Kai 0 EUt7viK6q Eu(pbAioq, (Athens, 1996), p. 47. On this line, 
Vlavianos notes that the British assistance to ELAS has its share in the civil war that followed in that it 
cabled 'contradictory' orders after 1943. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 30. Sarafis refutes enormous 
British assistance to the KKE. Sarafis, ELAS, p. 278. KKE's future political strategy would prove that, 
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Despite British efforts to limit EAM's powers by mid-1943 the communists had 
managed to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of the government-in-exile and 
the distrust felt by most Greeks of the quisling cabinets. EAM dominated the resistance 
scene by combining both political and military power. Myers wanted the guerrillas and 
the government in Cairo to co-operate with each other. On 10 August 1943, Myers, now 
promoted to Brigadier, and his political adviser Major D. Wallace flew to Cairo with a 
guerrilla delegation to meet with the government-in-exile. The delegation consisted of 
six Greeks, representing the main resistance organisations. EAM secured four out of the 
six places. The aim of the delegation was to obtain recognition of their status as part of 
the armed forces of Greece from the Greek govemment-in-exile. The delegates had two 
main demands. Firstly, that King George H should declare that he would not return to 
Greece before the conduct of a plebiscite. 16 Secondly, that the Greek government should 
be broadened to include EAM's members, who should hold three portfolios within the 
new government: Interior, War, and Justice. These members should be able to exercise 
their powers from within Greece. 
The Foreign Office was appalled. 17 Rex Leeper, the British Ambassador to the 
Greek government based in Cairo, accused Myers of encouraging and empowering the 
communists. As a result, Myers was replaced by Chris Woodhouse as Commander of 
the British Military Mission in Greece. Republican claims also alarmed the Greek King. 
On 18 August 1943, King George cabled Roosevelt and Churchill, appealing for their 
support against the demand of the delegation to postpone his return to Greece until after 
regardless the British, the Party was inclined to claim for power. Of the same opinion are: O'Ballance, 
The Greek Civil War, pp. 75-76,85-86; C. Shrader, The Withered Vine (London, 1999), p. 52; C. 
Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece (London, 1976), pp. 27,3 6,64. In this sense both Sarafis and 
Woodhouse proved right 
16 The position of the King was always in debate in Greece. Royalists and republicans had been competing 
since 1920s. E. C. Myers, 'The Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August 1943', in Auty, Clogg (eds. ), British 
Policy, p. 166; C. Woodhouse, 'Summer 1943: The Critical Months', in Auty, Clogg (eds. ), British 
Policy, p. 137. 
17 Churchill supported the Greek King and monarchy in Greece, as a sign of political stability and 
proximity to the West. 
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a plebiscite. Four days later, the American President and the British Prime Minister 
replied to the King's telegram after their meeting in Quebec. Both supported 'his 
contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible'. 18 Churchill and 
Eden believed that Britain's post-war supremacy in G reece, c ould b est bes ecured by 
working through monarchy, an institution to which they also felt a strong attachment. 
Roosevelt did not object Churchill's sympathy for the old order of Greece, although he 
remained determined to avoid involvement in Greek affairs. 19 Greece and the Balkans in 
general, were considered by the Americans to be outside their area of interest in late 
1943. 
The Cairo meeting was a failure. Churchill, Eden, and British Ambassador 
Leeper, together with the Greek cabinet, refused the demands of the KKE. The 
delegation departed from Cairo within days of its arrival. Richard Clogg has written that 
'the total failure of the mission [ ... ] coupled with the evidence that the Greek 
government-in-exile had received of the strong commitment of the British government 
to the support of the King, was certainly a factor contributing to the outbreak of civil 
war between the rival groups'. 20 The agenda of the Cairo delegation, therefore, was 
crucial in establishing the course of future events. Churchill in particular was 
detennined to re-establish the pre-war order in Greece. 21 
In October 1943, anned clashes broke out between ELAS and EDES. What is 
known as the 'first round' of the civil war had begun. Throughout the autumn of 1943 
8 FRUS (1943): 4,14243,932-34: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec. 9 PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/37203 R6555, A. Eden to Leeper, 16 July 1943; 
FRUS (1943): 4,131-32: Aide Memoir, British Embassy to the State Department, 24 April 1943; R. 
Leeper, "en Greek Meets Greek (London, 1950), pp. 10,27-28; Wittner writes that Roosevelt shared 
Churchill's attachment to the old order in Greece and this is illustrated in that the American President did 
not object the return of the King in Greece. Wittner,, 4merican Intervention, pp. 10-11. The clash between 
royalism and republicanism was an old issue in Greek affairs including coups and plebiscites to demolish 
and restore kingship since the inter-war period. 20 R. Clogg, "'Pearls from Swine": the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and the Greek Resistance', in Auty, 
Clogg (eds. ), British Policy, pp. 192-194. 21 The Times, I September 1943. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 3,211/4, Churchill 
to the King of the Hellenes George 11,20 August 1943. 
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and the winter of 1944 the two main resistance organisations began a series of attacks 
against each other. Neither managed to score a victory - although EDES managed to 
repel ELAS units that had penetrated EDES territory in Epirus. 22 In an attempt to reach 
a political compromise Premier Tsouderos and Ambassador Leeper proposed, in January 
1944, that Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens, should act as Regent on the liberation of 
Athens from the Germans. Damaskinos would try to bring about a political 
understanding among all parties in Athens, before elections and a plebiscite on the 
return of the King were held. Tsouderos' aim was to pre-empt EAM's attempt to form 
its own government. 23 On 6 March 1944, the formal agreement of the political parties, 
excluding the KKE, over Damaskinos' Regency was achieved. Sofoulis, leader of the 
Liberal Party, was nominated as prime minister in the first post-war government. 24 
By that time the military hostilities between EAM and EDES had also come to 
an end. A conference started on 15 February 1944, at the Plaka Bridge, over Arachthos 
River inE pirus. E AM/ELAS, E DES a nd E KKA m embers all took part. Woodhouse, 
who as senior BMM officer, had a major role in arranging the Plaka conference. He had 
telegraphed to Cairo and emphasised that 'a solution must be found now, or Greece will 
go the way of Yugoslavia'. 25 On 29 February 1944, all parties concurred in the 'Plaka 
Agreement', which put an end to the first round of the civil war. The agreement defined 
22 Frazier notes that EAM began the 'first round' of the Greek civil war. Frazier, Anglo-American 
Relations with Greece, p. 3 1. On the contrary, Vlavianos states that EDES turned its army against ELAS, 
after arranging a cease-fire with the Germans. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 34. 
23 E. Tsouderos, Greek Irregularities in Middle East-Avc0paUeg M Mý0-j AvaroA4 (Athens, 1945), pp. 
78,85; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43676 R1440, Leeper's telegram, 27 January 
1944. King George had prornised to accept the Regent to soften tension until the plebiscite. Archbishop 
Damaskinos held republican views, and had avoided the internecine struggles during the occupation by 
focusing his interests on his flock. He therefore was a candidate acceptable to all sides. 
24 Thernistocles Sofoulis was republican politician and leader of the Liberal Party, Premier 1945-46, 
1947-49. George Papandreou also consented. He was a republican, anti-Communist centrist politician, 
prot6g6 of the liberal E. Venizelos during the 1920s. PM in 1944. Leader of the National Political Union 
in 1946. In 1950 he founded the small Social Democratic Party, an offshoot of the old Venizelist party; he 
served in short lived Centre coalition cabinets in 195 0-195 1. 25 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43681 R3430, Woodhouse to Cairo, 27 February 
1944. 
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the area of operations of EAM and EDES organisations, with EDES being confined to 
its heutland o Epirus. 26 
Nonetheless, on 10 March 1944, EAM announced the formation of the Political 
Committee of National Liberation (PEEA). The formation of PEEA came as a shock to 
most politicians in Cairo. 27 The Chairman of the PEEA was Professor Svolos, an 
authority on constitutional law. On 9 April 1944, PEEA organised free elections by 
secret ballot throughout 'free Greece' (areas under EAM-ELAS control) to create a 
'National Council' of 202 delegates. The KKE, through the election of its National 
Council, took another step in undermining the legality and authority of the non-elected 
govemment-in-exile. 28 
The British government was alarmed by the creation of PEEA. In order to disann 
EAM and weaken the communist plans for taking over power, the Foreign Office asked 
Tsouderos to invite EAM and other parties to Cairo for discussions over a post-war 
government. Leeper's diplomacy, aimed at rendering EAM impotent by enmeshing 
them in a non-communist government, which they would have no opportunity to 
dominate, was too subtle for some. It was derailed by King George's sudden refusal to 
appoint Damaskinos as Regent. The King feared that the regency would be the first step 
towards his loss of the throne. 29 
26 Woodhouse, Apple ofDiscord, pp. 303-304; Sarafis, ELAS, pp. 244-60. Subsequently it was an 
indefinite and short-term agreement, foreshadowing future escalation. 27 EAM during the Plaka negotiations demanded the formation of a Provisional Committee to form a post- 
war representative cabinet, which at that point had been rejected by both the representatives of the 
government and the representatives of the BMM on the grounds that the government-in-exile was the legal 
authority they all recognised. On PEEA see: Archive ofPolitical Committee offational Liberation 
(PEEA)- ApXcio Tqq Holirw4s EmTpon4s EOviK4q A 7raXcv0hpcoaqc (PEEA), (Athens, 1990). The KKE 
seemed to follow the steps of Tito, who in November 1943 turned his Antifascist Council of National 
Liberation into a 'provisional government'. 
28 Papastratis notes that the creation of PEEA reinforced Tsouderos' plan to force all political parties 
except EAM to join him openly in Cairo, and then blame EAM for not accepting a solution to which all 
the other parties had agreed. Papastratis, British Foreign Policy, p. 164. 
29 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43682 R3988, Leeper telegram, 14 March; PREM 
3/211/11, Churchill to Eden, 10 March 1944; FO 371/43683 R4476, Leeper telegram, 13 March 1944. 
27 
The charged political situation in Cairo was worsened when a crisis broke out 
amongst the 20,000 Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East. On 31 March 
1944, thirteen officers of the Committee of National Union of the Greek armed forces 
demanded that Prime Minister Tsouderos forms a government based on PEEA. 30 On 7 
April 1944 the Greek army mutinied. A soldiers committee assumed control of the First 
Brigade, just before it joined the allies in the Italian theatre of operations. Greek naval 
units, stationed in the port of Alexandria, supported the mutinies. The Second Brigade 
also declared its loyalty to PEEA. Many other units of the Greek army and navy 
declared themselves in favour of PEEA. The only notable exception was the Sacred 
Battalion, which remained loyal to the King and his government throughout the 
upheaval. The air force backed neither side. 31 As a result of the crisis, Tsouderos 
tendered his resignation. On 13 April 1944, the King appointed the liberal Thernistocles 
Venizelos prime minister. " 
The British wanted to restore order. Churchill declared that 'rebellious 
manifestations in forces will not be tolerated' and that the British government would 
33 
support 'the lawfully constituted Greek Government headed by the King'. Leeper, 
reinforced by Churchill's solid backing, telegraphed the Commanders-in-Chief that the 
Greek government should 'win a complete and bloodless victory and teach the Greek 
armed forces a lesson'. 34 The units with which the British dealt first were the First 
Greek Brigade, stationed in Egypt, and the Greek ships in Alexandria. On 16 April, 
30 j. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports (Princeton, 1980), p. 482; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 
KEW (PRO), FO 371/43728 R5316, Leeper telegram-198,3 April 1944; PREM 3/211/11, Leeper 
telegrams-208,209,5 April 1944. The King had appointed Emmanouel Tsouderos Premier in 1941 and 
left with him for Cairo after the German occupation. George was in charge of the Greek armed forces. 
Venizelos' leftist background was hoped to be a factor in reconciling the republicans. 
31 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 78-79. Thernistocles Venizelos is one of the main republican 
politicians to influence the developments of the period. 
32 Themistocles Venizelos is one of the main republican politicians to influence the developments of the 
period. Prominent in the National Political Union alliance together with Papandreou and Kanellopoulos, 
leader of the Liberal Party, Prime Minister for a while in 1950 and acting premier in 195 1. 
33 W. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 5 (London, 1952), p. 481. 34 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43701 R6035, Leeper's telegram, 15 April 1944. 
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Admiral Sir A ndrew C unningharn t hreatened t hat t he R oyal N avy w ould s ink a 11 t he 
ships of the Greek fleet 'within five minutes', unless they abandoned the mutiny. Six 
days later Admiral Voulgaris, Venizelos' new Commander-in-Chief, took over the 
ships. On 25 April, the fleet surrendered and following the British intervention, all the 
mutinous Greek troops laid down their arms. 35 As a result of the mutiny, the Greek army 
was thoroughly reorganised. Approximately half of it was put into internment camps. It 
is probable that had the British not intervened or supported the old established order, the 
Greek politicians, under the pressure of the mutineers, would have formed a new pro- 
Communist cabinet. 36 The mutiny underlined the inefficiency of the Greek government 
and the weakness of its mainstay: the army. 
While the army was purged, the political task of controlling EAM remained 
unsolved. Papandreou, a prominent ex-member of the Liberal Party, provided the 
solution. The KKE regarded him as a sympathiser. On the other hand Papandreou 
convinced British officials that he could wrest the political initiative from EAM. With 
their support he was appointed the new prime minister of the government-in-exile. 37 
A new attempt to rebuff EAM was organised. Papandreou summoned a 
conference in Lebanon on 17-20 May 1944, to which twenty-five representatives of all 
seventeen political p arties and groups were invited in order to seek a way out of the 
35 K. Alexandris, Our Navy During the War Period 1941-1945- To NavTiK6 Maq T? jv Ilcplobo Tov 
17611yov (Athens, 1952), pp. 148-150. Adn-dral Alexandris was the Commander-in-Chief to be replaced 
by Voulgaris. 
36 Col. Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos commanded the Third Brigade. Tsakalotos fought in the mutiny as well 
as under the British Eighth Army in Italy, earning the title of 'Rimini Brigade'. Later on he played a 
prominent role in the civil war of 1945-49 as a senior officer of the Greek national army. In 1952, he 
became Chief of Staff of the Greek Army. The right-wing stream claims that the mutiny in April was 
'planned by the Communists' in order to monopolise power. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 187. 
However, as Woodhouse noted PEEA was the occasion not the cause. Woodhouse, Strugglefor Greece, 
p-78. Vlavianos states that the mutiny was only the result of rise of republicanism. Vlavianos, Greece 
1941-1949, p. 38. 
37 Venizelos was forced to resign on the grounds that he was a KKE sympathiser. P. Kanellopoulos, Diary 
31 March 1942- 4 January1945-HpEpoMpo 31 MapTiou 1942-4 Iavovaplov 1945 (Athens, 1977), pp. 
553-554; Iatrides (ed. ), Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece 1933-1947, pp. 505-508; Papastratis, 
British Foreign Policy, pp. 175-76. 
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political impasse that had arisen. 38 Papandreou's plan was to disarm ELAS and 
incorporate EAM into the government. As one result of this, the National Anny coupled 
with ELAS's forces would be much stronger and more co-operative. 39 Papandreou 
announced that, in the case of civil war breaking out, the Greek government would 
appeal for allied support and call on the Allies to intervene openly. Within this context 
he proposed the formation of both a Government of National Unity and a National 
Amy. 40 
All representatives finally signed the resolution of what is called the 'Lebanon 
Agreement' or 'Lebanon Charter' on 20 May. The most important provision of the 
argument called for all guerrilla fonnations to be placed under the command of a 
government of national unity, in which five out of twenty relatively unimportant posts 
were reserved for EAM representatives. 41 Papandreou did not make a clear statement on 
the Communist demand that the King's return should be prevented. He noted that 'the 
Government of National Unity is to clarify the issue'. 42 Britain's support for Papandreou 
proved a successful gambit. Meanwhile the KKE disapproved of PEEA's 'cheap' 
capitulation and repudiated the agreement. 43 Churchill announced in the House of 
Commons, 'a hopeful turn in Greek affairs'. 44 The course of events served British 
interests. On 28 May, the Foreign Office instructed Leeper that Papandreou was to be 
38 G. Papandreou, The Liberation of Greece-HA7rcAcvffp(oo-1 rqq FU6&oq (Athens, 1948), pp. 54-56. 
39 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43731 R7608, Spears Telegram-278,13 May 1944. 
40 Papandreou, The Liberation of Greece- HA7rcAcv0tpcoo-1 Tqq E. UMog, pp. 67-70; P. Papastratis, 'The 
Papandreou Government and the Lebanon Conference', in J. Iatrides (ed), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 119- 
130. 
41 L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 3 (London, 1971), pp. 408409; Sarafis, ELAS, pp. 308-33; 
Papandreou, The Liberation of Greece- H A7rcAcv0ýpr, 0", r1q EU6. boq, pp. 73-80. 
42 Papandreou, The Liberation of Greece- H A7rc2zv0tpc00-17 Ti7q EAWoq, p. 76. 
43 Sarafis, ELAS, p. 334. KKE's power claim demands were almost equal to those made in Cairo in 
August 1943, also repeated on 4 July 1944 and rejected by Papandreou. KKE Official Documents- 
Exiaqya Kelyeva- 1940-1945, pp. 406-407. The KKE demanded inter alia the retention of four ELAS 
divisions under the command of ELAS. This divergence between the KKE's agenda, PEEA and the actual 
agreement underlined the stability of the Government of National Unity. This is one of the incidents that 
prove the complexities of the KKE's policy and smoothens the argument of right-wing orthodox historians 
of Greece that the Greek Communist Party had planned its attempt to take over power right after EAM's 
creation. For this argument see: Averoff, By Fire and Axe. 
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given 'the fullest support, and at all costs prevented from yielding to the insidious 
atmosphere prevalent in Cairo'. Leeper was also directed to keep in touch with his 
American and Soviet colleagues and ask them to back British actions. 45 
The Lebanon Charter and EAM's agreement to join the government of national 
unity facilitated the principal British objective regarding Greece: to prevent the KKE 
from seizing power after the German withdrawal and then to create a Greek government 
broadly acceptable to the Greeks to take over after the liberation. British policy 
regarding Greece in 1944 was based upon the principle of eliminating the communist 
threat and establishing a pro-British governmental scheme so as to secure 'our strategic 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean'. Eden's report on 8 August to the Foreign Office 
reads: 
If we are to maintain any political influence in SE Europe and, 
above all, our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean 
after the war, it is essential that Greece should be ruled by a 
Government friendly to us. [ ... ]I regard it as essential that British influence in Greece and the traditional connection 
between the two countries should be preserved, but unless 
British f orces c an bes ent in there isa serious danger that the 
Greek people, who still look to us for assistance, will lose faith 
in Great Britain and that a Government will c ome i nto p ower 
which would bring the country under Soviet domination. 46 
The next day the War Cabinet decided to despatch a 6,000 strong British force to Greece 
to secure peace after the German withdrawal from the country. Roosevelt and Stalin 
were informed of the British decision on 17 and 21 August respectively and raised no 
objection. 
47 
In order to prevent a communist attempt to seize power, the new Greek 
government organised a Conference at Caserta, near Naples, on 26 September 1944, 
44 House of Commons Debates, 1943-1944, vol. 400, col. 772, Churchill, 24 May 1944, Thereafter cited 
as HCDeb. 
45 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43731 R8331, Churchill minute, 28 May 1944. 46 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), 371/437 1 5, R1 2457, Eden memorandum, 8 August 1944. 47 H. Macmillan, The Blast of War: 1939-1945 (London, 1967), p. 575. 
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under the aegis of Papandreou and a British committee . 
48 General H. Wilson, C-in-C 
Middle East, called both ELAS and EDES representatives to Italy to receive instructions 
concerning the operations for the final phase of the liberation of Greece. Sarafis, Zervas, 
Papandreou, Harold Macmillan, Minister Resident at Allied HQ in North West Africa, 
Leeper and Lt. Gen. Scobie, newly appointed as General Officer Commanding Greece, 
all took part in the Caserta Conference. It was agreed that all Greek guerrilla forces 
would be put under the orders of General Spiliotopoulos, Military Governor of Athens 
and Attica, acting as representative of the Greek govenunent. Spiliotopoulos would then 
serve under the command of Lt. Gen. Scobie. The agreement decreed that no military 
action regarding Athens was to be taken, except on direct orders from General Scobie. 
In this way EAM was put under British command. General Othonaios, a figure 
respected by ELAS, was nominated as the future Commander in Chief of the Greek 
aMY. 
49 
On the eve of the German withdrawal from the Balkans, Churchill and Eden 
a 
were still concerned about communist activities in Greece and Soviet intentions in the 
Balkans. On 9 October 1944, Churchill flew to Moscow to conclude the 'Percentages 
Agreement' with Stalin. He suggested that the Russians might have ninety per cent 
dominance in Romania while the British ninety per cent in Greece; Yugoslavia would be 
shared on a fifty-fifty basis. The spirit, if not the details, of this Anglo-Soviet agreement 
had an important impact, for it served to define post-war territorial areas of control. 50 
The last German units left Athens on 12 October 1944, and on 18 October the 
Greek govenunent, backed by Lt. -Col. Sheppard, the British liaison officer with the 
48 The Greek Government of National Unity moved from Cairo to Italy on 8 September 1944, to prepare 
itself for its return to Greece. 
49 Sarafis, ELAS, pp. 382-389. The text of the 'Caserta Agreement' is reproduced in Iatrides, Revolt in 
Athens, pp. 311-313. Othonaios replaced Ventiris, the latter a strong anti-Communist. 50 For an account of the Anglo-Soviet agreement see, Churchill, The Second War World, vol. 6, pp. 197- 
99; S. Xydis, 'The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans of October 9,1944', Journal of 
Central European Affairs 15, (October 1955), 248-7 1. 
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Greek government, was established in Athens. 51 The first British troops under Lt. Gen. 
Scobie arrived on 14 October, and were augmented at the end of October by two 
brigades of the 4th Indian Division from Italy. The basic objective of British policy had 
proved successful: the communists had joined a government friendly to Britain. The 
most serious problem facing the new government was how to bring about the peaceful 
disarmament of the guerrilla formations and their replacement by a national army, 
without whose backing the government could not long hope to remain in place. 
The December Events 
In mid-October there were no serious clashes between ELAS and EDES. Small 
British units guarded principal ports such as Athens-Piraeus, Salonika, Patra, Preveza, 
Volos, and Kavalla. The rest of the mainland was under the control of the guerrillas. 
Zervas with his headquarters at Ioannina held most of Epirus. ELAS with its 
headquarters at Lamia held Macedonia, Thessaly, Roumeli, and the Peloponnese. The 
islands were controlled by both ELAS and the Greek authorities, except Crete, which 
remained under German control until after their final surrender in May 1945. Therefore, 
EAM/ELAS had three quarters of the liberated territory under its control. 52 
The peace did not last long. Disagreement between ELAS and Papandreou arose 
over military issues. The Greek forces in the Middle East, ELAS and EDES 
organisations would have to be disanned in order to form the new National Army. But it 
soon became clear that Papandreou did not intend to disband the brigade most loYal to 
the King, the Third Brigade. 53 ELAS regarded the retention of the Third Brigade as a 
51 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/43694 R 16803, The Situation in Athens, 15 
October 1944. 
52 Leeper, Nen Greeks Meet Greeks, p. 85. 53 The Third Brigade or Rimini Brigade formed the bulk of the re-organised ME forces after the April 
1944 mutiny and consequently was formulated to be anti-Communist. It arrived in Athens on 9 November 
1944 from the Italian front to Athens to support Papandreou's cabinet. Its strength was nearly 2,800 men 
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breach of trust. On 7 November, Papandreou declared that he was planning to dissolve 
EAM before the Third Brigade, which would arrive in Athens from Italy on 9 
November. 54 The KKE was convinced of Papandreou's anti-Communist feelings and 
therefore called for mass demonstrations against the government. 
Leeper wrote in his diary on 7 November 1944 that he did not expect the facade 
of unity to last and that 'ever growing lawlessness by EAM in Athens' was about to 
explode. 55 The British government prepared itself to face a communist insurgency. 
Churchill wrote to Eden, that 'we should not hesitate to use British troops to support the 
Royal Hellenic Government under Papandreou'. 56 Indeed General Sarafis, military 
commander of ELAS, noted that he had been warned by Lieutenant General Scobie, 'to 
bear in mind that a guerrilla army is not able to face a modem army with heavy arms, 
57 tanks, aircraft and a fleet at its disposal'. British reinforcements were despatched from 
Italy to Greece. There were, however, few heavy weapons and no tanks in Greece. The 
Greek air force was weak. On 17 November two RAF squadrons and a Greek squadron 
flew i nto t he m ain a irfield at Athens, to be greeted by the Prime Minister in person. 
Another three RAF squadrons arrived by the end of the month. At the end of November 
Scobie had nearly twenty-three thousand troops under his command, though not all were 
combatants. 
58 
The refusal of the KKE to disarm ELAS led to the military confrontation 
between ELAS and the Anglo-Greek government forces in December 1944. As the dates 
including just over 200 officers, coupled with a British force of about 8,000 men. General Tsakalotos, 
Forty Years Soldier of Greece-Eýp&Ta Xp6via ETpa-rxý, vol. I (Athens, 1960), p. 5 87; Woodhouse, 
The Strugglefor Greece, p. 114; H. Macmillan, War Diaries, vol. 1 (London, 1984), p. 595. ELAS armed 
strength at the time of the liberation in mid-October 1944 was 5,240 officers and 43,700 other ranks. 
Sarafis, ELAS, p. 276. Therefore, the non-communist part of the army enjoyed a distinct superiority of 
force. 
54 G. Papandreou, The Third War-0 Tpi-roq 176)xpoq (Athens, 1949), pp. 202-03, Leeper, Hen Greek 
Meets Greek, p. 92. 
55 Leeper, Hen Greek Meets Greek, p. 92. 56 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, p. 250. 57 Sarafis, EL4S, pp. 291-92. Scobie was the British officer designated to represent the Allied Commander 
in liberated Greece. 
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drew near for the dernobilisation of ELAS, EDES and the Third Brigade, tension 
increased. Siantos - from PEEA - and Sarafis - from ELAS - asserted that they would 
not disband ELAS unless the Third Brigade was also disbanded. On 18 November, the 
KKE Political Bureau decided that 'if a political solution was not found, the ELAS must 
be prepared for a clash'. 59 In a show of force the six EAM ministers in the Government 
of National Unity resigned on 2 December. 
The direct cause of the fighting was EAM's demonstration on 3 December in 
Syntagma (Constitution) Square, Athens. The demonstration turned violent when police 
panicked and began firing at the demonstrators as they advanced across the square in the 
direction of the police headquarters. The 'second round' of the civil war, or the 
'December Events', h ad b egun. 'Maintain o rder in Athens', C hurchill c abled S cobie, 
'defeat EAM. The ending of the fighting is subsidiary to this. I am ordering large 
reinforcements to come to Athens'. 60 
Britain was determined to put down the insurgency. General Scobie ordered all 
ELAS units to leave Athens within seventy-two hours and on the following day he 
declared martial law. On 5 December Scobie committed his British troops to the fray. 
Scobie commanded the 4h Indian Division, the Greek Third Brigade, a parachute 
brigade and an armoured brigade, a total of nearly 20,000 combat troops. In the first 
three weeks of the fighting in the Athens-Piraeus area, ELAS held the upper hand, 
however. The Tatoi airfield and some 800 RAF headquarters and ground staff personnel 
were cut off in the northern suburb of Kifissia. The Kalamaki airfield was insecure and 
the ground routes from and into the city centre were under ELAS's control. 
58 Ibid, pp. 291-293. 
59 Y. Ioannidis, Memoirs-Avqqv4aeiq (Athens, 1979), pp. 329-33. J. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party 
(London, 19 82), pp. 170-17 1; Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 48; Shrader claims that Scobie should be blamed for polarisation over the demobilisation of ELAS, which brought the armed conflict. Shrader, The 
Withered Vine, p. 39. 
35 
Consequently, the port facilities were limited and there was, in Macmillan's words, no 
csecure place' of operation for the British . 
61 Between 13 and 16 December, however, 
two British divisions, a tank regiment, two brigades and other supporting units landed in 
Piraeus. Meanwhile, the ELAS forces of General Sarafis continued fighting their usual 
enemy: the EDES forces of General Zervas. 62 
Operational control of the Anglo-Greek forces were entrusted to Maj. Gen. John 
L. I. Hawkesworth. By 20 December General Hawkesworth had secured his base at 
Faliron and began attacking ELAS supported by artillery and aircraft. On 27 December, 
Hawkesworth's forces took control of the southern half of the city, except the Athens- 
Piraeus road. The tide had turned against ELAS although fighting continued. The role of 
the British forces during the December events was decisive even if they did not do the 
bulk of the fighting. British troops used tanks to secure main communication lines such 
as Sygrou and Kifissias Avenue and to defend the city centre and governmental 
buildings. In terms of offensive operations, British troops were limited to cutting ELAS 
off from Athens-Piraeus Avenue, so as to free Piraeus harbour and allow supplies to 
reach Athens. 63 The Greek units conducted the rest of the fighting. British intervention 
64 to key points, however, radically changed the course of the events against EAM . 
On Christmas Eve, Churchill and Eden flew to Athens for a first hand look at the 
emergency. This was a definite proof of Churchill's determination to oppose the 
communists' insurgency. On 26-28 December, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, the leaders 
of K KE, E AM/ELAS, the American and French Ambassadors, Colonel Popov of the 
60 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, pp. 252,254. According to Farakos: 17,000 men of ELAS 
took action in the December Events; 11,000 of Papandreou's forces; 8,000 of British Army. Farakos, 
ELAS and Power-O EAAE kai H Eýovala, vol. 2, p. 117. 61 Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 40; Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 227. See Map D. 2, p. 188. 62 O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War 1944-1949, pp. 104-105. 63 In December the Greek government forces constituted of. 4,000 men (Rimini Brigade), 500 (The 
Sacred Battalion), 3,000 (Athens City Police), 1,000 (X Organisation); 9,000 men (4h Indian Division-3 
infantry brigades), 2,000 (Airborne Brigade), 1,000 (Armoured Brigade), 1,000 (Battalion, Leicestershire 
Infantry Regiment); 50,000 (ELAS), 10,000 (EDES). Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 176. 64 G. Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-O EUIVIK6q Ey(pbAiog, vol. 1, p. 72. 
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Soviet Military Mission and Greek national governraent officials agree to appoint as 
Regent Archbishop Damaskinos, to take office, on 31 December 1944. On 3 January 
1945, a well-known republican General Nicolaos Plastiras, recently returned to Greece 
from self-imposed exile in PaTis, was appointed as prime minister. 65 
The 'second round' of the civil war effectively came to an end on 15 January. 
Although ELAS troops had defeated EDES and occupied most of the country they had 
been forced to abandon Athens. 66 The formal end of the December Events was a 
political settlement between the new govenunent and EAM, signed at a seaside villa in 
Varkiza, a small resort on the outskirts of Athens, on 12 February 1945. Under the terms 
of the Tarkiza Agreement', ELAS agreed to disarm. In return the Plastiras government 
promised amnesty for political crimes. Martial law was lifted, civil liberties guaranteed 
and the K KE w as r ecognised asaI egal p olitical p arty. E AM w as tobep ennitted to 
continue as a political organisation. A plebiscite on constitutional issues and elections 
67 
would be held in one year, followed by elections. As a result of the 'Varkiza 
Agreement', ELAS surrendered its arms, although a few 'hard core' party members, like 
Aris Velouhiotis, refused to comply and fled to the mountains. Other EAM-ELAS 
members left for Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. 68 ELAS officially ceased to exist. 
The Development of a Full Scale Civil War 
From the Warkiza Agreement' onwards the Greek government moved steadily 
to the Right. On 17 February 1945, the right-wing Populist Party led by the prominent 
conservative politician Konstantine Tsaldaris, which had been totally dismantled under 
65 W. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma (London, 1947), pp. 103,192-93. 66 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, p. 252. 67 The terms of the Tarkiza Agreement' are included in Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, pp. 320-24. 68 O'Ballance puts the number of ELAS fighters who crossed over into Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
at about 4,000. O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, p. 113; The right-wing historian Kousoulas estimates 
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the Metaxas dictatorship, was re-established in Athens. The Populists presented the 
King and themselves as the bulwark against communism. The moderate republican 
Venizelist Liberal Party, represented by Thernistocles Sofoulis, began to switch its 
allegiance to the right-wing group. 'White terror' governmental. measures against the 
communists grew. These included arrests of communist suspects, the strengthening of 
rightist organisations such as Grivas' 'X' to control the Army and Gendarmerie and 
reduction of the leftist press. 69 The right-wing shift of the government was also 
consolidated by the appointment of Admiral Petros Voulgaris as a new caretaker 
premier to conduct the first post-war elections, following Plastiras' resignation on 7 
April 1945. Voulgaris had proved his anti-Communist bent during the army purge of 
70 April 1944. 
On 26 July 1945, the victory of the Labour Party over Churchill's Conservatives 
in Britain came as a shock to the Greek political world. The Labour government seemed 
to represent the British 'socialism in one country'. 71 Greek conservatives feared that the 
British Labour government would distance itself from them. 72 These fears, however, 
were not realised. Bevin was an aggressive and anti-communist Foreign Seretary 
following Churchill's path. Prime Minister Attlee was not charismatic but strengthened 
Bevin's anti-communist strategies and backed every effort to weaken the Soviet threat. 
Attlee a nd B evin c ontrolled t he c abinet, w hich p revailed t he d ecisions of the Labour 
Party. The Left had only four representatives in the government of minor political 
importance and consequently possible debates within the cabinet were easily dissolved. 
The foreign policy of the Labour government continued Churchill's pursuit to maintain 
23,000 communists in Albania, 20,000 Yugoslavia, 5,000 Bulgaria. Kousoulas, The Price offreedom, p. 
149. 
69 General Ventiris, whom Plastiras appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, had promoted the 
penetration of extreme right-wing organisations within the army. Ventiris, in fact, was one of the leaders 
of IDEA a right-wing organisation, which prevailed over the Greek Army and in May 195 1, was to play a 
role in Papagos' resignation from the post of Cornmander in Chief. 70 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 161-62. 
39 
73 
British imperial interests in the Middle East against the Soviet Union. On 11 August 
1945, Bevin submitted a memorandum on British policy towards Greece to the Cabinet, 
stressing the continuity with Churchill's line. He also spoke of the need to contain . 
communism. 74 B cvin n oted int he H ouse ofC ommons t hat t he L abour government's 
foreign policy regarding Greece would remain almost entirely the same as that of his 
predecessor. 75 
The situation in Greece was exacerbated by the continuing conflict between the 
Right and the Left. Right-wing groups, such as Lt. Col. George Grivas' X sought to 
root out the former supporters of EAM/ELAS. In the KKE too militants were 
increasingly in the ascendant. In May 1945 Zahariadis returned from the German 
concentration camp at Dachau and resumed the leadership of the KKE from Siandos. 76 
Zahariadis at the Seventh Party Congress on 4 October 1945 noted that 'if this mess 
continues, every Greek will have to take to the hills'. 77 In order to avoid a new crisis 
Leeper suggested Voulgaris to resign in October 1945. After a month of uncertainty 
71 K. Morgan, The British Labour Governments 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985), p. 93. 
72 Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 120. Alexander, Yhe Prelude to the Thiman Doctrine, pp. 125-26. 
73 Morgan, The British Labour Governments 1945-1951, pp. 56-81. 
74 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/48277 R13856, Memorandum by Bevin, II August 
1945; FRUS (1945): 8,136-137: British Embassy to Department of State, II August 1945. 
75 HCDeb, 194546, vol. 413, cols. 289-91,16 August 1945. 
76 Following the decision of the KKE to remain officially committed to the establishment of a more 
equitable social order in Greece by peaceful means, the Central Committee of the KKE proceeded with 
the organisation of Self Defence (Aftoamyna); an intelligence and propaganda organisation created to co- 
ordinate defensive actions to protect the KKE from 'monarcho-fascist terrorism. Woodhouse, The 
Strugglefor Greece, p. 163; History of the KKE-A0K1, U10 Io-roplaq Tov KKE, pp. 526-535.0. Smith, 'Self- 
Defence and Communist Policy 1945-1947', in L. Baerentzen, J. 0. Iatrides and 0. Smith (eds), Studies 
in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, pp. 159-178. EAM threatened to abstain from the 
election given the governmental measure, the 'white terror', against the KKE sympathisers and the 
consequent falsification of the electoral results and polls. Sofoulis and his Liberal Party also consented 
with EAM, characterising the election day 'pitiful electoral comedy'. FRUS (1945): 8,170: MacVeagh to 
the Secretary of State, 7 October 1945; Sarafis, After Varkiza-Meric Tj B6PKi(a, pp. 127-134. McNeill, 
The Greek Dilemma, p. 180. 
77 History of the KKE-Aoq,, uio IoTopics rou KKE, pp. 526-535. The KKE established in cities and towns 
throughout the country an intelligence network based on Communist 'cells' with the purpose of collecting 
information, supplies, money, recruiting and terrifying non-Communist sympathisers. These cells were 
known as yiajka. O'Balance, The Greek Civil War, p. 142.0. Smith, 'Communist Perceptions, Strategy 
and Tactics, 1945-1949', in J. Iatrides and W. Linda (eds), Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and 
Its Legacy (Pensilvania, 1995), pp. 87-120. 
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over the new prime minister, a new stopgap government was formed under Liberal 
Sofoulis in November 1945 to conduct elections on 31 March 1946. 
Greek political instability had become an international issue. On 27 November 
1945, the respective American, British and French Chiefs of the Allied Mission for the 
Observation of the Greek Elections (AMFOGE) arrived in Athens, headed by the future 
American Ambassador to Greece Henry Grady. 78 The mission signified the beginning of 
American involvement in Greek affairs. This did not, however, threaten British interests 
in the area; on the contrary, it added another power to act as an anti-communist 
watchdog. 
In the meantime, the Second Plenum of the KKE Central Committee, which met 
on 12 February 1946, initiated the 'third round' of the civil war. It agreed upon a dual 
strategy of continued political action and build-up of military force. This was signalised 
by KKE's decision to abstain from the election of 31 March 1946, as announced on 22 
February, and the birth of the 'Democratic Army of Greece' (DAG), the successor of 
ELAS, in the autumn of the same year. 79 According to Zahariadis' speech at the Seventh 
Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1950, the Second Plenum 'in effect decided 
that the new armed struggle should begin'. 80 
The elections called for by the 'Varkiza Agreement' were finally held on 31 
March 1946, under the proportional system. The result was in accordance with the 
intentions and manipulations of the majority of the Greek political world. The KKE 
boycotted the election. It had already decided that 'the new anned struggle should 
78 FRUS (1945): 8,185: MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1945. AMFOGE was composed 
of more than 1,200 British, French and American observers, under the American chief observer Henry F. 
Grady. 
79 KKE's radical decision to abstain was based on political grounds and suppression of the communist 
voters and sympathisers. On the KKE's decision to abstain see, G. Mavrogordatos, 'The 1946 Election 
and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War', in J. 0. latrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 181-195; Vlavianos, 
Greece 1941-1949, pp. 189-224. DAG or DA is used in the text as DA for reasons of convenience. 8'N. Zahariadis, Ten Years qfFight-JtKa Xp&ia 176AIq (Athens, 1978), p. 28. 
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begin'. 81 The right-wing Populist Party, headed by Tsaldaris, won a majority of 206 
seats out of 354.82 The election of March 1946 was a critical development marking the 
evolution from occupation and civil strife. The right-wing party, even before the 
election, had driven former ELAS partisans back to the mountains. This process gained 
momentum int he e lection a Ithough t he g overnment e xacerbated an already polarised 
political situation. The plebiscite to decide the future of the monarchy prescribed by the 
Warkiza Agreement' was held on 1 September 1946. It too confirmed the re-emergence 
of the pre-1941 political order. Many who had no love for the monarch voted in favour 
of his return merely because they regarded the monarchy as the best guarantee against a 
communist accession to power. On 27 September 1946, King George H set foot on 
Greek soil for the first time since he had fled in April 1941. He would remain on the 
throne until his death in April 1947. 
The elections signified a new era for Anglo-Greek relations. On one hand, 
British policy was based on a determination to retain British military presence until the 
Greek governmentw as able to restore law and order. The ForeignOfficehoped that 
Greece's political leaders would join together in the face of the Communist threat and 
establish a government of national unity or, at least, a two-party government in which 
the moderate Right would join forces with the Centre and moderate Left. On the other 
hand, however, the Labour government declared its intention to be released from 
interfering in Greek politics. This new direction was to be implemented by Clifford 
Norton, who replaced Rex Leeper as Ambassador on 7 March 1946. Bevin instructed 
Norton to support the Populist government of Tsaldaris but to coax the Greeks towards 
81 Zahariadis, Ten Years ofFight-&KaXp6vial761jq (Athens, 1978), p. 28. 92 The main political factions were: the Populists under Tsaldaris, the Liberal Party of Sofoulis, National 
Union under Kanellopoulos, Papandreou, Venizelos, the National Liberal of Gonatas-Zervas and the 
KKE-EAM. AMFOGE estimated that out of a total population of 7,500,000 people only 70 per cent of the 
names on the lists belonged to valid registrants, 13 per cent being invalid and 17 per cent of doubtful 
validity. Cmd. 6812 Report of the AlliedMission to Observe the Greek Elections (London, 1946) pp. 18- 
29; R. Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece (London, 1987), p. 18. On I September 1946 the plebiscite 
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a policy of peace, constitutional freedom, parliamentary institutions and financial 
stability. 
83 
British ambitions for limiting intervention in Greece were, however, undermined 
by a renewed escalation of violence by the communists. On 26 October 1946 Marcos 
Vafeiadis (Marcos) announced the creation of the Democratic Army of Greece under his 
command. The guerrillas numbered no more than 13,000 men, yet fighters experienced 
in resisting the Germans more than balanced the advantages that government forces had 
in numbers and material. The squatter camps of neighbouring Yugoslavia, Albania and 
Bulgaria were laced with mountain trails suitable for moving men and supplies. 84 
Within this context of communist aggression, it was obvious to the Greek 
govenunent and its British allies that the Greek National Army (NA) needed vast 
improvements before it could defeat the guerrillas. In December 1946, the NA 
manpower ceiling was 100,000 men, along with almost 35,000 gendarmerie. Units of 
Rural Defence (MAY) and Units of Pursuit Detachments (MAD) were set by the Greek 
85 General Staff to act as local home guards in October 1945. None of these formations, 
however, was well equipped. Few were properly trained for their duties. Many lacked 
combat motivation. The Greek Navy too was in poor shape. The outlook of the Royal 
Hellenic Air Force was also dismal. It consisted of fifty-four British-made obsolete 
aircraft and fewer than 300 battle-trained pilots. Greek finances precluded the purchase 
of more aeroplanes, and the Germans had confiscated the only state aircraft factory. 
Greece had no petroleum refineries, no munitions manufacturers, and no facilities for 
was held, 68,4 per cent brought King George back. AMFOGE did not supervise the plebiscite, but did 
control the electoral registers. 
83 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/58679 R 3748, Foreign Office to Norton, 13 March 
1946. 
84 H. Jones, 'A New Kind of War'(Oxford, 1989), pp. 19-2 1; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 179-80,187-88. 
85 Averoff, By Fire andAxe, p. 191; Eudes, The Kapetanios, pp. 274,278. One of the main tasks of both 
orgamsations was to counterbalance the conununist Aftamyna 
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overhauling aircraft or for making spare parts. 86 The Greek government, for all its 
posturing, was in poor shape to fight the communists. 
86Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 190-19 1; M. A. Campbell, E. W. Downs, and L. V. Schuetta, The 
Employment ofAirpower in the Greek Guerrilla War, 1947-1949 (Maxwell Air Base, 1964), p. 8. 
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11 In Search of Security: 1947 
The Maximos Government: The Test of the Centre 
As a result of the escalation of the civil war a new round of political negotiations 
started in Athens. On 8 January 1947, the Foreign Office instructed Norton to press 
Prime Minister Tsaldaris to form a centrist coalition. ' British diplomats wanted power- 
sharing between the parties of the Right and the Left. Despite the assertion ofs ome 
historians that Britain favoured a right-wing govenunent in Greece, the consistent 
British aim was the establishment of a moderate government of the Centre. 2 MacVeagh, 
the United States Ambassador to Greece, also urged Tsaldaris to form a right-wing 
coalition of the Centre. 3 Tsaldaris, however, was unwilling to surrender the position of 
his right-wing party. He proposed instead that elections should be held. Both 
ambassadors rejected the Greek premier's proposition. They argued that there was no 
constitutional reason for new elections. Moreover, such an act would undermine 
stability of the institutions of government and encourage further unrest. 4 
The Anglo-American determination to create a moderate and stable government 
forced Tsaldaris' hand. On 10 January, he consented to the broadening of the 
government. A new cabinet would be formed under a compromise prime minister with 
the Populists and Liberals serving as joint vice-premiers. Negotiations started between 
the Populists and the Liberals over seats in the cabinet. Sofoulis, however, demanded 
the premiership. In order to enhance his claims to leadership he championed a 
1 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66994 R1 13, Norton to Foreign Office, 8 January 
1947. 
2 Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-Iaropla Tov EUqVIK06 EpqvAlov Hompov, vol. 1, pp. 174- 
176. 
3 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66994 R78, MacVeagh to State Department, 8 
January 1947; FRUS (1947): 5,4: MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 11 January 1947. It was believed 
that such an act would satisfy the claims for power of the insurgents and bring the warfare into an end. 
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5 
programme of amnesty, re-organisation of the army and a new election. Tsaldaris, had 
no intention of offering Sofoulis the premiership. He was unwilling to weaken his party 
by co-operating with moderate politicians of the Centre such as Papandreou, 
Kanellopoulos and Venizelos from the National Political Union (EPE). Moreover the 
hard-core Populists Gonatas and Zervas, refused to serve under the Liberals. Three days 
after the talks had begun they ended in failure with each participant accusing the other 
of intransigence over the distribution of power. 6 On 23 January, disagreement over the 
balance of power between the Liberals and the right-wing Populists caused the collapse 
of Tsaldaris' premiership. 7 
Dimitrios Maximos, an elderly Populist and ex-govemor of the National Bank, 
was drafted in a stop-gap prime minister. He took the oath as Premier, leading a 
coalition cabinet of the Centre, on 24 January 1947. Maximos enjoyed the approval of 
the Palace. He was a neutral figure, acceptable to the parliamentary parties, and, as 
Norton put it, 'no one imagined that at the age of seventy-three and after [a) long 
8 
absence from politics he wanted the job'. The coalition cabinet consisted mainly of 
Populists, Liberals and the National Political Union (EPE). Tsaldaris remained powerful 
because he became Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EPE were 
allotted important posts. Zervas became a Minister but without portfolio as a result of 
Norton's refusal to countenance a more important post for him. The British Ambassador 
pointed out that Zervas was known to advocate extreme measures against the Left; his 
4 See footnote 1. Tsaldaris, a purely Populist and right-wing politician, would have preferred new 
elections with the aim to form again a purely right-wing cabinet and avoid negotiations with the Liberals 
and the powers of the Centre and Left. 5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66995 R 460, Norton to Foreign Office, 10 January 
1947. 
6 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66996 R 578, Lascelles to Foreign Office, 14 
January 1947. 
7 FRUS (1947): 5,9-11: Marshall to Athens, 21 January 1947. 
8 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66998 R 15 15, Norton to Foreign Office, 3 
February 1947. 
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appointment c ould d estroy t he g overnment's c hances ofp roj ecting am oderate i mage 
both at home and abroad. 9 
In the short-term British and American objectives were realised through the 
formation of the Maximos government. A cabinet of the Centre had been created. 
Although some centre-right politicians had joined the cabinet (Kanellopoulos, 
Papandreou, Venizelos) there was no change in policy: the military campaign against 
the guerrillas would still be pursued. Yet, the Maximos coalition was extremely fragile. 
The Left, which would have preferred a more friendly government under Sofoulis and 
the Liberals denounced the new cabinet as a 'fraudulent product of British intrigue' bent 
on perpetuating Tsaldaris' 'reign of terror'. 10 King George H predicted that it would be 
very difficult for the new cabinet to function. Norton, although he liked the 'clever and 
moderate' Maximos, agreed. Paul Porter, Head of the American Economic Mission, 
who arrived in Greece in mid-January, reported that Maximos was 'the most non- 
partisan, moderate and co-operative personality in Government' but that his government 
was little more than a 'loose hierarchy of individualistic politicians'. " 
The Maximos cabinet had to cope with a series of problems. First, and most 
important, of these were the continuous communist attacks and the inadequacy of the 
National Army. By early 1947 the Democratic Army had managed to build an 
impressive force, operating as bands or 'groups', each consisting of seventy to one 
hundred men and called 'Military Formations'. In February 1947, Marcos had about 
13,000 fighting men organised in seven commands under his authority. These 
commands were in turn headed by political commissars or 'kapetanios'. The DA had 
9 Markezinis believes that the Maximos government was a Greek test to find the most acceptable 
combination to the Americans. He notes that it served the transitional period until the 'real' application of 
the Truman Doctrine. Markezinis, Political History-HoAmK4 Icropla, vol. 2, p. 307. However, the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine in just two months time, weakens this theory. 
10 History of the KKE-J0K1, U10 Iaroplaq Tov KKE, pp. 564-67. 11 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66998 R1524, Norton to Foreign Office, 3 
February 1947. 
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established pennanent headquarters in the north-west comer of the country, close to 
Lake Prespa on the Greek side of the Albanian and Yugoslav borders. The Grammos 
and Vitsi mountain ranges provided a natural fortress that protected the Democratic 
Army against the National Army. This location was also near to the Democratic Army's 
supply centres outside the country. 12 An important factor that strengthened the 
Democratic Army was the organisation of 'hit and run' attacks by bands of communist 
fighters a gainst i solated p olice a nd a rmy s tations. The advantage of the 'hit and run' 
strategy was that it weakened the strength and unity of the National Army by spreading 
its units into different micro-operations. 13 Thus, the Democratic Army challenged the 
National Army with guerrilla warfare. 
On paper the National Army should have had little difficulty in crushing the 
opposition. The nominal strength of the National Army at the beginning of 1947 was 
100,000 men, organised in five divisions and seven independent brigades; an increase of 
almost 15,000 men had been authorised as a result of Spiliotopoulos' (Chief of General 
Stafo visit in London in November 1946.14 The National Army, however, trained by the 
British Military Miss. ion for regular warfare, was inexperienced and ill equipped for 
counter-guerrilla mountain operations. 15 During 1947, the Greek National Army 
attempted to apply a strategy of 'encirclement' supported by the British Military 
Mission Commander Rawlins and American officers. 16 This strategy involved attacks 
on particular communist headquarters or isolated communist hubs. The drawback of this 
'2 Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 203-4. This eventually would prove a decisive fortress to support 
Communist insurgency operations. 
13 GES/DIS, The Greek Army during the Bandit War: The First Year of the Bandit War 1946-0 EUIVIK6; 
Xro=6; K=6 'rov AvTiavppopiaK6v Aycbva, (Athens, 197 1), pp. 65-66; Th. Tsakalotos, Forty Years 
Soldier of Greece- Eapdvra Xp6via ETparicbrqý Tq(; EUMoc, vol. 2, (Athens, 1960), p. 5 1. 
14 The British government had agreed to finance the improvement and increase of the National Army. On 
the Greek-British economic agreement in: Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-Icropla Tov 
E, Ujv1K06 EyýpvAlov HoAtluov, vol. 1, pp. 120-123,237-239. 
13 The National Army, as already mentioned, moved to Egypt after the Germans occupied Greece to 
continue their serni normal activities in training camps under the aegis of the allies. 
16 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/893, Rawlins, Review of the Anti-Bandit 
Campaign, 22 October 1947. 
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strategy was that it left many areas unprotected against the depredations of the 
insurgents. This favoured the Democratic Army, in that it could counter-attack after the 
National Army had withdrawn. Another implication of this strategy was that the 
National Army needed high manpower levels to extend control over the cleared targets. 
Thus 'hit and run' warfare offered numerous advantages to the guerrillas. 17 
Several other factors offset the DA's numerical disadvantages. An unknown but 
significant number of Greek civilians were assisting the communist fight. " The 'hit and 
run') missions terrorised settlements throughout Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace and 
yielded conscripts for the Democratic Army. 
The country's inadequate road system severely limited army pursuit. The 
National Army had no armoured force, except for a few British-made Centaur tanks. But 
these 18-ton tanks armed with small 50-millimetre cannons were virtually useless 
because they were unable to climb mountainous terrain under their own p ower. F ew 
passageways in the Greek countryside were paved and once motor vehicles left the main 
arteries, they had to reduce s peeds toI ess t han f ifteen m iles p er h our. As ingle r oad 
connected Athens in the south to Salonika in the north-east. Along the west coast the 
only north-south highway was the Yannina-Arta-Agrinion road. Across the northern part 
of the country, a single west-east link ran from Yannina to Trikala and Larissa. 
Moreover, the Yannina road wound through a low-lying coastal stretch between sea and 
mountains and provided an excellent opportunity for guerrilla sabotage and ambush. 19 
On 18 February, King George H asked Norton and MacVeagh to authorise an 
increase in the National Anny's strength to revive morale otherwise, he feared, 'serious 
and widespread breakdown of discipline'. 20 The Maximos government would be tested 
on its ability to put an end to the warfare and bring peace and stability to the country. 
17 Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, pp. 241-242; Shrader, The Withered Vine, pp. 216-18. 18 O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, p. 146. 19 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece 1941-1949, p. 205. 
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Changing the highest echelon of command would show its determination to defeat the 
enemy. Consequently, on 19 February 1947 George Stratos, Maximos' Minister of War, 
convened a meeting of the Supreme National Defence Council (ASEA) with the aim of 
boosting military organisation and morale. Lt. Gen. Ventiris replaced Lt. General 
Spiliotopoulos as Chief of General Staff although Spiliotopoulos was retained as Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff . 
21 Plans to improve the equipment of the army, the Units of 
Pursuit Detachments (MAD), the Units of Rural Defence (MAY) and Commando units 
were announced. 22 In February 1947 the general plan of the governmental forces was 
war on all fronts. The army, gendarmerie, MAD and MAY would all be used. The army 
thereafter would concentrate in spring 1947 and start continuous military attacks of 
large scale and duration in order to press the enemy to the defeat. 23 The rest of the forces 
would focus on the civil control of the Communists. 
Yet the bellicose rhetoric emanating from the Greek government did little to hide 
its parlous state. It could not afford to pay for serious military operations. On 17 
February Paul Porter cabled to Washington that the Greek state was virtually bankrupt, 
since it spent more than fifty per cent of the national income on non-productive 
purposes. The budget deficit was vast, inflation was rampant and the Greeks were 
20 FRUS (1947): 5,27-28: MacVeagh to Marshall, 19 February 1947. 
21 GES/DIS, Archives of the Greek Civil War 1944-1949-ApXcia TOv EUqVIK06 EuýpvAlov HoMpov 1944- 
1949-(thereafter cited as GESIDIS Archives-ApXcla) Av(bTaTov Euppof)), tov Uvwfj; ARI)va;, 11paKTucd 
q; I I" cmvc5ptdac(o; Tou AIEA, 19 Ocppouapiou 1947'(Minutes of the I la'Meeting of Highest Board 
of National Defence- ASEA, 19 February 194T), vol. 3, iceim. (text) 58, p. 333. ASEA was composed 
after the 'Varkiza Agreement' in February 1945 to co-ordinate the armed forces; headed by the Prime 
Minister, Greek Ministers of War, Navy, Air and the three Chiefs of General, Navy, Air Staff, 
representatives of the British and American military missions were also included. After the end of the civil 
war it became General Staff of National Defence (rEEGA). 
22 Lack of discipline and organisation were among the main drawbacks of the NA. Tsakalotos, Forty 
Years Soldier of Greece - Eap6vTa Xp6via EipaTioýýq rj,;, EUd6oq, pp. 52-55. 23 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcia, Avagopd ITpaTof) 4 Ocppovapiou 1947 (Army Report, 4 February 1947), 
vol 3, kcim. 42b, p. 259. The war preparations had already started since the days of Lt. Gen. 
Spiliotopoulos to be accomplished and further enlarged under Lt. Gen. Ventiris. The new plan differed to 
the old one in that the DA would be fought all over the country, as opposed to the local nuclei throughout 
1946. 
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overcome by a sense of national helplessness manifested in the conviction that the 
country should be taken care of by its rich allies. 24 
On the same day the Foreign Office also concluded that there were three ways in 
which the situation in Greece could evolve. First, if Britain and the United States agreed 
to aid the country jointly after 31 March, or, if the Americans undertook to shoulder the 
entire burden the Greek government would fight it out with the communists to the bitter 
end. Second, if Britain and the United States decided to abandon the country, the Greek 
National Army might still manage to crush the guerrillas during the campaign planned 
for the spring. This seemed a doubtful prospect, however, as, according to Norton, the 
Democratic Army was now operating throughout Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and the 
Peloponnese with a high standard of organisation, discipline, and morale. Third, if 
Western aid ceased on 31 March, and the guerrillas survived the spring campaign, the 
morale of the N ational Army w ould p robably c ollap se and its units would panic and 
dissolve. Maximos' cabinet would then be compelled to negotiate terms with the 
communists from a disadvantageous if not hopeless position. 25 Norton stressed the need 
to continue assisting Greece using familiar geopolitical arguments. The threat of a 
political breakdown in Athens, in the light of the communist uprising, would render 
Greece highly vulnerable to Soviet imperialism. 26 This would damage the security of 
Europe and the Western world. It would affect areas of particular importance for 
Britain: the sea routes of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Soviet threat to 
Turkey and Iran, coupled with the civil war in Greece were interpreted as threatening 
Europe and the Northern Tier. The threat of Soviet imperialism in the Eastern 
Mediterranean gave the impetus, therefore, for keeping Greece within the British sphere 
24 FRUS (1947): 5,20: Paul Porter to Clayton, 17 February 1947. 
25 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67000 R2359, Norton to Foreign Office, 14 
February 1947. 
26 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032 R1900, Norton to Foreign Office, 5 
February 1947. 
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of influence. The Greeks were told of the 'permanent' and 'unchangeable' nature of 
British interests in the area and in the political developments of the country. 27 
The Truman Doctrine 
Geopolitical arguments were not, however, the whole story. The bleak prospects 
of the Greek goverriment were matched by the bleak prospects of the British 
government. British financial problems preoccupied Whitehall. The issue of whether or 
not to extend financial assistance to Greece, an obligation that expired in March 1947, 
dominated the ministers' agenda. On 29 January, Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer sent a note to Prime Minister Attlee arguing that in light of the weak British 
economy aid to Greece should be reduced. The Chancellor warned the Prime Minister 
that the British cabinet should judge national defence 'not only against the more distant 
possibility of armed aggression, but also against the far more immediate risk of 
economic and financial overstrain and collapse'. 28 Ranged against Dalton were the 
Minister of Defence, Albert Alexander and, more importantly, the Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin. Bevin argued that Britain should finance an expansion of the Greek 
National Army. To balance increased aid to Greece, British forces in Greece would be 
reduced to one brigade of four battalions, which would itself withdraw after the retreat 
of the Red Army from Bulgaria. Bevin's plan garnered support from the Chiefs of Staff 
The British govemment had a clear choice set before it. 29 
On II February Hugh Dalton asked for a final decision on ending aid to Greece 
which, in his view, 'from the end of the war onwards had received thirty nine million 
11 YrIHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 
1947,86.1,16740, Avayopdt Tou npcapmý Ayvi8q (yTqv Ekkqvucý rIpcapeta A01jv6)v, 23 Iavouaptou 
1947 (Ambassador Agnidis' Report to the Greek Embassy in Athens, 23 January 1947). This note 
confutes the revisionist argument that the Greek government had nothing to expect from London after 
March 1947. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 236. 28 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), T 236/1037,11 January 1947; H. Dalton, High Tide and 
After: Memoirs 1945-1960 (London, 1962), pp. 193,197. 29 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/16 C. P. (47) 34, Policy towards Greece and 
Turkey, 25 January 1947. 
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pounds, almost without result'. If the British cabinet desired to save money, he argued, 
it would have to 'start immediately, by cutting the expenses towards Greece'. Greek 
instability and the inability of its politicians to work together to improve their country 
reinforced Dalton's scepticism about the value of further aid. He complained to Bevin 
that 'the Greeks were not helping themselves. 30 
Bevin himself was in a quandary. On one hand, he believed that the KKE should 
be contained. On the other hand, he recognised that the Greeks remained incapable of 
defending themselves and the burden on Britain was heavy. The British Foreign 
Secretary therefore turned to the United States to seek assistance. 31 The two British 
ministers agreed that the United States would be asked to subsidise the Greek fight 
against communism and western interests in the area. Bevin cabled 'a strong telegram to 
the United States for the sole purpose of bringing matters to a head'. Attlee consented to 
an attempt to make 'the Americans face up to the facts in the eastern Mediterranean'. 32 
On 21 February, Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in Washington, was 
instructed to deliver a note to George Marshall, the American Secretary of State, 
announcing that, given British financial woes, Britain could not sustain its assistance to 
Greece after the end of March 1947.33 
Anglo-American negotiations followed the British note. The Truman 
administration was in little doubt that if the British could not contain the communists in 
30 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032 R2440, Dalton to Bevin, 13 February 1947. 
31 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032 R2443, Dalton to Attlee, II February 1947. 
32 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/37/2, Memorandum Bcvin, 18 February 
1947. 
33 YrIHPEZIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS 
(YIA), 1947,46.1,21503, Avagop6rrou Tac0,86pl aro I`cvuc6 Ent'rexcio T. Tp=6,21 Mapriol) 1947 
(Tsaldaris' Report to GES, 21 March 1947); FRUS (1947): 5,32-37: British Embassy to State 
Department 21 February 1947; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032 R 1900, 
Foreign Office to Washington, 21 February 1947. There are various interpretations of the British decision 
to withdraw aid from Greece: saving manpower, political pressure from the leftist part of the Labour 
government and public opinion, financial necessity, apply pressure on America, change of strategic 
priorities, deliberate plot of the British government to force the Americans to enter the international arena. 
In R. Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece, pp. 132-156. The most convincing possible reason 
focuses on creating a joint Anglo-American alliance to contain communism in the area. Jones, A New 
Kind of War, p. 3 3. 
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the Eastern Mediterranean alone, the Americans would have to join in. 34 This did not 
mean, however, that they were necessarily willing to accept a British timetable or a 
British prescription for action., As a necessary prelude to any Anglo-American 
agreement the Americans demanded the continuation of the British presence in Greece 
and co-operation in coping with the civil war. Greece would be included in the 
American sphere of interests but the British had also to support the undertaking. 35 
London welcomed the American response. If the Americans agreed to share the 
burden then London would agree to loan the Greeks two million pounds for the 
maintenance of their army until June 1947. The British would also retain five thousand 
men in Greece, as well as non-combatant forces, and would assist the Greek army and 
the Americans in organising the anti-Communist campaign. On 3 March, Ernest Bevin 
announced that British troops would remain in Greece. However, their number would be 
reduced in April to five thousand men. 36 Contrary to t he v iew oft he h istorians w ho 
claim that the British note signified the end of a significant British role in Greece, 
Anglo-American negotiations yielded a condominium of the United States and Britain 
in Greek affairs. 37 On 12 March, the Truman doctrine, expounded to Congress by the 
President af ew d ays a fter t he conclusion of Anglo-American negotiations on Greece 
was greeted with enthusiasm by the British. 38 
34 H. Truman, Memoirs: 1946-1952, vol. 2, (London, 1956), pp. 124-25; M. P. Leffler, A Preponderance 
ofPower (Stanford, 1992), pp. 144-146. 
35 FRUS (1947): 5,72,79-8 1: State Department to British Embassy in London, I March 1947; PUBLIC 
RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/5, DO (47) 6, Cabinet Defence Committee, 3 March 1947; 
FO 371/67034 R 3190, British Embassy to the State Department, 4 March 1947. 
36 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), T 236/1038, OF 48/39/1,3 March 1947; FRUS (1947): 5, 
87: The Secretary of State (Marshall) the Embassy in Greece, 4 March 1947; PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/5, DO (47) 6,3 March 1947; FO 371/67034 R3190, British Embassy to 
the State Department, 4 March 1947; CAB 128/9, CM 30 (47) 2, Cabinet decision to confirm maintenance 
of BMM in Greece, 18 March 1947. 
37 Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-Io-ropla Tov EUjviKo6 Ey(pvAlov, vol. 1, p. 429. Vlavianos, 
Greece 1941-1949, p. 15 1; Jones, A New Kind of War, pp. 17-3 5. This argument is approached mainly by 
revisionist historians. 
38 Declaration of the Truman Doctrine, www. whistlestop. org, 12 March 1947; The Truman Doctrine has 
been considered as a revolution, which made the United States abandon isolation. For those writers who 
perceive a revolution, see: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York, 1956), p. 106; F. F. Lincoln, United 
States'Aid to Greece, 1947-1962 (Germantown, 1975), p. 166; W. H. McNeill, Greece: American Aid on 
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The Greek government too was pleased with this double alliance. President 
Truman received grateful reports from Prime Minister Maximos and Liberal leader 
Sofoulis, who declared that the American help would serve 'the aim of reconstructing 
and rehabilitating peace and freedom' and that all Greek requests for help from the 
United States 'have become true'. 39 On 18 March, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Tsaldaris cabled the Chiefs of Staff, War and Finance Offices that, to his great 
relief, the British government would offer the NA two million pounds for military 
equipment and another one million pounds for economic assistance until the Congress 
ratified the financial assistance to Greece. 40 The right-wing world, according to the 
newspaper Kathimerini declared that salvation now had two fronts: America and 
England . 
41 Tsaldaris declared that he 'continued to remain faithful primarily to Great 
Action, 1947-1956 (New York, 1957), p. 35. More balanced interpretations against a revolution include: 
J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of Cold War (New York, 1972), p. 318; B. R. Kuniholm, 
Origins of the Cold War in Near East (New York, 1980), p. 427. MacVeagh insisted that the northern tier 
was the 'front line' between the 'two parts of the world' and that the Greeks were in the 'front-line 
trenches'. Leffler writes that the Truman Doctrine was the US policy to counterbalance Soviet influence in 
the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean scheduled since 1946. Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power, p. 12 1. Critics of the Truman Doctrine include: W. A. Williams, The Tragedy of. 4 merican 
Diplomacy (New York, 1959); Wittrier, American Intervention; Sfikas writes that 'the policy of support to 
authoritarian and repressive right-wing regimes in the name of freedom' have been applied, in Sfikas, The 
British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War, p. 143. Among defenders of the Truman Doctrine: 
H. Feis, From Trust to Terror (New York, 1966); J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, 
1982); B. R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (New York, 1980); D. R. McCoy, 
The Presidency ofHarry S. Truman (U. Press of Kansas, 1984). The Truman Doctrine was significant in 
that it was the first step in containing communism; it nonetheless left a number of unresolved questions 
regarding the duration of American aid, not solved before NATO creation. A. Bullock, The Life and 
Times ofErnest Bevin (London, 1983), pp. 470-47 1. Bullock, as opposed to the historians who believe 
that the Truman Doctrine was the American response to the British note to abandon Greece, deems that it 
was a diplomatic success on Bevin's part to divert the American approaches over Greece so as to gain 
American protection of the Middle East, accordingly, British presence in Greece was the price the British 
had to pay to keep the Americans in the Mediterranean. 
39 YrIHPEZIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 
1947,129.1,1614, Ava(popd Tou I'l. Otxov6gou-rKoýpa aito qv Mjvucý r1peapcia GqV O1UdLGtyKT0V 
aTov r1peAvicoupy6 M64týto, II Mapriou 1947 (Report by P. Economou-Gouras from Greek Embassy in 
Washington to Prertiier Maximos, II March 1947). 
"' YnHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 
1947,46.1,21502, Avagopdrou TaaX86pij 7rpo;, co I-EE, 18 Mapriou 1947 (Tsaidaris' Report to GES, 
18 March 1947). 
41 Kathimerini, 16 March 1947. On the contrary liberal newspaper To Vima stressed that America would 
undermine Greek independence whereas Rizospastis declared that the Left would continue fighting. In To 
Vima, 14 March 1947; Rizospastis, 14 March 1947. 
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Britain. 942 To the western world and the pro-westerners the Truman Doctrine signified 
the strengthening of western ties and security under an Anglo-American front. It 
signified neither the end of British commitment in Greece nor the end of Britain as a 
world power. 
43 
The War in Greece 
One of the major reasons why the Greeks continued to look to Britain was the 
reality of military operations. The rhetoric of the Truman doctrine was vital for the long- 
tenn future of Greece. Yet the Greek state could, all too easily, have collapsed in 
military defeat in 1947 before American aid made itself felt. 
In February 1947 the KKE Politburo had decided to give priority to the military 
struggle. Nicos Zahariadis, the General Secretary of the KKE, informed his mentor, 
Stalin, in a memorandum dated 13 May 1947, that 'the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the KKE [ ... ] consider the armed struggle as the most important'. 
44 By 
the spring of 1947 the Communists had committed themselves to an all out armed 
confrontation with the government. Indeed, contrary to the claims of pro-leftist 
historians, who claim that it was the 'white terror' that had caused the KKE to act in 
self-defence, the Party had a clear intention of seizing power through military victory. 45 
On 6 April 1947, Nicos Zahariadis crossed the border to visit Moscow and 
Belgade to discuss the military option with his c omrades. 0n 17 April, hew rote to 
Marcos that 'the problem of re-provisioning had already been solved'. The Democratic 
Anny would have as its main objective 'the capture of Salonika' and should create a 
42 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67003 R6476, Norton to Foreign Office, 8 May 
1947. 
43 Markezinis, Political History-HoAITIK4 IOTopfa,, vol. 2, p. 291; Vlavianos, History of Greece, p. 236; Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics, p. 15 1; Stavrianos, Greece: American Opportunity, pp. 184-185. " Quoted from the 14 December 1947 edition of A ygi by 0. L. Smith, 'Self-Defence and Communist Policy', in Baerentzen, Iatrides, Smith (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949, p. 
175. The decision was subsequently taken with the understanding that both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs 
would provide the necessary material help. 
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16 
'free domain' in Macedonia, Thrace and probably Epirus. in May Zahariadis assured 
Stalin that the Party was capable of beating the Maximos government and coul raise an 
army of 50,000 men to liberate northern Greece with the 'assistance of all our foreign 
friends'. 47 On 27 June, Miltiadis Porfyroyennis, representing the KKE Central 
Committee, told Eleventh Congress of the French Communist Party in Strasbourg that 
henceforth 'all of the political, military and international conditions existed for the 
creation of a Free Government in Greece'. He demanded the support of all Communist 
parties in the struggle for final victory. 48 
The military i mPlications oft his c all e merged o ver t he s urnmer of 1947. T he 
Communists decided to abandon their guerrilla strategy, create a conventional army and 
fight a positional war against the National Army. 49 On 11 September, the Third Plenum 
proceeded to formulate the strategic dimension of the KKE's plan to seize power. The 
new strategy was based upon the 'Lakes Plan' - the creation of a free area in Macedonia 
and Thrace with Salonika as its centre. This area would be held by a Democratic Army 
50 triple in size to around 60,000 men by the spring of 1948. 
45 History of the KKE-JOKIP10 Iaroplaq TOv KKE, pp. 564-569; 0. Smith, 'Self-Defence, in Baerentzen, 
Iatrides, Smith (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949, p. 160. 
46 Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, pp. 238-240. 
47 Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 240. It has been suggested that after Zahariadis' discussion with 
Zhdanov, Stalin promised the KKE full support. Moreover, that Zahariadis, after being re-assured of 
Stalin's support, asked Tito and Dimitrov their supplementary military assistance. J. Baev (ed. ), The 
Greek Civil War in Greece-O Eyýp6Aioq 176)xpoq ainv EW&a (Athens, 1997), pp. 143-146. 
48 Woodhouse, Strugglefor Greece, p. 212; Eudes, The Kapetanios, p. 296. The Central Committee of the 
KKE met in Belgrade in September 1947 with only six out of the twenty-five regular members of the CC 
in attendance. The resolutions of this plenum, one of the most controversial in the history of the KKE, 
presented Marcos and the other advocates of guerrilla warfare with afait accompli. The ad hoc CC 
changed the military, political and strategic dimension of the Party. KKE Official Documents 1945-1949- 
KKE Er! 677pa Kelpeva 1945-1949, vol. 6, pp. 245-247. 
49 Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 261. The author believes that the decision for transition was 'ill-timed' 
and 'ill-advised' and led the KKE to defeat because its recruitment and military problems had not been 
solved. For a leftist critic of the decision to convert to conventional warfare see: S. Vukmanovic, How and 
Ry The Peoples'Liberation Struggle Met with Defeat (London, 1950). so 0. L. Smith, 'Communist Perceptions, Strategy and Tactics, 1945-1949', in J. latrides, W. Linda (eds. ), 
Greece at the Crossroads. The Civil War and its Legacy (Pennsylvania, 1995), p. 107. In that article, 
material from the newspaper Avgi published in 1979-1980 is examined; accordingly the official version of 
the KKE that the Third Plenum took place in the mountains on 12-15 September 1947 is refuted. KKE, 
Qfficial Documents 1945-1949-Em677ya KciyEva 1945-1949, vol. 6, p. 245. The Umnes Plan' was bound 
to fail, as it required tripling of its strength in a short time and the necessary assistance from abroad had 
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The aggression and confidence of the KKE caused uproar in Greece. The Right 
accused the KKE of threatening to undermine the territorial integrity of Greece. The 
leader of the opposition party, Sofoulis, accused the Maximos government and the Right 
of not having put down the Communist claims for power. The Left greeted 
Porfyroyennis' announcements with concern. Some members of the EAM tried to 
interpret his statement a merely a political gambit. 51 Indeed the Central Commission of 
EAM proposed to the government its own plan to lessen tension. They suggested that 
EAM s hould t ake p art int he c abinet, t hat ag eneral. a mnesty should be declared that 
Parliament should be dissolved, and that the anti-Communist intelligence organisations 
should be disanned. 
The Greek government was far from sanguine, however. Maximos interpreted 
Zahariadis' visit to Moscow as constituting a formal authorisation from Stalin to create 
a communist 'Free' government. 52 This raised the danger that any territory lost in 
northern Greece might never be won back. Governmental Greece would shrink and 
'Free' Greece would grow until the latter choked the fonner. In the light of this new 
danger, the leaders of the opposition, the liberal Sofoulis and the conservative 
Tsouderos made an attempt to reach a political compromise between the communists 
and the government. Prime Minister Maximos made it clear, however, that the only way 
for reconciliation with the KKE to occur was if the Communists laid down their arms. 
In p ractice nop arty f elt itw as sow eak that it had to capitulate and the negotiations 
carne to a fruitless end. Their aftermath was ferocious govenunent campaign against the 
Left. On 9 July, three thousand KKE sympathisers were arrested on the pretext that a 
not been secured. The plan of the KKE to take over before the Americans could penetrate militarily into 
Greece was not viable, as the KKE had no military means to support its plans. 51 History of the Greek Nation-Icropla TOv EUqviKob EOvovq, vol. 16 (Athens, 2000), p. 143. 52 Averoff, By Fire and Axe-Oom6 Kai TacKo6pi, p. 224. Unfortunately, there are no records available to 
verify the agenda of the meeting. 
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communist revolt was imminent. 53 Even the American Ambassador MacVeagh 
had 
doubts at to the wisdom of these draconian measures. 54 
By the spring of 1947 the Democratic Army had occupied wide expanses of 
territory to which the governmental forces had no access. The one advantage that 
accrued to the Greek National Army - an advantage that was to be accentuated 
by the 
Communists' evolving strategy - was that for the first time they had a tangible target. 
The National Army planned, given the victories of the Democratic Army in the 
mountains of northern Greece, to clear the rebels from the south to the north. The focal 
point of operations would, therefore, be central Greece. Here government forces hoped 
to achieve two objectives. First, to cut the route for supplies and reserves to the south 
and, second, to cut the line of retreat to neighbouring countries. The area in which the 
counter-attack would start included the regions north of Karpenisi, and Mount Agrafa, 
to the cities of Karditsa and Trikala. The whole operation was given the code-name 
'Terminus', symbolising the aim of the National Army to put an end not only to the 
55 
military power of the rebels but the political and social upheaval in Greece as well. 
Four. operations would form the main Operation Terminus. First, was Operation Aetos 
(Mount Agrafa, Aheloos river, Nevropoli, Koziakas, Metsovo) starting on 5 April with 
estimated duration of fifteen days. 56 Second, was Operation Ierax (Hasia, Antihasia, 
53 Averoff, By Fire and Axe-ft-rid Kai T=06pl, p. 244. Partsalidis, Passalidis, Loulis, Gavriilidis from 
the Political Bureau of the KKE included. Arrests were followed by exile without trial to camps of 
concentration in Makronisos for the conscripts, Trikeri for the detainees, Yaros for the convicted. 
54 FRUS (1947): 5,23 1: MacVeagh to the Secretary of State, 13 July 1947. 
55 FENIKO EIIITEAEIO ZTPATOY /AIEYE)YNI; H ILTOPIAM ETPATOY, ATHENS (FgZ/AlZ), 1947, 
1067/A/44, Avagop6t Atot", roý) ITpmrid; AvTtcrrpdLTijyoi) A. FtavTt; ý, 3 MapTioi) 1947 (Lt. Gen. 
D. Giantzis' Report, 3 March 1947); GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcla, rEI 7[pog A icat B ld)g= ITpaTob, 
'EittXcipqaq N6Tta kai AI)TU(d Tou MadxRwva, 8 (Deppouapiou 1947'(GES to A and B Army Corps, 
'Operations in the South and West of Alialanona' 8 February 1947), vol. 3, keimeno 45, p. 285. The south 
to north modus operandi had been perceived before the replacement of Spiliotopoulos; to be perfected 
during the spring under Ventiris. GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcla, 1,1 i: TpaT, d - rcvuc6 ZXt8jo I: TpaTtd; Sta TqV 
8tc4aymýv T(ov cmxetpýac(ov TEPMINOYZ, 10 MapTioi) 1947'(1 st Army Group, General Plan of the 
Terminus Operation, 10 March 1947), vol. 3, keim. 73, p. 398.; GES/DIS, Archives- Apvcla, " ZTPaTid, 
, rcvtK6 IXt8to Irp=t4 Sta qv &4aycoyýv T(av cnqctpýac(ov TEPMINOYI, 10 MapTtoi) 1947'(1 Army 
Group, General Plan of the Terminus Operation, 10 March 1947), vol. 3, keirrL73, p. 402. 
56 GES/DIS, Archives-Apvela, B 16ga F. Tporrob, 'AtaTayý Eicqctpý=ov- Yuv0qgcrrtK6 6voRa 'AcT6; ', 23 
MapTiOl) 1947' (B Army Corps, 'Operation Command, Code name 'Eagle', 23 March 1947), vol. 4, keim. 
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Kambounia) planned to last for ten days starting on 11 May. Third, was Operations 
Korax (north of Metsovo to the Albanian border, Kastoria) and Kuknos (Mount 
Olympos, Pieria). Finally Operation Pelargos (Mount Ossa, Pylio) was due for launch in 
July depending on the success of its predecessors. 
The British lay at the centre of 'Terminus'. The command of the National Army 
was a joint Anglo-Greek effort. The decisions of the Supreme Council of National 
Defence were taken by the Greek Prime Minister, the Ministers of Air and Navy, the 
Chiefs of the General Staff, Navy and Air sitting alongside the commanders of the 
British Military Mission, the British Naval Mission and British Air Mission. " Yet 
'Terminus' did not meet its target. Although the Democratic Army under the command 
of Marcos Vafeiadis lacked both men and munitions, they were able to mount a number 
of successful 'hit and run' missions against the attackers whilst themselves avoiding 
58 being pinned down in protracted battles. The Communists had a wholly superior 
intelligence operation to the government. The command of the Democratic Army was 
very often informed about the plans of the National Army before the attacks themselves 
took place. Many units of the NA became demoralised by their lack of effectiveness. 
Moreover the mountains and inaccessible landscape protected the Democratic Army 
defenders. 59 Although the government force eventually cleared the ground, its 
cumbersome operations seemed lack-lustre when compared to communist daring. 
4, p. 56; D. Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War, 1945-1949-OAvriavupopiaK6qAyo5v, 1945-1949 (Athens, 
1956), p. 224; GES/DIS, Archives- ApXE! a, 8il McpaXFia rpaycto rl), T1poqopt6)v A2, 'AO-Tio 
IIXýpoyoptd)v, 28 MapTiou 1947'(8d' division, Information Office A2,28 March 1947), vol. 4, keim. 8b, 
pp. 79-80. According to the estimations of the Information Office of the 8"' division the number of the 
insurgents in the Operation Aetos area rose to approximately 2,000 men. The Greek historian D. Botsikas 
writes that the guerrilla forces in the Operation Aetos area did not exceed the 1,200-1,500 men. 
Zafeiropoulos agrees with the estimations of the Information Office of the 86' division. Zafeiropoulos, 
Anti-Bandit War-0 Av-rtavpqqpiaK6q Ayd5v, 1945-1949, p. 224. 
57 GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcla, AV6)TaTov ZuRpobktov EOvtKfl; AR-6vil; 23 (Deppovaplou 1947 (Supreme 
Council of National Defence, 23 February 1947), vol. 3, keirn. 58, p. 333. 5'T. Psimenos, Rebel in Agrafa 1946-1950-Avr4Mq ar'Aypaýpa 1946-1950 (Athens, 1985), pp. 78-79. 59 History of the Greek Nation- IcTopla Tov EUqV1K06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 145. According to Woodhouse 
the weaknesses of the NA consisted of. low morale, shortage of manpower, Marcos's tactical astuteness in 
launching a major diversionary attack. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 205-207. 
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An additional reason for the failure of the National Anny to decisively defeat the 
communists was the 'Epirus Manoeuvre' executed by the DA by the beginning of July 
1947. The 8h division of the National Army, having turned its attention towards Mount 
Grammos, had lcft unguarded the exits to Konitsa and Ioannina. The command of the 
Democratic Army grasped the opportunity to launch attacks in the Epirus area from 7 
July. On that day the 8th and 15'h divisions of the National Army were about to attack 
the forces of the Democratic Army in the area of Eptahorion. Two of the commands of 
the Democratic Army attacked the forces of the National An-ny at the point were the 
latter were scheduled to meet and co-ordinate their forces. That was the weak point of 
the National Army. The Democratic Army attacked with approximately one thousand 
five hundred men (three battalions and one party of two companies from the Hasia 
command and another three battalions from the Epirus command). The tactic aimed at 
breaking the pincer movement of the NA at first and then beating the enemy from the 
rear. The first success of the Democratic Army came on the night of 6 to 7 July. Parts of 
the 8h division of the NA in Zouzouli area were forced to retreat. The advance of the 
governmental forces was stopped . 
60 Simultaneously, however, successful counter- 
attacks occurred against the 15th division. 61 
Epirus, the Democratic Army's hub, became the focal point of the warfare. On 
12 July, the National Army was overcome in Derveni. This development caused panic to 
the national forces, which started evacuating the Grammos area to cover the interior of 
Epirus. The 8 th division turned to Konitsa and a great part of the 9th division, scheduled 
to attack Grammos, was sent to Ioannina by track. The next day, the Democratic Army 
troops occupied the Bourazani bridge threatening the road to Ioannina. Eventually the 
situation was stabilised in favour of the NA. New government air and land forces 
60 Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War-0 AVTIUVUUOplaK6q Ayd5v, 1945-1949, vol. 2, p. 243. 61 GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, 1"'I: TpaTt6tq'Eic0cat; rlenpayRtvo)vElliXetpýc; F(t)v'K6pa4', 15 
Y. CnTE[tPPt0U 1947' (1" Army, 'Report on Operation Korax', 15 September 1947), vol. 5, keim. 20, p. 178. 
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managed to stop the communist advance. However, the fact that the key route of Pindos 
remained under the Democratic Army was a sign of failure for the National Army. The 
communists still controlled the areas across the Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian 
borders, which provided them with supplies, equipment and havens in which to hide and 
organise their battles. Hence 'Terminus' was only a relative success for the NA. 
That some successes were salvaged from 'Terminus' was to a large extent due to 
the British contribution. This contribution was felt, most decisively, in the realm of air 
power. 62 One of the National Army's trump cards was the co-operation of air and land 
forces, for the Democratic Army completely lacked an air force. Whereas the National 
Army enjoyed combat air support, especially when defending strongholds, and the 
advantages of aerial reconnaissance, the Communist benefited from neither. Yet the 
Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) was a weak force. Its main body consisted of two 
British Supermarine Spitfire IX rocket-armed ground attack squadrons - with sixteen 
aeroplanes each. Some C-47s (Dakotas) were also used in a makeshift bombing role. 
The rest of the air force was made up of obsolete communications aircraft such as 
Airspeed Oxfords and Avro Ansons. 
During the summer of 1947, however, the British worked hard to strengthen the 
RHAF. The British dispatched 250 aeroplanes to Greece. By October 1947 the RHAF 
was equipped with included 113 Spitfires, eight C-47 (Dakota) transports, nine Vickers 
Wellington bombers and 108 liaison aircraft (Ansons, Harvards, Austers, Oxfords, Tiger 
Moths, L-5s). The single-engine AT-6s (Harvards) were useful reconnaissance aircraft, 
the Spitfires and Wellingtons carried out strafing and bombing operations and the twin- 
engined C-47 transports protected ground troops and dropped supplies. By late 1947 the 
Greek Air Force had three fighter-bomber squadrons, each comprising twenty Spitfires, 
62 Among the historians who claim that British involvement came to an end by beginning of 1947 is 
Markezinis, Political History-HoAjrIK4 JoTopla, p. 312. 
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equipped with rockets, cannons, and bombs, and three reconnaissance units, each made 
up of four Harvards armed with a single machine gun and fragmentation bornbs. One 
squadron and one reconnaissance unit were located at each of the three bases: Salonika 
for the north-castcm operations, Larissa for central Greece, Elevsina for the south. 63 
These units were hampered by poor maintenance and inadequate pilot reserves. Their 
obsolescent aircraft would have been incapable of effective air superiority operations. In 
a situation where the government enjoyed total air superiority they were of inestimable 
advantage. 64 To a large extent it was air power that proved decisive in stabilising the 
situation at the height of the Epirus crisis. Despite the Communist victory, the massive 
intervention of the RHAF, the arrival of the new govenunent forces and the vacillation 
of the Democratic Army helped the National Army in its final though relative victory. In 
the second week of July the Democratic Army was forced to retreat to Mount Pindos. 65 
The fights under the 'Terminus' continued until mid October 1947 but without decisive 
results for the civil war in Epirus area. The Democratic Army was far from totally 
63 The Wellington was the principal bomber used by RAF in the initial stages of the Second World War, 
this twin-engine aeroplane was effective only against specific targets and not for bombing large areas. The 
RHAF found the Wellington useless in the civil war and ordered it grounded. For months the RHAF was 
only minimally successful, for it had inadequate equipment and facilities and an insufficient number of 
trained pilots and maintenance men. When the enemy was spotted, the pilots failed to co-ordinate with 
ground units or establish effective communication. The Spitfires were vulnerable to ground fire and could 
not retaliate effectively because of their limited space for ammunition and their short-range flying 
capacity. The RHAF later used the Dakotas (C-47) for bombing expeditions, but with no particular 
accuracy. On one hand the air force provided valuable reconnaissance information, protection of ground 
troops, provision of supplies, drop of propaganda leaflets; on the other hand though, the planes could not 
identify guerrilla strongholds hidden in the mountains and that prevented the air and ground forces from 
defeating the DA. Later on the stricter co-ordination of air and ground forces, the use of tanks and napalm 
bombs or liquid fire, transformed the RHAF into a more effective force in winning the war. Campbell (et. 
al. ), The Employment ofAirpower, pp. 34-41,55-56,66-69. 64 FRUS (1947): 5,367-368: Memorandum by the Deputy Co-ordinator (Wilds) for Aid to Greece and 
Turkey, 15 October 1947; Records of the JCS, Part 2: 1946-1953, Strategic Issues: Section I (thereafter 
cited as JCS), US Military Assistance, 1798/1, 'US Assistance to Greece', 15 October 1947, Reel I, 
Frame 0662. 
65 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXeia, fil 1TaTt6t'EK0cat; TIc7rpaygtvo)v EmXctpýacwv 'K6pa4% 15 ZenTegPP101) 
1947' (0 Army, Reports on Operation Korax, 15 September 1947), vol. 5, keim. 20, pp. 179-180. The 
decision of the DA not to attack the city of Ioannina is been characterised 'lost opportunity' by the KKE 
and is a controversy among the left-wing historiographers. Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War-O 
Avrzuvp, uopiaK6qAY05V, 1945-1949, p. 247. It signified, however, the guerrilla character of the communist 
warfare. 
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defeated, despite Zafeiropoulos' estimations that 'the operations of 1947 assured the 
salvation of Greece'. 66 Rather 'Tenninus' brought relative success. 67 
The operations of the NA against the DA from April onwards demonstrated that 
the Greek government was determined to escalate anti-communist warfare while 
Zahariadis was leading the KKE towards a full scale civil war. The escalation of the 
civil war had turned the focus of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KKE on 
Soviet military assistance. Zahariadis while preparing for full scale operations was 
hoping that Stalin would assist militarily, strategically and financially the struggle of the 
KKE. From April onwards he persistently brought pressure upon his Soviet comrades to 
support the KKE's struggle to win the war in Greece. " 
Such a development would fit Stalin's strategic interests in the area and 
strengthen the Soviet's international status. Even in a less ambitious plan, a powerful 
KKE within the Greek political scene seemed attractive to the Soviets and their foreign 
policy. However, the Soviet leader was well aware of the British involvement in Greece 
as well as the increasing American interest to prevent the Greek communists from 
taking over power. By 1947 it was clear to him that there were no possibilities of 
preventing western involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore Stalin would 
neither support an open or total confrontation with the West, which would jeopardise 
Soviet foreign interests in the Eastern Europe, nor back the war in Greece. Had Stalin 
decided to support the KKE and its fight, he would have equipped the KKE and 
supplied its anny before or during 1947. 
66 Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War-O AvriavuuqpiaK6q Aycbv, 1945-1949, p. 262. 67 rENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY /AIEY(3YNEH IETOPIAE ZTPATOY, ATHENS (rEE/AIE), 
1067/B/6 0 P(boi)ktvq oTov Bmýpij, 27 OKTo)ppto'u 1947 (Rawlins to Ventiris, 27 October 1947). On the 
same report Rawlins noted to the Chief of the Greek General Staff Lt. Gen. Ventiris the complains made 
by Col. Davies, Commander of the British Liaison Units on C Army Corps, on the bad organisation and 
lack of discipline of the training officers of the non-commissioned C Army Corps training school in 
Salonika. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 205-207. Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War- 
IoTopla rov Ey(pvAlov HoAtluov, vol. 1, p. 327. 
6' For an analysis of the KKE policy and the USSR see: Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949; P. J. Stavrakis, 
Moscow and the Greek Communism 1944-1949 (London, 1989). 
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Stalin did not really support the KKE's struggle. The lack of reliable Soviet 
assistance is also consolidated in Zahariadis' letters dated 6 October and 10 November 
1947. These letters to 'comrade Baranov' in Moscow revealed that Soviet aid was 
exceptionally slow in arriving and the amounts that did arrive were 'still' unsatisfactory. 
Zahariadis also confirmed that his Balkan comrades 'do what they can' with their 
limited resources. " This was the picture of the communist assistance from abroad 
during the civil war. Stalin provided a minimum assistance to the KKE which would not 
turn to a sufficient back up to counterbalance t hat oft he o ther s ide. T he Y ugoslavs, 
Bulgarians and Albanians offered their land for shelter and training and minimum 
assistance given their own financial restrictions. The communist fight thus suffered from 
limited international assistance, government measures and increasing western 
assistance. 
The Sofoulis Government: A New Centre Experiment 
Mi itary ambiguity translated into new political instability. The Maximos 
government had failed to provide Greece with peace and indeed the civil war had 
become a war on all fronts. Maximos, agreed with Dwight Griswold, Chief of American 
Aid Mission to Greece, that structural and tactical changes at governmental level were 
needed. Griswold suggested that Zervas should be dismissed as his anti-Communist 
campaign united the Left rather than weakening it. 70 Konstantine Tsaldaris, leader of the 
powerful Populist Party, Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, gasped the 
opportunity to demand the formation of a new, purely Populist government. On 18 
August, Tsaldaris flew to London for discussions with Sir Onne Sargent, the Pennanent 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Tsaldaris turned to the Foreign Office to which 
69 Avgi, no. 32,12 January 1980. Quoted in Stavrakis, Moscow and the Greek Communism 1944-1949, p. 
162. Stavrakis characterises the Soviet policy towards the KKE as 'prudent expansionism' or 'policy of 
dualism'. Stavrakis, Moscow and the Greek Communism 1944-1949, pp. 6,14 1. 70 FRUS (1947): 5,299-301: MacVeagh to Marshall, 19 July 1947. 
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'he remained dedicated first' because the State Department had told him to form a 
coalition government. Tsaldaris failed, however, in his attempt to convince Sargent that 
he was the most suitable man to take over power. What struck Sargent most from these 
talks was T saldaris' overweening ambition, which Sargent was sure would be placed 
before the national interest of Greece. 71 
A new governmental crisis erupted over the Liberals' attempt to eliminate right- 
wing elements of the cabinet. On 21 August, Papandreou, Kanellopoulos and Venizelos 
asked the Populist Ministers of Public Order and of War, Napoleon Zervas and George 
Stratos respectively, to resign on the grounds that they were unpopular both in Greece 
and with the British and the Americans. Their aim was to form a Liberal government 
headed by Sofoulis. Both Tsaldaris and the two ministers rejected the demands and on 
23 August the three National Political Union (EPE) ministers resigned. The coalition 
collapsed. As a result, on the same day, Prime Minister Maximos resigned as well. 72 
A new element in politics was the fact that Greece had a new king. Paul had 
succeeded his brother at a good moment, in the spring of 1947, when the start of the 
government offensive, continued British support and the promise of American aid had 
engendered an air of optimism. He was fortunate to have a few months grace to ease 
into the succession before the political and military crises broke out. Not that Paul was a 
passive observer. He was determined to be more of an interventionist in politics than his 
brother had been, whose influence had usually been exercised as blocker and a wrecker. 
As the constitution required, Paul asked the leader of the second biggest party to fonn a 
government. Tsaldaris, in an attempt to strengthen the government he was planning to 
fonn, asked Sofoulis and t he L iberal P arty toj oin t he c abinet. S ofoulis t umed d own 
71 FRUS (1947): 5,287-288: Memorandum of Villard to Marshall, 8 August 1947; PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67145 R 11654, Report of Discussions between Sargent and Tsaldaris, 18 
August 1947. 
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Tsaldaris' proposal, as he demanded more power for the Liberal Party. Dwight Griswold 
warned Tsaldaris that if he formed a purely conservative cabinet American aid would 
slow down. 73 Griswold's intervention, however, had no impact upon Tsaldaris' plans. 
As Orme Sargent h ad p redicted t he I eader oft he P opulists a nnounced t hat hew ould 
form a 'pure' right-wing government. Tsaldaris formed a cabinet, which was not 
acceptable even to other conservatives such as Stefanopoulos, Gonatas or Alexandris. 
74 
In response to Tsaldaris' bid for power the American government used its most 
effective weapon to put the Greek politicians on their best behaviour. On 30 August Loy 
Henderson, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs at the State Department, 
arrived in Athens. He warned Tsaldaris and Sofoulis that if they refused to co-operate 
with a coalition government then American aid to Greece would be stopped and they 
would be blamed for it. 75 Henderson proposed the formation of a Sofoulis-Markezinis 
coalition government. Tsaldaris, alarmed at the prospect of losing power entirely, was 
forced to compromise. Once more Washington and London had stood together in 
refusing to support Tsaldaris. Instead, they preferred a coalition of the Centre under 
liberal Sofoulis. 
The rest of the Greek political world agreed. EPE now agreed to the new 
coalition, after the exclusion of hard-core right-wing members. Tsaldaris, however, 
remained as Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 7 September, the new 
72 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371n2240 R2576, Norton to Bevin, IS February 
1948: Annual Report for 1947; FRUS (1947): 5,299-301: MacVeagh to Marshall, 19 August 1947; 
Markezinis, Political History-HoAITM4 IO-ropla, vol. 2, pp. 307-309. 
73 FRUS (1947): 5,311-313: MacVeagh to Marshall, 25 August 1947; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 
KEW (PRO), F0371/67007 R1 1718, Reilly to Foreign Office, 26 August 1947; History of the Greek 
Nation-IoTopla TOv EU11VIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 146. King Paul was crowned in April 1947 following 
George's death. 
74 All three important allies of the conservative world (Ministry of Co-ordination, Public Work, Finance 
and Justice) under Tsaldaris cabinet in 1946 and Maximos in 1947. FRUS (1947): 5,318-319: MacVeagh 
to Marshall 27 August 1947; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67007 R 11798, Reilly 
to Foreign Office, 27 August 1947. 
75 On that event is based the view that American pressure turned the Greek government into a viable 
coalition of the centre-right. In Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 209-10. A view shared and pursued 
by the British as well as already noted. 
66 
cabinet of ten Liberals and fourteen Populists took the oath. The new government 
committed itself to an amnesty for insurgents who agreed to surrender and to the release 
of detainees. 76 On the other hand, it pressed the British and American to further 
strengthen national armed forces. 77 The implications of 'Terminus' made this the first 
priority. On 14 October 1947, the Supreme National Defence Council (ASEA) met in 
Athens. C hairing the in eeting King P aul c alled f or war on all fronts: 'the aim of the 
operations, ' he declared, 'is to defeat the bandits not to repulse them from one place to 
another'. The main proposal of the meeting was the direct increase of the size of the 
army and the creation of Territorial Army battalions, which would assume the duties of 
static defence and thus set the regular army free of this responsibility to concentrate on 
the actual fighting. 78 
Counter-insurgency Operations in Greece 
The outcome of Operation 'Ten-ninus' had made clear that a new type of 
warfare was needed if the Greek National Army was to defeat the Democratic Army. By 
the end of 1947 the British and Americans were working hard on the problem of 
counter-insurgency in an effort to help their Greek allies. Counter-insurgency warfare 
combined intelligence with civil and military efforts. 79 The British role was important in 
76 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72240 R2576, Norton to Bevin, 18 February 1948: 
Annual Report for 1947; FRUS (1947): 5,299-301: MacVeagh to Marshall, 19 September 1947; 
Markezinis, Political History-HoAITIKý Io-ropla, pp. 309-311. 
77 Winner, American Intervention, pp. 227-228. 
7' GES/DIS, Archives-Apxcla, Av(oraTov ZuRpob%tov EOvwý; Agb"; (AMEA), 'llpaKTtKd 3 I'll 
luve8pidac(o;, 14 OKTcoppiou 1947'(Highest Committee of National Defence (ASEA) 31" Meeting, 14 
October 1947), vol. 6, keim. 33, p. 219. ASEA co-ordinated all national forces. See also p. 48, f. 21. By 
the end of October 1947, the National Army increased from 100,000 to nearly 132,000 men. Jones, 'A 
New Kind of War') p. 106. 
79 The Greek undertaking has been a typical case of foreign COIN objectives, as formulated later in the 
1950s and 1960s, combining military, political and civil control. The uniqueness of the Greek case, 
though, is that the KKE itself changed its warfare from guerrilla to conventional combat from 1947, 
complicating the nature of operations and that the insurgency died out for various reasons, some of them 
related to the KKE itself. The Anglo-American co-operation was another factor that made the Greek case 
important. For the rhetoric of the British Army and British COIN operations see H. Strachan, The Politics 
of the British Army, (Oxford, 1997); Th. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era 
(New York, 1995); Th. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (London, 1990); C. McInnes, 
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its development. British post-war counterinsurgency activities world-wide have been 
well documented; however, the effort in Greece has been neglected. It is the role of the 
United States in shaping Greek counter-insurgency operations that has been emphasised 
by most historians. It would be fruitless to deny the importance of the American effort. 
Yet the history of Greek counter-insurgency quite clearly demonstrates the continuing 
importance of Britain in the final years of the civil war. 80 
At the end of the Second World War the role of the British Military Mission had 
been defined as the training of the National Army. 81 It also provided small arms, 
artillery, clothing and miscellaneous supplies. 82 As a modem guerrilla conflict gathered 
momentum in the Greek mountains by the end of 1946, the Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that the British Military Mission should be allowed to unfettered advice 
on counter-insurgency operations. The British set about organising more specialist 
teams to train the National Army in ground and air operations, commando tactics and 
83 'Irregular Warfare' techniques. The Royal Hellenic Air Force, the national forces, the 
Greek Royal Navy and the Police were all encompassed by the British reconstruction 
programme. 
In 1946 General Rawlins, Commander of the British Military Mission between 
1945-1948, General Spiliotopoulos, the Chief of Greek General Staff, and Field Marshal 
Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had agreed to transform the National 
and Doctrine, 1945-52 (PhD, Univ. of London, 1992), pp. 169-218; T. L. Jones, 'The British Army and 
Greece, 1945-49', Small Wars and Insurgencies 8, no 1 (Spring 1997), 88-106. 80 D. S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance (London, 1977); Th. K. 
Adams, US Special Operation Forces in Action (London, 1998); J. J. McCuen, The Art of Counter- 
Revolutionary War (London, 1966). 
81 BMM and Military establishments operated in Ethiopia with the aim of training the Imperial Army, in 
Saudi Arabia with a small BMM at Taif to give infantry training in Greece and a small number of British 
Navy, Army, Air and Police personnel and Turkey instructing in certain specialised fields. FRUS (1947): 
5,523: State Department Memorandum on Military Missions, undated. JUSMAPG on the contrary was 
applied for the first time by December 1947 in Greece. For allies' co-operation see: Map D. 3, p. 189. 82 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, BMM(G) Official History; WO 32/15547, 
History of BMM in Greece 1945-1952; King's College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, Papers of General Sir Harold E. Pyrnan, 7/l/2,17 January 1947. 
83 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 79/54, COS (46), 11 December 1946; WO 202/946, 
31 December 1946; WO 202/908, BMM(G) Official History. 
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Army so that it could 'fight an irregular enemy in mountainous country'. To this end the 
British proposed innovations such as the greater use of air support, light infantry and 
commandoS. 84 The effect of these innovations would emerge gradually over the next 
two years. Ine arly Ja nuary 1947 t he C hief oft he I mperial G eneral S taff p ressed t he 
Cabinet Defence Committee for a greater British counter-insurgency involvement in 
Greece. On 14 January 1947, General Rawlins received a new directive which 
authorised the British Military Mission to 'give the greatest possible assistance' to the 
enlarged Greek security forces. On 21 January, following another Internal Security 
conference held at the War Office, Rawlins was instructed to send his men to Greek 
'field units' and to ensure that the Greek General Staff acted upon British advice. 85 
In 1947 the escalation of the communist attacks gave the British an opportunity 
to test their counter-insurgency techniques on the battlefield. At the start of 1947 
organised new commando training courses . 
86 A three-stage plan was approved by the 
Chiefs of Staff on 27 January 1947. The first phase was to comprise the retraining and 
reorganisation of the security forces, assisted by British Liaison Units, and various 
special teams including Mountain Warfare Instruction Teams, British Instruction Team 
Intelligence officers, and an 'Arrny-Air Co-operation Training Team' under Major 
Walker-Brush. The second phase would feature 'counter-organisation' actions against 
the KKE underground network (viajka). These actions would consist of population 
relocation combined with large-scale 'encirclement clearance' operations incorporating 
the armoured and artillery assaults. The third and final phase, after an area was cleared, 
84 Agreements to organise at least 3,000 men in Commando colurnns were also taken on 28 November 1946 by the British Chiefs of Staff. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, pp. 361,432-33,53 1. The years 
to come in the following chapter would prove the gradual strengthening of the national forces. 85 King's College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Papers of General Sir H. Pyman Papers, 6/l/2, New Directive to Rawlins, 14 January 1947; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW 
(PRO), DEFE 4/2, COS (47) 30,21 February 1947; WO 261/637 Increase of the BMM, 30 January 1947. 86 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 134/4, DO (47) 1, COIN Tasks, I January 1947; WO 
261/637, BMM report, 30 January 1947. 
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would be to return it to civil goverranent control. 87 In pursuit of these objectives the 
British Military Mission urged the National Army to enhance its mobility and 
intelligence-gathering capacity. 88 
In March 1947 the posture of the British Military Mission was modified to 
encompass Bevin's plan to involve the United States in an allied counter-insurgency 
effort in Greece. Despite the assertions of many historians that the Truman Doctrine 
signified the passage from a Pax Britannica to a Pax Americana the Americans did not 
89 
take on the burden of counter-insurgency operational advising alone after March 1947. 
Indeed the Americans themselves insisted that the British should remain fully involved 
in the effort. On 2 September 1947, the top American official in Greece, Dwight 
Griswold, invited the British to join twenty-five American Army officers in advising the 
National Army on future operations. On 19 September 1947, the War Office and Chiefs 
of Staff approved this idea. 90 On 11 October 1947, Bevin, encouraged by the American 
desire to co-operate with the British, proposed that the British Military Mission's 
operational advisory role in Greece should be strengthened. He wanted to send Indian 
Army and other 'officers with guerrilla experience to the [British] Mission [in Greece]' 
to review the strategy of the National Army. 91 The British Military Mission further 
suggested the creation of 'Commando deep patrolling' as well as the retraining the 
intelligence network. 
92 
87 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/1, COS (47) 15,27 January 1947; WO 261/637, 
BMM(G), 30 January 1947. At that time, Britain had not developed counterinsurgency rhetoric. As 
observed in Greece and later on in other test cases such as Malaya, counterinsurgency measures included: 
the use of minimum force, the use of a good intelligence network, cutting off the insurgents from their 
supplies, the use of the army for static defence duties and emergency laws to apply civilian control in 
McInnes, Hot War Cold War (London, 1996), pp. 118-124. 
88 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), AIR 24/760, COIN plans, RAF Report, 30 April 1947. 
89 C. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 109. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, P. 
236; Close (ed. ), The Greek Civil War, pp. 203-207. On the contrary, British assistance had played a 
significant part in the NA's struggle against the DA. 
90 Winner, American Intervention, pp. 232-6; Jones, 'A New Kind of War', pp. 91-98; PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/7, COS (47) 121,19 September 1947. 
91 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 8/527, note from Bevin, II October 1947. 
92 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/893, AIR 46/62, Rawlins, 'Review of the Anti- 
Bandit Campaign', 22 October 1947. Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 236. Iatrides, 'Britain, the US and 
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By spring 1947, however, the Americans had started to expand their political, 
financial and military role in Greece. The first American Mission to Aid Greece 
(AMAG) was established in Athens in May 1947.93 The head of the American Mission 
to Aid Greece, Dwight Griswold, would supervise all expenditures and administer both 
civilian and military assistance programmes. The mission in Greece began with a staff 
of forty members (exclusive of military and naval personnel) but that figure soon grew 
to about 175. The military branch of the mission consisted of the United States Army 
Group Greece (USAGG) headed by General William Livesay, who arrived in Greece on 
19 June, and a small naval section. United States Aid Group Greece had a staff of fifty- 
four, including officers, enlisted men, and civilians. The naval mission had no more than 
thirty men, whose duty was to train the Greeks in using American minesweepers, tank 
landing ships, personnel boats, tugs, and other craft up to the size of a destroyer. United 
States Aid Group Greece's mission was to secure supplies and equipment for the Greek 
anny. It would function in co-ordination with the British Military Mission in advising 
the National Amy. 94 
Livesay's first challenge was the Greek government's insistence on the 
expansion of the gendarmerie. The gendarmerie played a vital role in maintaining civil 
order after the army had cleared an area of the communist forces. However, its pay and 
benefits was four times than that of an average soldier, so there was no advantage in 
replacing soldiers with gendannes. George Marshall opposed any expansion of the 
Greek gendarmerie. Accordingly, Livesay approved the improvement of Army Security 
Greece, 1945-29', in Close (ed. ), The Greek Civil War, pp. 203,207. Instead in January 1948 A. V. 
Alexander suggested sending reinforcements from Palestine to bolster the allied COIN effort in Greece. In 
R. Frazier, 'The Bevin-Marshall Dispute of August-November 1947 Concerning the Withdrawal of 
British troops form Greece', in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, pp. 249-262; 
Sfikas, Oi, 4yyAoi EpyaTwol, p. 207; T. L. Jones, 'The British Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in 
Greece, 194549', Small War and Insurgencies 8, no. 1 (1997), 88-106. 93 The Greek historian Veremis writes that AMAG in 1947 signified 'the changing of guard from Britain 
to the US'. Th. Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics (London, 1997), p. 15 1. Nevertheless, in 1947 
the United States was taking its first gradual step towards intervention in Greece. 94 Jones, ', 4 New Kind of War', pp. 61,101-103. 
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Units rather than the gendarmerie to conduct 'mopping-up operations' after the army 
had cleared an area previously held by communists. Of course the Greeks cared more for 
American aid rather than quibbles over its actual implementation. Napoleon Zervas, the 
Minister of Public Order, accepted the American preference for military over para- 
95 
military forces. The switch from the gendarmerie to Army Security Units was the first 
substantive American impact on Greek planning. The Americans agreed to a National 
Army increased in size from 100,000 to 132,000 men. 96 
By early November 1947 the Truman administration was moving toward the 
establishment of another advisory and planning group in Greece (Joint United S tates 
Military Advisory and Planning Group) under Livesay's direction. This would be a 
group of ninety officers and eighty enlisted men divided among the army, navy, and air 
force, as part of the military section of the aid mission. They would have direct 
communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group, with its headquarters in 
Athens, would aid the Greek General Staff through four advisers specialising in anned 
forces personnel, intelligence, planning and logistics. In co-operation with the British 
Military Mission, the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group would 
provide advice to the Greek commanders and staff. The British would continue their 
current training duties whilst the Americans concentrated on raising the standard of 
97 infantry units. On 31 December 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) appointed 
Livesay to command JUSMAPG. 
A new Anglo-American concordat covering the presence of British forces had 
98 also to be worked out in the summer of 1947. In January 1947 the British government 
had decided that the 14,000 British troops stationed in Greece would have to be reduced 
95 Ibid, pp. 71-73. 
96 Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 106. 
97 FRUS (1947): 5,399: anonymous note, 6 November 1947; Kenneth Matthews, Memories ofa 
Mountain War Greece (London, 1972), p. 177; Wooodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 221-222; 
Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 249. 
72 
to one brigade of four battalions. By July 1947 only 5,000 combatants remained in 
Greece. The British regarded their presence as a symbolic gesture of British interest and 
military power in the country. They were formally committed to the defence of the 
territorial integrity of Greece against any foreign encroachment. 99 Yet Bevin proposed to 
the Chiefs of Staff that this mission should be reviewed. He suggested that all the troops 
might be withdrawn in September 1947. The Foreign Office argued that the retention of 
a small force of 5,000 men would be inadequate to meet a possible Soviet attack, that 
the British presence merely provoked the Greek left, and that the troops were thus not 
good value for money. 100 On 30 July 1947 Sir Jock Balfour, the British Chargi in 
Washington, was instructed to inform the State Department that Whitehall had decided 
upon the 'immediate' withdrawal of its army from Greece for 'financial' and 
cmanpower' reasons. Athens was not informed of the British decision. 101 
In reply to the British dimarche Marshall cabled Bevin one of the strongest 
notes recorded in Anglo-American relations concerning Greece. The American 
Secretary of State stated that the British note rendered co-operation 'unnecessarily 
difficult' and expressed doubts as to whether there would be any significant financial 
saving to Britain. Marshall threatened that if London persisted with its course the United 
States might reconsider all economic commitments in Europe and re-examine the 
strategic position of Greece, 'because United States foreign policy had been [I 
predicated upon British willingness to contribute to the maintenance of stability in 
Europe'. 102 
98 FRUS (1947): 5,268: British Chargt John Balfour to Secretary of State, 30 July 1947. 99 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128/9, CM 14(47) 4,30 January 1947; CAB 128/9, 
CM 30(47) 2,18 March 1947. 
100 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67043 R 1064 1, Report by the COS, 28 July 1947. 
101 FRUS (1947): 5,268: Balfour to Marshall, 30 July 1947; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), 
FO 371/67043 R 10494, Foreign Office to Washington and Athens, 30 July 1947. 102 FRUS (1947): 5,273-274: Marshall to Bevin, 1 August 1947. 
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Bevin replied that there had been no change in British policy and inquired as to 
how long the Americans wished the British troops to remain in Greece. 103 On 9 
September 1947, the Chiefs of Staff noted that 'it is strategically important that we must 
have the closest military collaboration with the United States [ ... ] to support British 
policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean'. Any decision about withdrawal 
of British troops must be determined on political grounds. 104 The following day Bevin 
decided 'to take no definite decision' until further discussions had taken place with the 
Americans about the Near and Middle East. 105 The British troops would remain in 
Greece willingly until 1950. Bevin's manoeuvre had never been indicative of a desire to 
abandon Greece. His main purpose was to make the United States send troops to 
Greece. This would increase the American interest in Greece and in Britain's main area 
of interest: the Middle East. 106 Yet the Truman administration was unwilling to face the 
difficulties in Congress that the dispatch of combat troops would have entailed. ' 07 
Politically, it suited the Americans that the British should remain fully engaged in 
Greece. 108 
Conditions on the ground remained conducive to a continuing Anglo-American 
condominium. There was neither the time nor the opportunity for an orderly transfer of 
power even if either party had wanted it. On Christmas Eve 1947 the KKE took the step 
most feared by American and British observers: it announced the establishment of the 
Provisional Democratic Government in the mountains of north-westem Greece (at Pyli, 
103 FRUS (1947): 5,275-278: Douglas (Ambassador in the UK) to Marshall, 3 August 1947. 
104 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 8/797, Note to Prime Minister, 9 September 1947. 
105 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/47/33,34,35, Withdrawal of British 
Troops from Greece, 10,12,15 September 1947. 
106 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 8/841, Policy in the Middle East and Eastern 
Mediterranean, 21 November 1947. In these talks, Bevin had made it clear that Greece's independence 
was vital to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, which together with the Middle East forms a 
strategic whole. The United States aimed at securing an anti-Communist 'barrier' in Italy-Greece-Turkey- 
Iran. 
107 On the issue of the withdrawal of the British Army see, Frazier, 'The Bevin-Marshall Dispute', in 
Baerentzen, Iatrides (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, pp. 249-262. 
74 
in the vicinity of Lake Prespa, near the intersection of the Greek, Albanian and 
Yugoslav borders). In an atmosphere of 'celebration' the rebel radio station, Free 
Greece, announced the setting up of this shadow government headed by Prime Minister 
and Minister of War 'General Marcos'. Zahariadis, following Stalin's model, assumed 
no cabinet post but remained the KKE's General Secretary. 109 
The announcement of the formation of the Provisional Democratic Government 
was accompanied by a deten-nined major attack by the Democratic Army designed to 
seize the north-west town of Konitsa as its capital. Fourteen Democratic Army 
battalions (over 2,500 men), led by Marcos, moved south from Mount Grammos on the 
night of 24-25 December and, aided by diversionary attacks elsewhere in Thessaly and 
Epirus, seized control of the approaches to Konitsa, which was defended by a national 
forces garrison of some 900 men. Konitsa was the last of the unoccupied fronts of 
Epirus. Amply supplied with men, rations and ammunition from a provisions supply 
base in the village of Argyrokastro, over the border in Albania, Marcos employed all of 
his available artillery (two batteries of 75mm mountain guns, three or four 105min 
howitzers, and a variety of mortars) to support a number of attacks on the town from 
different directions. 
Delayed by heavy rains the NA relief forces moving from Grevena and Ioannina 
did not appear until 30 December. Abandoning the usual guerrilla tactic of withdrawing 
before the arrival of superior relief forces the DA chose to stand and fight. However, the 
108FRUS (1947): 5,458-461: Memorandum by Henderson, 22 December 1947; Leffler, A 
Preponderance, p. 194. 
109 Marcos' Provisional Government was, despite Zahariadis' assurances, not recognised by anyone, even 
by the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. It soon became clear that Stalin, alarmed by the growing American 
involvement in an area so close to his satellites, wanted the Greek civil war to be brought to an end. 
Marcos later criticised Zahariadis for the decision to proceed to the formation of the PDG without having 
fulfilled the necessary precondition for international recognition: to capture a major city in which a 
governmental authority could be established. In Vlavianos, Greece 1941-1949, p. 245. The 
announcement of the Provisional Government had long-term political effects. On 27 December 1947, the 
Sofoulis government responded to the communists' initiatives by passing the Emergency Law 509, which 
outlawed the Greek Communist Party and penalised all communist activities with incomparably harsh 
penalties; the death penalty included. 
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National Army, newly equipped with American weapons and supported by both air 
power and artillery, soon drove the Communist troops from the high ground around the 
town. After suffering heavy casualties the Democratic Army began to Withdraw on the 
night of 31 December-1 January. By 7 January 1948, the National Army had cleared the 
immediate area although fighting continued until 15 January in the surrounding region. 
The Greek General Staff later estimated that the Democratic Army had committed about 
5,000 men to the battle and suffered 1,169 casualties (400 killed, 746 wounded, 23 
captured), while the National Army had suffered 363 casualties (71 killed, 237 wounded 
and 55 missing). ' lo 
The battle of Konitsa was the largest and most sustained Communist offensive 
up to that time. It was the first conventional battle the Democratic Army had attempted. 
It was the Communists' first serious defeat. The attempt to seize Konitsa demonstrated 
that a guerrilla force, acting prematurely as a conventional army, lost most of its tactical 
advantages when it exposed itself to the superior firepower of its opponents-"' The 
dangers of Zahariadis' concept, of confronting the National Army in conventional 
operations, were made manifest. Marcos' determination not to abandon guerrilla tactics 
was shown to have a basis in reality. Zahariadis, however, refused to learn the lessons of 
the Communists' first major military blunder. At a meeting held at Vitsi on 15 January 
1948 Zahariadis announced that the strategy and tactics of the Democratic Army would 
continue to evolve from guerrilla operations towards more conventional techniques. The 
Democratic Army would transform itself into a structured military organisation, 
employing units of battalion size (500-600 men) and higher. Marcos opposed 
110 GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, ApXcio ITparof) (Army Report), vol. 7, pp. 52-101; Zafeiropoulos, Anti- 
Bandit War-O Av-riavpqqpiaK6q Ayd5v, 1945-1949, p. 306; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War., pp. 160- 
162; Eudes, The Kapetanios, pp. 308-309; Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-Io-ropla Tov 
E, UqVIK06 EpýpWov, vol. 1, pp. 373-388. The KKE officially characterises the Konitsa operation a power 
show and KKE's attempt to provide the Democratic Government with credentials. History of the KKE- 
, dOKf, UIO IoTopiaq Tov KKE, vol. 1, p. 58 1. For KKE supplies from the north see: Map DA, p. 190. 111 History of the KKE-, dOKIUIO Iaroplaq Tov KKE, p. 58 1. 
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Zahariadis' plans but the will of the General Secretary of the Politburo prevailed. The 
Provisional Democratic Government proceeded to the creation of a hierarchy of the 
Democratic Army officers' ranks similar to that of a regular army: these proposals were 
signed by the President and War Minister General Marcos. 112 
The process of the 'militarisation' of the Democratic Army had to take place in 
secret sustained by a minority of the population and quite frequently in areas and 
circumstances where its prospects were uncertain and unstable. The areas in which the 
Democratic Army was operating oflen lacked sufficient communication between each 
other. Even if communication was possible enormous precautions had to be taken so to 
hide war cabinets from government forces. 
The 1947 operations demonstrated the willpower of the Democratic Army to 
pursuit its aims and challenge the status and strength of the National Army. In April the 
National Army launched, its first massive campaign against the DA to eliminate its 
powers and free the occupied by the Communists areas. Hence 'Terminus' begun in 
April with the aim to cut the DA's communication line from the north and clear central 
and northern Greece from the communist influence. The undertaking was relatively 
successful for the government forces. The operation demonstrated the weaknesses of the 
NA: functional inefficiency and lack of organisation and discipline. The fights turned in 
112 I. General (Marcos Vafeiadis), 2. Lieutenant-General (Sarantis Protopappas), 3. Major-General 
(G. Boditsios, Th. Genios, V. Ganatsios, N. Theoharopoulos, N. Kanakaridis, G. Blanas), 4. Colonel: 
Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Air force, and Political Delegates, 5. Lieutenant-Colonel: Infantry, Artillery, 
Air force, Political Delegates, Medical Committee, 6. Major: Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineer, 
Political Delegate, Medical Committee, Military Justice, 7. Captain: Infantry, Engineer, 8. Lieutenant: 
Artillery, Engineer, 9. Second Lieutenant: Artillery, Engineer, Medical Committee, Political Delegates; 
History of the Greek Nation-1aropiarov Wqv=6 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 150. Shrader, The Withered Vine, 
pp. 48048 1. On the DA's transformation see: D. Close, Th. Veremis (eds. ), 'The Military Struggle, 1945- 
1949', in Close (ed. ), The Greek Civil War, pp. 109-112. YrIHPEZIA IZTOPIKOY APXEIOY- 
SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 1948,126.2,16204, Ynoupyciov 
Eýmrcptic(bv, An6ppqrov, -ralpoyopic; Enuccigewov Evcpyctd)v', 23 Iavouaptou 1948 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Top Secret, Information on Future Actions, 23 January 1948). Unfortunately, there is no 
way to double check the validity of the public intelligence information office in terms of numbers and 
specific lists, but propaganda of the KKE itself reinforce the idea that DA fighters were expecting Soviet 
assistance. M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London, 1962), pp. 181-82; V. Dedijer, Battle Stalin 
Lost (New York, 197 1), pp. 68-68. 
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favour of the government forces in the battlefield though the communist forces were not 
totally defeated in the area. The key factor that brought the supremacy of the national 
forces was the use of air power to spot and bombard the DA. The 'Epirus Manoeuvre' in 
July proved the power and determination of the Democratic Army to pursue its goals. It 
brought a serious blow to the prestige and morale of the National Army, and despite the 
fact that the communist defenders were finally beaten, it was another relative 
government success. The line of communication between the DA and the Balkan 
communist countries was not cut. Thus from a strategic point of view 'Terminus' failed 
to meet its two main objectives. The Democratic Army lost the battles but not the war. 
Konitsa battle was the first communist conventional attempt against the NA. The tide, 
however, had started turning towards the national forces due to allied support and 
equipment. 
Overall the 1947 c ampaigns proved the determination of the DA to take over 
power and the need to re-organise and supply the NA. The role of the British and 
Americans in this process obviously was of great importance. These operations, 
nonetheless, were of different and changing nature for both sides. The year 1947 marks 
a changing type of warfare for the communist defenders. Typical guerrilla warfare 
turned to an almost conventional one from the battle of Konitsa in December onwards. 
The successful defence of Konitsa encouraged the National Army and British 
and American Missions to believe that an offensive in 1948 might give the Democratic 
Army a decisive victory. The prospect of victory by the summer of 1948 seemed a 
realistic one. Underpinning this optimism was a perception that all units had been more 
effective whilst co-operation between ground and air forces had improved. The 
continuous assistance, advice and equipment provided by the foreign allies had 
improved the quality of the national forces. At the same time the Communists were 
beginning to conduct operations in a way that suited the British and the Americans. 
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III The Denouement: 1948-1949 
Military Preparations 
At beginning of 1948 the Greek General Staff began work on the transformation 
of the national forces. This transformation was made possible by the enhanced 
assistance of both the United States and Britain! In January 1948 the National Defence 
Corps (commonly known as the Ethnofroura) was strengthened to counter-balance the 
communist Aftoamyna. Ethnofroura would accommodate the local 'home guard' 
functions of the Units of Pursuit Detaclunents (MAD), Units of Rural Defence (MAY). 
Its initial establishment of 20,000 would soon increase to more than 50,000 men. These 
units, coupled with the Gendarmerie, would perforrn the civil part of clearance 
operations by arresting, detaining, and persecuting communist suspects. The manpower 
ceiling for the National Army itself rose in stages from 132,000 in early 1948 to 147,000 
in May 1948.2 
The British had a share in these new arrangements. On 19 January 1948, the 
British Military Attacht, Colonel Shortt, complained to the War Office that there were 
not yet enough officers with the counter-insurgency experience required in Greece. 
Nevertheless in March 1948 the Training Commando Units Centre was created. The 
Greek 'Raiding Forces' were reconstituted as commandos at the Vouliagmeni Training 
Centre near Athens. 3 
The British advisers were, however, already by 1948 shifting their main 
emphasis to conventional rather than counter-guerrilla war as they sought to meet the 
' This moderates the view of orthodox and revisionist historians that the defeat of the insurgents was the 
result of the two foreign powers' intervention. See also in this chapter footnotes 88-92. 2 By the end of the civil war the total of all services was 265,000 including 13,500 in the Royal Navy and 7,500 in the Royal Hellenic Air Force. Zafeiropoulos, The Anti-Bandit War-O AvriovupqpiaK6,; Ay6v, p. 20. Gendannerie as trained and advised by the British Police Mission would pursuit the communists 
outside the battlefield. 
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Communists' shift to the conventional strategy. 4 Major General Ernest Down replaced 
Stuart Rawlins as British Military Mission Commander on 27 March 1948. As a result 
British advice on operational doctrine was modified. The strategy of 'encirclement' had 
been found wanting in 1947. Down favoured the replacement of encirclement in villages 
5 
and towns with the 'relentless chasing small bands in the hills'. He adhered to the 
strategy of 'clear and hold' but insisted that it had to be based on the continuous conduct 
of o ffensive o perations s upported bym aximum u se of air power. 6 To match Down's 
aggressive military strategy Clifford Norton re-thought his political strategy. Norton was 
so deten-nined that the National Army should crack the 'bandits' in 1948 that he told the 
Americans that no political compromise was possible 'until their final defeat. He 
adjudged that attempts to reach a compromise with some elements at least of the Left, 
which heh imself h ad u rged ont he G reek govenunent during 1947, were 'absolutely 
wrong'. 
7 
On 14 February 1947, the Greek government agreed to effective Anglo- 
American control o ver t he N ational A rmy. 8 T he a rrival ofav igorous a nd a ggressive 
American field commander, Lt. Gen. Van Fleet on 24 February 1948 to assume 
command of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group signalled the 
American determination to bring the civil war to an end. As Van Fleet told the press, the 
3 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, History of BMM(G); WO 33/2641, War 
Office Paramilitary Establishments, 19 January 1948. 
4 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/950, BMM(G), 31 March 1948; WO 261/548, 
BLO in GHQMELF, 20 March 1948; DEFE, 4/11, COS (48) 24,18 February 1948; Jones, 'The British 
Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944-1952', Small War and Insurgencies 7, no-3 
(winter 1996), 278. 
5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5110, COS (48) 64(0), 24 March 1948; King's 
College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Gen. H. Pyman Papers, 6/1/14,3,4 
March 1948; Woodhouse states that training effort of the BMM had been inefficient for long and that 
'criticism of British training methods by American officers was justified'. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor 
Greece, p. 238. 
6 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72248 R12202, Gen. Down's 'Appreciation of the 
Bandit War in Greece', October 1948. Field Marshal Papagos, 'Guerrilla Warfare', in F. M. Osanka (ed. ), 
Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 236. 7 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72242 R 6174, Norton to Sargent, 12 May 1948; 
FO 371n2242 R 7475, Norton to Bevin, 21 June 1948. 
8 Wittner, American Intervention, p. 242; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 238. 
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JUSMAPG, 'appears to be in charge of operations. 9 Van Fleet's aim was to keep the 
Democratic Army continuously engaged. JUSMAPG, Down and the Greek commanders 
framed the plan for government operations in 1948. The national forces, it was agreed, 
would undertake a 'staggered offence' designed to extend control progressively over 
selected areas on the country, moving from the south to the north in four phases. First, 
the Roumeli region would be cleared in order to ensure that the national forces had a 
line of communication between Athens and Salonika. Second, the National Army would 
attack Democratic Army bases in the Grammos area in June 1948. Third, it would 
conduct commando operations to clear the Peloponnese. Fourth the National Army 
would conduct a winter campaign in the Vitsi area to eliminate the Democratic Anny. 
10 
During this planning the distribution of power between the allied military 
missions became a delicate issue. Averoff has claimed that the collaboration between 
the British Military Mission and the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning 
Group was 'excellent'. O'Ballance assumed that JUSMAPG was in complete control by 
the summer of 1948. In fact functions remained shared between the British and the 
Americans and conflicting interests brought clashes between the two missions. " In 
January 1948 Britain had assigned an additional one hundred seventy-five advisers to 
the Greek army units in the field; this meant that there were three times as many British 
as American advisers fulfilling this role. The January 1948 agreement between the 
American and the British missions assigned operational and logistical duties to the 
former mission and training to the latter. General Down suggested that co-operation 
could be further improved by the merger of the American and B ritish groups. 12 V an 
Fleet, however, rejected this proposal. He wanted America's officers to have as wide an 
9 Wittner, American Intervention p. 244. 
10 Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 225. The main drawback of the 1947 'encirclement' strategy was that it 
required enormous manpower to cover the various targets and left other nearby areas unprotected and 
vulnerable to the 'hit and run' tactics of the DA. 
11 Averoff, By Fire and Axe, p. 267; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, p. 175. 
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authority as possible. The two missions continued to offer separate advice to the 
National Army. Members of both missions could enter the combat zones but they could 
take 'no executive part' in the campaigns. 13 The Greek Commander-in-Chief had to give 
orders for any field operations, deployment of units or release of battalions. 14 
The Battles of 1948 
From the spring of 1948 the Greeks confronted each other in conventional 
warfare. The Greek national forces, under the guidance and assistance of the British 
Military Mission and Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, started 
a series of attacks against the Democratic Army. The National Army had a strength of 
132,000 men, with artillery, armour and aircraft, and were supported by a further 50,000 
National Guards. On the other side were approximately I ess t han 2 4,000 D emocratic 
Anny troops, who had little artillery, no armour, and no aircraft. Despite the 
overwhelming superiority of the government forces, however, encounters were hard 
fought and the outcomes uncertain. The National Army continued to display poor 
organisation and fighting ability. The inferior Democratic Army hampered even further 
by its faulty strategy fought bravely and with a will to win that the goverranent forces 
found hard to match. 
Operations began with an attempt by the National Army to occupy the DA hub 
in Roumeli. The Mounts of Parnassos, Giona and Agrafa remained important 
Democratic Anny bases and jeopardised the rear of any National Anny operations in the 
north. The aim of the Operation Dawn was to clear an area of about 2,000 square miles 
in the 'waist' of Greece and eliminate the K KE's m ilitary c entres i nside G reece a nd 
12 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, BMM (G), History. 
13 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues, Section: 1, US Military Assistance, 1798/7,16 March 
1948, Reel 1, Frame 0815; Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues, Section: 1, US Military 
Assistance, 1798/10,7 May 1948, Reel I, Frame 0894. 
14 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/895,15 January 1948; WO 202/950, BMM(G) 31 
March 1948; Jones, 'A New Kind of War, pp. 158-159. See also Map D. 3, p. 189. 
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abroad. On 13-14 April 1948 the National Army established the tactical initiative by a 
diversionary raid into the Mount Agrafa area by a commando battalion. The commandos 
successfully neutralised important communist headquarters at the village of 
Mastrogianni. 15 Spurred on by General Van Fleet's call to 'get out and fight! ' the 
National Army initiated its first major campaign under the new strategy of 'staggered 
offence' on 15 April 1948.16 Army units blockaded the north, east and west of the area 
of operation, whereas to the south the Gulf of Corinth, patrolled by the Royal Hellenic 
Navy (RHN), prevented the Democratic Army's escape. 17 The Royal Hellenic Air Force, 
strengthened by RAF's aircraft, flew in support overhead. There was hard fighting in the 
Mornos Valley and around the town of Artotina but the hard-pressed Democratic Army 
units, abandoning mules and hostages, took guerrilla-like avoiding action and escaped 
towards Agrafa. By 17 May the insurgents had been forced out of Mount Roumeli. 18 For 
the time being Roumeli was cleared of organised Democratic Army units and 
government communications between Athens and Salonika were re-established. 
Forty days were required for the completion of Operation Dawn, which ended on 
26 May 1948. Many of the Communist troops had been able to escape to the north or 
hide in Roumeli itself but the Democratic Army's underground organisation had been 
broken up. Large quantities of its supplies had been captured, and the communist army 
had suffered over 2,000 casualties (6 10 killed, 3 10 wounded, 995 Aftoamyna personnel 
15 Instead of a sweep from south to north, as planned in 1947, which had the effect of driving the rebels 
back to their secure bases, Operation Dawn aimed to concentrate and crush the forces of the DA in central 
Roumeli. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 237-9. The numbers of the National Army are 
estimated totals of the different units as there are no statistics in the official documents of GES/DIS. As a 
result there are variations in the strength of the National Army. For instance Margaritis gives a total of 
90,000 men in a combat battalion that consisted of 500-600 men. Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil 
War-IoTopla Too EUIIVIK06 Ep(pvAiov, vol. 2, p. 34. 
16 GES/DIS, Archives-Apx6a, 13' UqLct Drpa-rob "EmXFtpýmj 'Xapauyý', 25 MapTiou 1948" (B' Army 
Corps, Operation Dawn, 25 March 1948% vol. 7, keim. 59, p. 311. 
17 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 240. See Map D. 5, p. 192. 
18 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcia, 051yeta I Mcpap&; II Maýo'u 1948 (Directive for I Division, II May 
1948), vol. 8, pp. 166-67. Operation Dawn is described by Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 255, 
257; Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 239-240,258-260. 
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captured) and there had been mass arrests of communist civilian supporters. 19 
Dominique Eudes has noted that Operation Dawn was the product of British 
gempiricism'. 20 British intervention was apparent in the course of this operation. British 
advisers had pushed the importance of intelligence-led counter-organisation mass 
arrests. Yet the British themselves did not regard Dawn as a great success. They pointed 
out that the National Army had not managed to inflict decisive losses on the 
CommuniStS. 21 
The next major National Army operation, Operation Crown, was launched on 20 
June 1948 and continued until 22 August. Theo bjective of Operation Crown was to 
clear out the main Democratic Army stronghold in the Mount Grammos and cut the line 
of communication to the north and south. Grammos was a complex of mountains and 
extremely rugged terrain. In the centre of the range lay Aetomilitsa the seat of the 
Provisional Democratic Government where Vafeiadis had his general headquarters. The 
Democratic Army defences in Grammos consisted of two lines of fortifications, each 
several kilometres in depth, and were strong and well manned. The outer defence ring 
blocked the passes leading through deep ravines to the interior of the region; the inner 
ring, protecting the core area, included numerous wcll-camouflaged machine gun 
bunkers constructed of logs. Within the Grammos stronghold approximately 24,000 
Democratic Army troops led by Vafeiadis faced some 70,000 govemment troops 
organised in two formations, A and B Corps. 22 
19 Averoff, By Fire and, 4xe, p. 260; Tsakalotos, Forty Years Soldier- Eapdvra Xp6via Eipario5Tqq, vol. 2, 
%120. 
Eudes, The Kapetanios, p. 320. 21 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/10, Operational War Office plan BMM(G), COS 
(48)22,13 February 1948; AIR 46/30, RAF to BLU, 19 March 1948; DEFE 5110, COS(48)38 (0), 17 
February 1948, COS(48)64(0), 24 March 1948; WO 202/893, BMM(G) Operations, 20 August 1948. 22 D. Katsis, Diary ofA DA G Rebel 1947-1948-To HucpoA6yio Ev6q Avr6pTj rov JEE 1947-1948, vol. 2 (Athens, 1998), p. 150. According to intelligence report the General Staff estimated the Democratic Army 
combatant forces at about six-and-a-half thousand men. Although the government intelligence information 
was wrong, the National Army held a clear numerical supremacy. GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcia, GES/Al, 
EXtStov Enqctpýacwv Kop(ový;, 10 Maýou 1948, nap6tpqgct npwTo, l7paycio A2, &%Ttov 
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The initial National Army deployment comprised five divisions (40,000 men) 
supported by air and artillery, together with an additional 7,500 National Corps and 
4,500 Ethnofroura troops to protect the government lines of communications. The 
National Army plan called for a three-phase operation. First, it aimed to clear areas near 
the main Democratic Army base. Second, government troops would attack and occupy 
positions along the Democratic Army outer defence belt. Third, communications 
between the Grammos and Democratic Army support in Albania would be cut and a 
general assault from all directions would be launched against the Democratic Army 
inner defences. Tsakalotos' A Corps was assigned the mission of protecting the lines of 
communication and dealing with the Democratic Army units in Epirus while 
Kalogeropoulos' B Corps was assigned the main attack itself. 23 
The National Army would enjoy much better air support from the RHAF during 
the operation. One of the most important contributions was to be made by two 
24 
squadrons of British-made Spitfire fighter-bombers based at Ioannina and Kozani. The 
Royal Hellenic Air Force aircraft, employing strafing attacks, rockets, fragmentation 
bombs, and, for the first time on 20 June, napalm supplied by the Americans, wreaked 
serious damage on Democratic Army installations and troops. The Royal Hellenic Air 
Force flew 3,474 sorties during Operation Crown reaching a peak during August, when 
1,570 sorties were flown. 
25 
nX1po(popt6)v (GES/Al, Operation Plan Crown, 10 May 1948, annex 1, Bureau A Information form), 
vol. 8, pp. 263-68; Zafeiropoulos, The Anti-Bandit War- 0 AvrtcvyqopiaK6qAycbv, pp-363-64. 
23 O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 170-173. The official archives do not provide the exact number 
of the forces that took part in the Grarnmos fights and thus the approximate number varies based on the 
additions of the paramilitary troops. A combat battalion consists of 500-600 men, whereas the LOK units 
are considered to be weaker than regular units. Margaritis estimates that the number of the National Army 
to take part rose to 90,000 men. In Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-IoTopla TOD WIVIK06 
Eyýpvllov HoAtyov, vol. 2, p. 34. 
24 Air support had become an established COIN concept in the RAF, RHAF and British and Greek army 
groups. The Air Ministry thus mirrored the practice of other British institutions in dispatching specially 
selected personnel to advise the Greeks on COIN matters. In that sense T. L Jones is justified in noting 
that the RHAF approved RAF 'anti-bandit doctrine. Jones, The Development ofBritish 
Counterinsurgency Policies and Doctrine, 1945-1952, p. 208. 
25 Campbell, Down, Schuetta , The Employment ofA irpower, pp. 42-45,52. Implications of the 
Operation 
Crown were that the British-made Centaurs, armed with small 50 millimetre cannons, were obsolete, 
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Operation Crown officially ended on 21 August 1948. By 22 then some 1,500 
Democratic Army defenders had slipped over the border into Albania fully equipped. 
Another 8,000 Democratic Army combatants moved off to the Vitsi region. 26 Averoff 
characterised Operation Crown as 'the largest, the most difficult, the longest, and the 
most deadly battle of the entire war'. 27 Nonetheless, it achieved only moderate success, 
for it did not bring about any fundamental change in the situation. The ability of the 
Democratic Army to take refuge in nearly Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was 
particularly galling. Several National Army commanders were accused of a lack of 
aggressive leadership. After the end of the o peration V an F leet c haracterised itas 'a 
bitter disappointment' and the 'guerrilla's' leadership, training and morale as 
'excellent'. He stated that 'everything that has been accomplished up there has been 
done by air and artillery'. 29 
Technically Operation Crown was an American operation. Yet British continued 
to have a say in Greek warfare. The American mission gave advice in the allied joint 
planning group where it retained four permanent members compared to the BMM's two. 
The situation was, however, different at the technical level. Joint United States Military 
Advisory and Planning Group had fewer than 300 men. It maintained 20 officers at the 
National Army unit level whereas the British Military Mission had over four times as 
many men overall and seven times the American number in Liaison Units. Lieutenant 
General Tsakalotos pressed his generals to adopt British thinking and therefore to place 
underpowered and unable to climb. As a result, the army was unable to defeat the Democratic Army and 
close the guerrillas' main avenue of escape. Wittner, American Intervention, p. 243; O'Ballance, The 
Greek Civil War, pp. 170-173. An additional drawback was that the Spitfires could carry only a limited 
number of napalm bombs for they were too heavy. Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 293. 26 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 476/2 R9148/11/19, Consul-General Knight to Reilly 
(Athens) 6 August 1948; GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcla, rEYJ rpayciov A I, '130c(K eniXelpý0CWq BtTafou- 
Ano 23 Auyo-GaTou [tcWt 3 Aciccgppiou 1948'(GES/Bureau A 1, 'Operation Vitsi Report, 23 August to 3 
December 1948), vol. 1 1, p. 35; O'Ballance gives the Democratic Army casualties as 3,128 killed, 589 
captured, and 603 surrendered, O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, p. 173. 27 Averoff, By Fire andAxe, p. 280. 
28 FRUS (1948): 4,196,206: Van Fleet, 24 November and 30 November 1948; Woodhouse, The Struggle 
for Greece, pp. 242-245. 
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a greater emphasis on small unit patrolling. 29 The Greek headquarters noted that during 
the summer operations, General Down 'acted as Advisor-in-Chief on tactical matters' 
and British liaison units advised on the execution of operations down to brigade level. 
Furthermore, Royal Air Force officers on the ground cast a 'critical eye' on the Royal 
Hellenic Air Force. 30 
Mount Vitsi was the next important hub of the Democratic Army. The 
Provisional Democratic Government and the Democratic Army General Command had 
been re-established at Vitsi after having been forced to leave their headquarters in 
Grammos. The Vitsi operation lasted from 29 August to 20 September 1948. The plan 
of the Vitsi campaign was much the same as that undertaken at Grammos albeit on a 
smaller scale. The National Army used three (1", 2 nd , 15"') divisions 
from B Army 
Corps. After reconnaissance aeroplanes located the enemy, Spitfires began strafing 
operations. The initial results were successful. Nonetheless, as in the Grammos 
operation the National Army's weakness became apparent as the drive broke down 
because of confusion in command, complicated by bad weather. On 29 August, the 
National Army launched a strong attack against the Vitsi position but the government 
troops w ere t ired a nd t he D emocratic A nny t roops defended their base tenaciously. 31 
29 General Down, Commander 1948-1950, distinguished himself in supporting 'clear and hold' operation 
by air support and small army units. 
30 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/983, BMM(G) Operations, 20 August 1948; 
DEFE, 4/14, COS (48)92,5 July 1948; AIR 23/6395, RAF to BLU, I June 1948; Jones, 'A New Kind of 
War', pp. 158-59; Abbott, The Greek Civil War, p. 13. After the Czech crisis the United States increased 
defence budget for Universal Military Training (UMT) in Western union within the context of European 
Recovery Program. Greece, Italy, Germany, Palestine, France, Philippines were a few countries military 
assistance was recommended to support governments friendly to the United States to preserve internal 
order. M. Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower (Stanford, 1992), pp. 148,194-197,239. British advisers, 
however, continued to be involved in National Army training during 1949. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 
KEW (PRO), WO 202/899, Commander in Chief Middle East Land Forces (CINCMELF) notes to War 
Office, 16 October 1948. See Map D. 6, p. 193. 
31 FENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY/ AIEYGYN1H IETOPIAZ ETPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (FEE/All), 1948,1012/ A/57, 
Avayopdt AvTtaTp&Tqyou A. rtavTl; ý 7Ecpt cjcKa0apAaco);, rou BtTato% 3 OK=Ppiou 1948 (Lieutenant- 
General D. Yiantzis' Report on Vitsi clearance, 3 October 194 8). 
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The results were moderately successful. Both sides needed a rest and were thus forced to 
pause. 32 
The stalemate of Grammos and Vitsi led the Greek government to renew its 
pleas for an expansion of the armed forces funded by the Americans. Tsaldaris argued 
that the army should be enlarged from 132,000 to 250,000 soldiers by the spring of 
1949. The army, Tsaldaris and Sofoulis insisted, must wage offensive war at the same 
time as it conducted defensive operations to protect people and property in the wake of 
the advance. 33 On 29 September 1948, the stalemate in Grammos and Vitsi forced Van 
Fleet's hand. He advised the Department of the Army that the Greek armed forces 
should not be reduced to a level which the Greek economy could support. He informed 
Colonel Walker from the United States Army, who arrived in Athens to discuss the 
issue of reduction, that such an act was out of the question. Given the 'guerrilla' move 
from one area to another, Van Fleet insisted that 'overall the picture had worsened rather 
than improved since the Grammos victory'. 34 General Down, for his part, emphasised 
the importance of air cover while performing counter-insurgency operations. 35 General 
William A. M atheny, C hief oft he Air Section of the JUSMAPG, too argued that an 
expanded air support system was needed to give the army the mobility it required. The 
soldiers could not by themselves pursue small guerrilla groups in such rough terrain. 36 
Both the British Military Mission and Joint United States Military Advisory and 
Planning Group in Athens moved towards the Greek position of further enlarging the 
32 Margaritis characterised the September results as 'failures'. In Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-loTopia Tov EU? jviKo6 Ep(pt)Afov HoAtyov, vol. 2, pp. 195-13 1; Rentis, Minister of Interior, 
overreacted by asking Sofoulis whether this 'would be another Asia Minor disaster'. In Th. Tsakalotos, 
Grammos-rpdppoq (Athens, 1970), p. 32. 33 FRUS (1948): 4,154-155: Memorandum by G. Marshall, 30 September 1948; FRUS (1948): 4,156- 
157: The Chargt in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State, I October 1948. 34 FRUS (1948): 4152-153: Grady to Secretary of State, 29 September 1948. 35 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5111, COS's views, COS (48) 127(0), 10 June 1948; 
AIR 8/1258, COS (48) 155,19 July 1948; FO 371/722498 R12202, Gen. Down, Appreciation of the Anti- Bandit War in Greece, 22 October 1948. 
36 FRUS (1948): 4,160: Grady to Marshall, 16 October 1948; Wittner, American Intervention, p. 245; Jones, 'A New Kind of War, pp. 184-85. 
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armed forces in response to the Grammos-Vitsi stalemate in autumn 1948. The key to 
success, according to the JUSMAPG, was 'more men, more money, more equipment'. 
Van Fleet submitted a military b udget f or t he c orning f iscal y ear. Aso pposed tot he 
$150 million allocated by the government for fiscal year 1949 Van Fleet requested a 
new budget ceiling of $200 million and a new Greek army ceiling of 147,000 men. 
37 
Van Fleet's belligerent attitude had consequences for the British. The more the 
JUSMAPG became involved in the National Army affairs, the more the BMM was 
demoted into a secondary role in Greece. On 2 July 1948, the War Office had even 
recommended that in order to retain American co-operation, the BMM should be 
subordinated to the JUSMAPG. By 1 October 1948, the British had agreed that the 
JUSMAPG should assume full responsibility for 'all operational matters [ ... ] [Ofl policy 
or higher direction [and] tactical training', and henceforth the Americans should 
predominate in this regard . 
38 Nevertheless, the British Military Mission would still be 
responsible for organisation and training of the Greek, air, army, navy and police and in 
this way the British share in Greek affairs is consolidated. 39 
Stalemate in Late 1948 
The Grammos-Vitsi stalemate reawakened the issue of Army restructuring. 
Prime Minister Sofoulis tried to solve the army's leadership problem by putting forward 
a well-known military figure, General Alexander Papagos, for the position of 
37 FRUS (194 8): 4,193 -94: McGhee to the Under-Secretary of State (Lovett), 24 November 194 8; FRUS 
(194 8): 4,18 3: Grady to Marchall, 13 November 194 8. 
38 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/14, War Office view in COS (48) 91,2 July 1948; 
WO 261/549, GHQMELF Report, 20 September 1948; WO 202/895, Agreement Regarding British 
Advice, 1 October 1948; Jones, The Development ofBritish counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, pp. 
225-26. 
39 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/8, COS/WO views, COS (48) 129,22 October 
1948; IFENIKO ErIITEAEI0 ZTPATOY/ AIEYGYNEH ILTOPIAL YTPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (17EVAIZ), 1948,1012/A/6, 
Avayopdt ano Tov AvTtaTPdT1j7o r. rianayecapy[o-u, 27 OKTcoppiou 1948 (Report by Lieutenant-General 
G. Papageorgiou, 27 October 1948). In July 1948, Mac Veagh was replaced by Henry Grady as 
Ambassador and Chief of the USAGG to smooth tension between Mac Veagh and Griswold over 
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Commander-in-Chief of the Greek armed forces. 40 King Paul also supported Papagos' 
accession as Commander-in-Chief. 41 Papagos himself laid down his conditions of 
acceptance in a letter to Sofoulis on 11 November. He demanded complete control of 
planning, order of battle, appointments and operations. Martial law was to be imposed 
throughout the country, with strict censorship. Papagos would command the Navy, Air 
Force and Gendarmerie as well as the Army. Papagos was unwilling to brook 
interference by the allied missions. 42 These demands w ere soe xtensive that S ofoulis 
hesitated to meet them. Nevertheless martial law was extended to the entire country on 
29 October 1948. 
Despite his touchiness on the issue of foreign interference both Van Fleet and 
Down supported Papagos as Commander-in-Chief. Van Fleet's bullish demands for 
more money and equipment ran parallel to Papagos' similar demands. To many in 
Greece, therefore, it seemed that the Americans were willing to endorse not only 
. 
43 uture Papagos but also his methods Any hopes that Papagos' appointment in the near f 
would g ive t he G reek g overmnent ab oost s oon e vaporated, however, because a new 
command issues. Grady, head of the Allies' March 1946 observation of Greek elections, would be 
responsible for supplies, logistics and operations in Greece. 
40 Alexandros Papagos had been victorious in Albanian war against the Italians in 1940 and was 
imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp from June 1943 to May 1945. After the War he held no military 
command but in July 1947 he was offered the title of General ex officio. Papagos was Lord Chamberlain 
of King Paul's Household until January 1949. He witnessed Operation Dawn as an observer with Van 
Fleet and Down. In January 1949 he became Commander-in Chief of the armed forces as well as Field 
Marshal. Papagos was the first non-blue blooded Greek to become Field Marshal, a title hitherto 
exclusively preserved for the members of the royal family. Lt. Gen. Giantzis became Chief of the General 
Staff. 
41 The Palace played a vital role in Greek decision making, standing at the top of political hierarchy. It 
represented a combination of both political and military powers and within this context the Court could 
play a decisive role in politicising the Army or militarising the cabinet. Norton, Van Fleet, Down and 
Grady, however, had proposed Papagos' appointment as Commander-in-Chief by 23 October 1948 
because the national forces needed a 'strong personality' and a 'strong leader'. PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371n2248 R 12095, Norton to Foreign Office, 23 October 1948. Papagos' 
strong personality would create in early 1950s a clash between the two important institutions of Greek 
politics: the Army and the Court. 
42 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72249 RI 3203, Papagos to Prime Minister, II 
November 1948; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 247. 43 FRUS (1948): 4,176-77: Grady Confidential Telegram, 26 October 1948; Wittner, American 
Intervention, pp. 247-248; Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 186. 
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political crisis broke out. 44 On 6 November, Venizelos, who had withdrawn from 
EPE 
to rejoin the Liberal Party as its Vice-Chairman, informed King Paul that the majority of 
his Members of Parliament had withdrawn their support from the coalition government 
in order to form a new Liberal cabinet. As a result, Sofoulis resigned on 12 November. 
45 
Tsaldaris and his Populist Party tried to styrnie the Liberals by forming a new 
cabinet with the right-wingers Napoleon Zervas and General Stylianos Gonatas as 
Ministers of Public Order and War respectively. Norton and Grady, however, intervened 
to prevent this 'provocative' move. 46 They reasoned that a purely right-wing formation 
would antagonise the Liberals and the other parties of the Centre, who would constantly 
try to overthrow it. Four days after Sofoulis' resignation Norton proposed to Grady that 
he should intervene in favour of the formation of a neutral cabinet excluding the 
provocative extremists General Zervas and General Gonatas. As a result of this Anglo- 
American pressure the coalition re-assembled on 18 November under Sofoulis' 
premiership. 47 Norton and Grady had been forced to intervene more overtly that they 
would have wished. The crisis further discredited democratic Greek politicians in their 
eyes. Greek politicians would indulge in their own petty squabbles at the moments of 
gravest danger. 
As the politicians squabbled in Athens the Greek government had to face a wave 
of Democratic Army counter-attacks. Despite the losses sustained in holding off the 
44 The military inefficiency was attributed to the political weakness. The main characteristic of this was 
the 'conventional' policy and a lack of determination to beat the enemy. General Down has reported that 
the Greek national forces lacked combat spirit and the Greek politicians and government were exclusively 
responsible for this. Close, 'The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State', in Close (ed. ), The Greek Civil 
War, 1943-1950, pp. 172-73. 
45 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 37ln2201 R 13356, Norton to Foreign Office, 23 
November 1948. YrIHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY- SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, 
ATHENS (YIA), 1948,57.1,56786, YPEX-Av6)vuRq Ava(popd Ilept Eaonpmý; rlo%MKý;, 16 NOCPP 
plou 1947- Report On Greek Internal Politics, 16 November 1947. 
46 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72248 R12357, Norton to Foreign Office, I 
November 1948; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371n2248 R12579, Norton to Foreign 
Office, 6 November 1948. 
47 PUBLIC p 
'ECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72202 R13356, Norton to Foreign Office, 23 November 1948. 
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governmentils attacks on Grammos and Vitsi, Zahariadis convinced the KKE that the 
fault did not lie with the strategy of using the Democratic Army in a conventional army 
role. Zahariadis blamed instead Marcos' emphasis on guerrilla tactics for dividing the 
Party and obstructing victory. The Democratic Army, according to the General Secretary 
of the Politburo, should be more thoroughly reorganised along regular army lines to 
enable it to take the offensive. Zahariadis' will prevailed. The General Secretary ordered 
as eries ofa ssaults ont he t owns ofK arditsa, E dessa and Naoussa, and established a 
concentration of troops in Grammos and Vitsi that was intended to beat the National 
Army into submission. 48 
By the end of 1948 the Democratic Army had accomplished its reorganisation 
into divisions, brigades, battalions similar those of the national forces. After the 
Grammos battle the total Democratic Army forces, according to the intelligence sources 
of the GES, rose to 21,400 combatants. Of these 2,700 were acting in the Peloponnese, 
1,700 in mainland Greece, 2,500 in Epirus, almost 6,500 in Vitsi and Agrafa and 
another almost 7,700 in Thrace . 
49Having re-occupied the Grammos during the last 
months of 1948 the Democratic Army increased its attacks on major towns throughout 
Greece. 
The most serious of these attacks was carried out bys ome 6,000 D emocratic 
Anny troops against the town of Karditsa, on the plain of Thessaly. Karditsa was a town 
of 50,000 citizens, plus refugees from other areas, defended by a reinforced National 
Army battalion of approximately 860 men. On the night of 11-12 December 1948 the 
48 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 253-57; Iatrides, 'Civil War 1945-1949', in Greece in the 
1940s, pp. 210-11; Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 276-77; Matthews, Memories of a Mountain War, pp. 
252,267; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 181-183; Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, pp. 252- 
53; Eudes, The Greek Civil War, pp. 335-338; Jones, 'A New Kind of War', p. 190. 
49 rENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY/ AIEYE)YNIH 11TOPIAZ ETPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (17EVA11), 1948,1015/A/57, 
Amý)Ovvlq rIXqpoyopt(bv, 15 FenTegPpiou 1948 (Information Office, 15 September 1948); GES/DM 
Archives-ApXcla. Atc0uv" nXijpoyopt6)v -FEE, 'Ac), Tio I'I%ijpoqopt6)v 10 1CnTERPptou 
1948'(Information Office, GES, 10 September 1948), vol. 1 1, p. 318. According to Shrader the DA 
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communist forces eliminated the National Army outposts and struck at the town. 50 The 
Democratic Army combatants put out road-blocks, set ambushes on approach roads and 
destroyed a bridge on the Trikkala to Larissa road, all of which delayed the arrival of 
reinforcements. The telephone network connecting the government's defence was 
damaged. By the dawn of 12 December the city was entirely under the control of the 
Democratic Army force. The Royal Hellenic Air Force was unable to damage 
Democratic Army posts because they had been established in the city centre. 51 At this 
stage the Karditsa battle appeared to be a great victory for the Democratic Army, which 
proved quicker and more efficient than the National Army. 
However, by the night of 12 December Greek national forces reinforcements 
started arriving in the area from around Thessaly. These forces included armoured units 
equipped with British-made Centaur tanks. Once the National Army had been 
strengthened the Royal Hellenic Air Force attacked the Democratic Army forces. The I" 
and 2 nd divisions of the B Arrny Corps pushed the Democratic Army forces outside the 
52 
city centre into the open country. In the battle the National Army lost 23 men killed, 
76 wounded and 35 missing a total of 134 men or 18 per cent of its initial force. The 
gendarmerie lost four men and had six wounded. The Units of National Guard Defence 
(MEA) lost 15 dead, 15 wounded and 13 missing men. The losses of the garrison were 
about 200 killed, wounded and missing. Most serious of all were the civilian casualties: 
150 were killed and wounded and over 1,000 were abducted, of whom about 35 per cent 
strength was about 23,000 combats during the height of the civil war in 1948-1949. Shrader, The Withered 
Vine, p. I 10. 
50 GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcla, 'EXtStov Ka'r6lilyIq 704o); Kap8tral; '(Capture plan of Karditsa city), 
vol. 11, pp. 378-79. 
51 rENIKO EIIITEAEIO ETPATOY/, &IEYE)YNEH IETOPIAF. ZTPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (I-EVAIZ), 1948,1513/ B/ 23, 
Y-XtStov Alau6mog 17164(o; KapSfra% Ava(popd AvTtaTPdqy0U rtavTýý, 12 AcKeppplov 1948 ( Report 
on Safeguard Karditsa city, Lieutenatn General Yiantzis, 12 December 1948); GES/DIS, Archives- 
Apxcla, Eicftact; nenpay[ttwov Opoupd; KapSiTua; (Report by Karditsa Guard), vol. 11, p. 387; T. Psimmenos, Rebel in Agrafa- Avr6prqq oT'Aypaýpa, 1946-1950 (Athens, 1983), p. 209. 
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53 
were women. The Democratic Army troops suffered some 800 casualties. The battle of 
Karditsa ended up as something of a success for the National Army. Eventually the 
battle would turn in favour of the government forces. 
On 21-22 December, some 2,500 Democratic Army combatants attacked the key 
towns of Edessa and Naousa on the road from Salonika to Florina, using both machine- 
guns and mortars. The assault on Edessa failed. The Democratic Army attacks failed to 
catch the National Army by surprise. The communist forces were weakened by their 
losses in material and troops, the physical exhaustion of its combatants and bad winter 
weather. Under the constant threat of the air strikes it was becoming harder and harder 
for the Democratic Army to hide and move from one area to another. 54 
Despite the unsuccessful attacks, the Democratic Army did not waste any time 
before starting the next operation. The troops of the Democratic Army departed on 26 
December 1948 from Vitsi with sixty new recruits, food and a large quantity of medical 
supplies looted from a hospital. On II and 12 January 1949, the same Democratic Army 
troops, which had attacked Edessa on 21 December, took Naousa from its 900 strong 
National Army garrison. On 12 January, however, further National Army reinforcements 
of some 2,5000 men arrived from Salonika and Veroia to assist the National Army. On 
15 January, the National Army managed to re-capture the city of Naousa. Nevertheless, 
the D emocratic A rmy a ttackers e scaped o nce a gain ing ood o rder ont he night of 15 
January 1949 with large quantities of supplies and over 600 recruits. The National Anny 
52 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcla, EKOccrt; r1c7cpayýLtva)v Opoupd; KapSiToa; kaTa qv Tptýgcpov I&Xýv 11, 12,13, Acice[tPpiou 1948'(Report by Karditsa Guard over the battle on 11,12,13 December 1948), vol. 11, p. 3 89; Psimenos, Rebel in Agrqfa-Avr6ipTjq ar'Aypa(pa, 1946-1950 pp. 290-2 10. 53 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 257; Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 230. 54 GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcAx Atofictaý EOvoypoi)pd; E)EaaaXia;, 'EKOeall Ent -r(Ov yCYov6TCOV TCOV EO(PdS(OV OTt; 19,20,23 Aciccgppfou 1948' (Report on events in Sofades on 19,20,23 December 1948), 
vol. 11, pp. 398404. 
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lost only 8 men, whereas the Democratic Army lost 58 killed and 70 captured or 
surrendered during the battle for the town. 55 
Despite the growing size of the National Anny, its material advantages, its better 
allied equipment and the steady improvements in leadership and training introduced by 
the British and the Americans, it continued to find that superior numbers and firepower 
did not bring the hoped-for final success against the Democratic Army. The ability of 
the Democratic Army to escape, endure long-lasting operations and counter-attack were 
all threatening signs for the National Army. The Democratic Army had conducted 
unsuccessful p ositional d efence, I ike t he b attles ofK arditsa a nd Naousa and suffered 
serious defeats, like Operation Crown. It was, in truth, losing the war. Yet the 
atmosphere in governmental Greece at the turn of the year was hardly triumphant. The 
continued uneven performance of national forces further strengthened the voices of 
those calling for change. 
The End of tit e Civil War 
On 19 January 1949 Papagos was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Greek 
armed forces. He was equipped with new powers enabling him to replace corps 
commanders, implement martial law and bypass the nation's civilian leadership. Three 
days after his appointment, P apagos enlarged the Supreme National Defence Council 
into the War Council, which consisted of the premier, the deputy premier, the leaders of 
the four parties participating in the government, Grady, Van Fleet and Down. 56 Papagos 
informed the War Council that 'the size of [the] Greek Armed Forces was inadequate' 
and that he had accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief only upon allied and 
55 GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, GES/Al, 'EKOcat; cntq; cntOtac(o; kaT6tNaoýýg, 11 -16 lavowplou 1949' (Report on Naousa battle, 11-16 January 1949), vol. 12, keim. 8, p. 94; GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, 
'EkOeat; -tta q V&Xj q; Ndouaa; kat yta Tov E%tyg6,28 lavouapiau 1949'(Report on Naousa battle and 
manoeuvre, 28 January 1949), vol. 12, keirn. 8, p. 91. 56 ASEA was the body to co-ordinate the Greek armed forces. For ASEA see also pp. 48,66. 
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governmental assurances that the armed forces would be increased to 250,000 men. 
57 
Indeed the national forces including the Units of Pursuit Detachments (MAD), the Units 
of Rural Defence (MAY) and Units of National Guard Defence (MEA) increased 
throughout 1949 and reached an eventual total of 265,000 men. The tide of battle in the 
Greek civil war shifted dramatically in 1949 as a result of the enlargement of the 
National Army, modem and abundant equipment, new tactics and most notably the use 
of the air power. Papagosp roved to bean efficient Commander-in-Chief but he was 
fortunate in having such supportive allies. The communists still committed to an 
aggressive strategy. Yet that strategy was one which the British and the Americans were 
well-equipped to meet. 
At the Fifth Plenum of the KKE on 30 and 31 January 1949, Z ahariadis h ad 
engineered the ousting of Marcos from his positions as Premier, Minister of War, and 
Commander of the Democratic Anny. 58 Vice Premier Ioannidis took over as Premier of 
the Provisional Government. Zahariadis himself took over the direct command of 
military operations, in order to complete the conversion of the Democratic Army from a 
guerrilla army to a conventional force. By the spring of 1949 the Democratic Army had 
reached a strength of 100,000 men and women fighters, reserves and auxiliaries from 
, 11, . broad. Between 30 March and 5 April 1949, Zahariadis radically re-organised the 
Provisional Government to constitute a cabinet under his full control. 59 Zahariadis' 
strategic policy of sustained attacks against well-defended urban areas, along with a 
'static defence' of the Grammos and Vitsi, concentrated the lightly armed Democratic 
57 FRUS (1949): 6,24649: Satterthwaite to Secretary of State, 8 February 1949; Wittner, American 
Intervention, p. 248; Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 196. 58 Marcos, after being expelled from the party took refuge in the Soviet Union and did not return to 
Greece before 1982. 
5' Now that Marcos was put aside Zahariadis had no opposition in decision making in the Politburo. In 
January 1949, the KKE officially announced that it had sided with Moscow regarding Tito's quarrel with 
Stalin since June 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform. Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 334-35; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 263. 
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Army and exposed it to the devastating effects of the National Army's superior 
numbers, artillery, and most of all aerial firepower. 
In March 1949 the 8h Democratic Army division in Grammos managed to join 
up with the Democratic Army forces, which had escaped into the mountains after the 
Grammos battle (on 20 August 1948). During the winter of 1949 this force had created a 
new area of Communist control in the highest areas of the Mount Grammos. Its aim was 
to "re-capture Grammos area'. This area was Democratic Army's political and military 
base with natural barriers to protect the Democratic Army from the National Army. The 
bases in Mounts Grarnmos and Vitsi were also adjacent to the Albanian and 
Yugoslavian borders and housed reception and distribution points for supplies and 
equipment from the neighbouring Communist countries. The Yugoslav-Soviet split had 
decreased the amount of aid the Democratic Army received from Yugoslavia. On the 
other hand the DA had received a large quantity of Czechoslovakian and German spoils 
of the Second World War. Albania and Bulgaria continued to provide the Democratic 
Army with a wide range of support, including free transit across their borders, 
pennission to manoeuvre on their territory, training bases, hospitals, recruiting areas, 
food, money, clothing, arms, ammunition and refuge for the families of the Democratic 
Army combatants. 60 It was from Albania that a Democratic Army division, newly 
equipped with modem Soviet-type automatic weapons, entered the Mount Grammos in 
the first days of April 1949 seizing and occupying peaks and passes. 61 
In late March 1949 General Van Fleet developed a campaign plan for 1949. Van 
Fleet's plan was to use some 50,000 National Defence Corps (Ethnofroura) men to free 
the National Army from its static defence obligations, to contain the Democratic Army 
in northern Greece, to conduct mobile operations with the bulk of the 147,000 men of 
60 Margaritis, History ofthe Greek Civil War Impla Tov EUjvIK06 EppAfov 17oAtpov, vol. 2, p. 48 1. 
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the National Army to attack the Democratic Army strongholds in Mounts Grammos and 
Vitsi and then to mop up the remaining communist troops throughout Greece. 62 The 
British Military Mission opposed Van Fleet's south to north plan, citing the urgent 
necessity to first cut off the Democratic Army's supply lines with the neighbouring 
Communist states. Van Fleet, however, persuaded General Papagos and the Greek 
General Staff to follow his own plan. 63 
In March 1949 the BMM re-assessed its role in Greece. General Down ordered 
that henceforth the British should not take on any operational role because the 'United 
States view tends to predominate'. Indeed Van Fleet preferred that the British should 
take 'take no active part in operations'. Nevertheless the BMM continued to offer advice 
to the Commandos at the Vouliagmeni Training Centre. There it stressed the need 'to 
patrol constantly in order to obtain information and security'. The British retained some 
influence in tactical training and planning. The advisers attached to the Greek Raiding 
Forces, which were incorporated into the Commandos, operated throughout 1949.64 
General Down noted that the Raiding Forces were 'the best troops for eliminating small 
groups of bandits [ ... ] [by] continuous and relentless' pursuit operations. 
65 
Most of the aid that would enable the Greek armed forces to be expanded came 
from the United States. Yet Britain remained active in specific areas. Field Marshal Sir 
William Slim, who had succeeded Montgomery as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
pointed out after a visit to Greece that the 'bandit' problem was still a serious one and 
demanded a major commitment of air power. He proposed a further increase of the 
61 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXelu. 81j jt&papXe[a, 'IcrToptjc6V T(oV TEXnralow RaX6)V Tou rpdpgo%' (8th division, 'the last battles of Grammos') vol. 13, keirn. 16, p. 127; Zafeiropoulos, The Anti-Bandit War-O 
AvriovppqpzaK6qAy(Lv, pp. 575-76. 62 Campbell, (et. all), The Employment ofAirpower, p. 30. 63 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, p. 34; Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 235. 64 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/895, British and American views, 10 February 1949; FO 371/78481 R2657, Down in Peak Foreign Office note, 3 March 1949. 65 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216nO2, Field-Marshal Slim report, 18 March 1949; Jones, The Development ofBritish Counter-Insurgency Policies and Doctrine, pp. 205-248; Jones, 'The 
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Royal Hellenic Air Force by two bomber and one reconnaissance squadron. On 24 
March 1949 Slim told Bevin that if Greek air power was enhanced the Democratic 
Army would be defeated within the next 12 months. 66 Subsequently Norton was 
'pleased to a nnounce' tot he G reek g overnment t hat B ritain w ould furnish t he R oyal 
Hellenic Air Force with 22 Spitfires which would arrive in Greece in June-July 1949 to 
67 cover the summer operations. Yet even in this specialist field American influence was 
growing. United States Navy Helldiver bombers and large stores of napalm bombs were 
68 
made available for the operations carried out in the summer of 1949 . 
One of the first successes enjoyed by the Papagos regime was the final operation 
to mop up Democratic Army forces in the Peloponnese. These were wiped out by 
Operation Pigeon. The National Army under Lieutenant General Tsakalotos had great 
superiority in numbers: a division, a brigade and thirteen battalions of light infantry: 
nearly 20,000 men, against the approximately 4,000 Democratic Army troops which 
remained in the region after the Aftoamyna (KKE self defence organisation) had been 
purged. Operation Pigeon began on 19 December 1948, before Papagos took over. It 
consisted of 11,000 men and several LOK units under Tsalakotos. The operation was 
divided into two phases. The first phase was to clear the northern part of the peninsula 
supported by a secondary effort to neutralise the Democratic Army troops from the 
south. The second phase was thorough sweep from north to south. 69 
The Greek Navy secured the coasts of the Peloponnese, particularly along the 
Gulf of Corinth in the north, to prevent re-supply and escape by sea of the Democratic 
British Army and Counter-Gueffilla Warfare in Transition, 1944-52, Small Wars and Insurgencies 7, 
no. 3 (Winter 1996), 265-307. 
66 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371n8348 R3285, Slim-Report on the Situation in 
Greece, 18 March 1949. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/49/5, Greece, 
Bevin's report on meeting with Slirn-CIGS on 24 March 1949. 67 PUBLIC RECOp 'D OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/49/7, Bevin to Attlee, 13 May 1949; FO 371n8339 R5579, Norton to Foreign Office, 2 June 1949. 
68 GESIDIS,, 4rchives-ApXcia, A Z(bga ZTpamb/Al, 'EkOcar, c7nXctpýac(0; 'rlUpa6; ', 2-30 AuY6aT0'U 
1949, (A'Army Corps, Report on Operation Torch, 2-30 August 1949), vol. 14, keim. 35, pp. 414-15. 
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Army forces. 70 At the end of January 1949 the 2Vd brigade of the Democratic Army and 
other units in the Ahaia and Hleia areas tried to counterattack the National Army. 
Gradually, however, the National Army proved stronger and more effective, causing the 
collapse of the enemy's activities. The Democratic Army was denied supplies, nursing 
care for the wounded and an intelligence network. At the same time the battles created a 
wave of unarmed communist migrants who tended to stick to the Democratic Army 
combat units for protection. The Democratic Army's flexibility and military 
performance was consequently undermined. 71 
In the seven weeks of Operation Pigeon, the Democratic Army combatants had 
679 killed, 1,601 taken prisoner and 628 voluntarily surrendered, in addition to the 
complete destruction of Aftoamyna apparatus. The National Army reported 26 killed and 
72 wounded from A Army Corps. Having attained his objectives Lieutenant General 
Tsakalotos left the mopping-up to mobile Gendarmerie, Detachment Units and groups 
of armed peasants under regular army officers. 72 The communists were defeated both 
politically and militarily in the Peloponnese. 
Having cleared the Peloponnese Lieutenant General Tsakalotos went to 
Roumeli to implement the 'south to north' plan. The campaign was to begin with 
mopping up operations in central Greece. Operation Rocket was launched on 25 April 
69 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcla, A' 2: 6)ga 1TPaTWAl, '1Xt8tov EntXctpýac(ov, nFptartpa,, 14 AciccýPptou 
1948'(A' Army Corps, Operation Pigeon, 14 December 194 8), vol. 11, p. 29 1. 
70 The role of the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was not a dramatic one, for there was no actual battle at 
sea. On an average of four times a week, ships were called upon to deliver gunfire ashore to assist in the 
defence of a beleaguered coastal village or support with their presence an army unit operating near the 
coast. Its task was limited to patrolling the sea and the providing of sea transport for the movement of 
troops and supplies. Thus the navy denied the waters to DA defenders. The aim of sea patrolling was to 
prevent the communists from sea escape, reinforcement or re-occupation of seaside cleared areas and to 
secure the islands from potential attack. J. C. Murray, 'The Anti-Bandit War', in T. N. Greene (ed. ), The 
Guerrilla And How To Fight Him (London, 1962), pp. 65-111. 71 The Greek Navy consisted of about 115 ships, three-quarters of which were on loan from Britain. There 
were I cruiser, 10 destroyers and 2 submarines. The Greek Navy lifted a complete infantry division, 
together with four LOK (Commando) units, from the mainland to the Peloponnese. 72 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXE! a, A 16ga 1TpaT6, ' EicOcai; MtXqpýacw; AXF-), 6)ol), 21-30 MapTiOU 
1949'(A Army Corps Report on Aheloos operations, 21-30 March 1949), vol. 13, p. 465; Tsakalotos, 
Forty Years Soldier of Greece- Eo; p6vra Xp6via ETpaTi&rtjq rjq EUd&oq, vol. 2, p. 2 10; Woodhouse, The 
Strugglefor Greece, p. 261. 
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1949.50,000 troops of the National Army descended upon Rourneli and Thessaly 
determined to drive the 12,000-strong Democratic Army northwards. Their tactics were 
to round up all suspected Aftoamyna personnel and other communist sympathisers in the 
area of operations. The government forces were formed into small groups in order to 
carry o ut a relentless p ursuit of the communist army. Three months after the start of 
Operation Rocket Tsakalotos' forces had driven the Democratic Army troops north of 
the Aliakmon River. Central Greece, Thessaly and the southern area of Mount Pindus 
were all clear. 
73 
In mid-1949 Epirus became the main focus of the government forces. The major 
task of the National Army was to drive the Democratic Army from its bases in the 
Mounts Grammos and Vitsi. On 12 May 1949, Papagos initiated a new temporary 
command: the Headquarters of Epirus and Western Macedonia (SHDM) under direction 
of t he G eneral A rrny I nspector, L ieutenant G eneral V entiris. 74 T he s cheme u nited a 11 
government forces in an area dominated by the communists. SHDM, once reinforced 
from southern Greece, would have nearly 200,000 men under its control. The creation of 
the Headquarters of Epirus and Western Macedonia demonstrated the army's 
determination to improve its reputation after the lacklustre perfon-nance of previous 
years. The Headquarters of Epirus and Western Macedonia included B Army Corps, 
which w as inc harge oft he M ount V itsi a rea. Inp articular t he heavily reinforced 8'ý 
division was responsible for Epirus. Political, military and intelligence units were 
incorporated to raise the strength of the division to some 30,000 men. 75 
73 Averoff, By Fire and Axe, p. 338; E. Wainhouse, 'Guerrilla War in Greeece, 1946-1949. A Case 
Study', in F. M. Osanka, (ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare: fighting communist guerrilla movements (London, 1962), pp. 217-227. 74 Lieutenant General Ventiris from Chief of the Greek General Staff since February 1947, became 
General Army Inspector in February 1948 and Commander of SHDM in May 1949. During 1948 
Lieutenant General Giantzis became Chief of the Greek General Staff. 75 GES/DIS, Archives-ApX6aAPX1aTPdTqY0q rIandyoq, Atarayý, I-Ipoa(opwý YUyKp6TIaq Atowý=);, 12 
Maýou 1949 (Field Marshal Papagos, Command, Provisional Command Composition, 12 May 1949), 
vol-13, keim. 5 1, p. 358. The force of the National Army was so enlarged that a regular National Army infantry division had nine battalions and the 8h of the B Army Corps had twenty-one. On 24 June 1949, 
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In August 1949 the National Army launched Operation Torch. The plan of this 
operation was to drive the Democratic Army from its strongholds in Grammos and Vitsi 
on the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Torch A would attack the Democratic Army on 
Mount Grammos. Torch B would clear Mount Vitsi and finally Torch C would clear out 
the Grammos region. 76 By the beginning of August 1949 the Royal Hellenic Air Force 
had concentrated almost all of its effective units around the Grammos and Vitsi areas. 
The plan was first to bombard the Democratic Army's areas of control. The National 
Army would then follow up to pursuit the communist troops. The power of the Royal 
Hellenic Air Force consisted of three squadrons of 54 English-made Spitfires XVI, three 
reconnaissance flights of twelve American Harvards, one transport squadron which 
comprised of eleven Dakotas, one flight assigned to artillery observation composed of 
ten old-fashioned aircraft and a bombardment flight which constituted three Dakotas. 77 
The real advantage was the proximity of the airports to the battlefields. Most of the 
Prime Minister Sofoulis died at the age of eighty-eight. Alexander Diomidis, ex-Governor of the Bank of 
Greece, formed another coalition government until new elections be held in early spring after the four year 
term of the current parliament was due to expire. This transition, however, did not affect the Army's 
operations. 
76 On II July 1949 Tito announced the closure of Yugoslav frontiers with Greece owing to the numerous 
violations and the many Yugoslavs who were being killed. However this was the result of Tito-Stalin 
break and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform by June 1948. On the role of Yugoslavia's cut of 
assisting the DAG, it has been supported that Tito had decided to reduce aid to the guerrillas as a result of 
Western diplomatic pressure and the possibility of Western economic aid. In N. Pappas, 'The Soviet- 
Yugoslav Conflict and the Greek Civil War', in W. S. Vucinich (ed. ), At the Brink of War and Peace: The 
Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective (New York, 1982), pp. 224-225. E. Barker explains it as a result 
of the pro-Stalinist stance of the structure of the KKE. In Barker, 'The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War 
of 194649', in Baerentzen, latrides, Smith (eds), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, pp. 300- 
05. Another view suggests that Tito was unable to stop his country's aid to the Greek communists as soon 
as he wanted to because of protests from his Slavo-Macedonian communist supporters. In J. Pidevec, 
'The Tito-Stalin Split and the End of the Civil War in Greece', in Baerentzen (et all. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, p. 316. The Communists named Tito 'traitor' for having withdrawn his 
support to the communist struggle. Zahariadis, Ten Years ofStruggle-, dtKa Xp6via 17611q, p. 4 1. From 
the view point of the Right Zafeiropoulos agrees with the communist argument that the DA was totally 
'dependent' on Yugoslavia. Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War -0 AVTiCVppopiaK6q AyO5v, p. 657. O'Ballance notes that the closing of the Yugoslav-Grcck frontier was a 'deadly' blow to the DA. In 
O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, p. 195. M. Mazower notes that it was the 'last straw'. In Mazower (ed. ), After the War Was Over, p. 7. Indeed the Yugoslavian help had affected the final outcome, but not 
to a significant extent. By June 1949 the DAG had already been decisively defeated in the Peloponnese, 
an area with no direct connection and effect to Yugoslavia. On top of that the DA forces were better 
equipped than ever during the Grammos and Vitsi battles in August 1949. See Map D. 6, p. 187. 77 Spitfires XVI gradually replaced the IX model. This type of aircraft was totally upgraded since their 1940 ancestors and the Battle of England. They were equipped with strong engines of 1,700 horsepower, 
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aircraft were operated from Kozani, which was equi-distant to Vitsi and Grammos. The 
arrival of the American Helldivers improved bombing performance even further. During 
the first week of August the air force made widespread use of napalm. 78 The centrality 
of air support in counter-insurgency operations had become an established concept. The 
full realisation of this concept was made possible by American material support. The 
concept itself, however, was the fulfilment of the advice the British had given the 
Greeks about the use of air power since 1947.79 
Several key positions were taken and the Democratic Army's lines of 
communications into Albania were threatened as a result of the Torch A attack. The 
Torch B offensive started on 10 August 1949. The National Army managed to force the 
Provisional Government to abandon its capital at Pyxos (Epirus) and take refuge in 
Albania. Some 4,000 Democratic Army troops also crossed the border into Albania. 
Another thousand fled to Yugoslavia where they were disarmed and interned. For the 
National Army the battle w as m ost s uccessful: M ount V itsi w as c leared. D emocratic 
Army casualties during Operation Torch B included 997 killed, 509 captured, and 133 
surrendered, as well as twenty Albanian soldiers killed and seven captured. B Army 
Corps of the National Army lost 265 killed, 1377 wounded and 9 missing. 80 Even more 
availability to transfer war-cargo, rockets, bombs, and after special alterations, under the aegis of 
JUSMAPG, to carry Napalm bombs. Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War-O AvriavppopiaK6q Aycbv, p. 595. 
78 The first two of a large instalment of American Helldivers had arrived that month at Larissa, the newly 
established HQ Central Greece. The remainder of the aircraft-39 Helldivers and 10 additional surplus- 
were scheduled to arrive by carrier on 15 August 1949. T. Papathanasiadcs, 'The Bandits' Last Stand in 
Greece', Milita? y Review 30,11 (February 1951), 22-3 1. 
79 Campbell (et all. ), The Employment ofAirpower, pp. 31,51-52; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 
196-99; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 278-93; Jones, 'A New Kind of War', p. 218; Jones, 
The development ofBritish counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, p. 242; GESMIS, Archives-ApXcfa, 
IHAM, 'EKOeat; ent q; acponopwýq 8pdaccoq KaT& qv cmXcipilail '11upa6; ', 18 AuyObmu 1949' 
(SHDM, Report on air force activities during Operation 'Torch', 18 August 1949) vol. 14, keirn. 27, pp. 
312-13. 
80 GES/DIS, Archives-ApXsla, B Mga Y. TpaTob Ai rpa(peto, 'EKOCat; cnqctpýacw; Irlupcr6; '. Apo 10- 
15 MyobaTou 1949'(B Army Corps Al Bureau , Report on Operation 'Torch, 10-15 August 1949), vol. 14, keim. 33, pp. 389-390; GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, Avo)Ttpa AtOlKtail; Aeponopelaq, 'EKOCCIV, 
Mupa6; ', 10 lenTclipplou 1949' (Highest Air Command, Report on Operation Torch, 10 September 
1949), vol. 15, keim. 5, p. 147; Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 280; Jones, 'A New Kind of War', 
p. 218; Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 239. 
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damaging than the casualties and the loss of territory for the Democratic Army was the 
loss of its equipment. 
Torch C was the final offensive on Mount Grammos and started on 19 August. 
By the start of operations the Royal Hellenic Air Force had been reinforced by fifty-one 
Helldivers. The Democratic Army defenders numbered 7,000-8,000 combatants plus the 
remnants of those who had escaped from Vitsi. The National Army outnumbered the 
Democratic Army forces, however, by ten to one . 
81 On the night of 24-25 August the 
final assault on the Grammos area began with an artillery bombardment and attacks 
from rocket-firing Spitfires. The government army moved forward shielded by the 
Helldivers, which in the first twenty-four hours, dropped forty-eight tons of incendiary 
bombs on the Democratic Army's defences. Between 24 and 29 August the Royal 
Hellenic Air Force flew 826 sorties and delivered 250 tons of bombs, rockets and 
napalm. The accuracy of the bombing was more impressive than in any previous 
operation by the National Amy. 82 
The Democratic Army position on Mount Grammos itself fell on 27 August. On 
the following day the National Army sealed off the two main passes into Albania, Stairs 
and Brooks. The Democratic Army defenders finally abandoned Grarnmos entirely on 
31 August. Their remnants retreated into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia 
where they were subsequently disarmed and detained. The civil war was over. Contrary 
81 Woodhouse claims forty-nine Helldivers. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, pp. 281-83; Margaritis, 
History of the Greek Civil War-Icropla TOD EWIVIK06 Epqvllov HoAtpov vol. 2, pp. 535-36. 82 The air force mobilised at Operation Torch C included: a. Kosani airport-ahnost 50 Spitfire XVI model 
combatant air craft (two squadrons), one flight pursuit of Spitfires IX model, one flight Dakota bombards 
(4 air craft), one flight Harvard, b. Larissa airport- one squadron bombard Helldivers (24 air craft), flight 
Dakota transport (4 air craft), c. Ioannina airport- one flight combatant Spitfire (6 air craft), d. Argos, 
Elefsina, Sedes, Orestiko, Airports various air support. GES/DIS, Archives-Apxcia, Av(oTtpct Atot"an 
Atponoplq, 'EicOcat; cntXctpýcrcw; 1TIupa6; ', 10 E=TCPPPt0U 1949'(High Air Command, Report on 
Operation Torch, 10 Sept. 1949), vol. 15, keim. 5, p. 152. On Tsamo attack: GES/DIS, Archives-Apxcla, 
Iý Mepap&, 'EKO&atq ncnpayýttvwv ent Tn; c7itxcipýace); -ni)pa6; r' MI TcT(bacca;, rov rpdRýo% iý 
MepapXeia' (I Division 'Report on Operation Torch C', Grammos collapse, I Division'), vol. 15, p. 48. 
GESMIS, Archives- Apx, -Ia, EKOcat; Tq; aeponopik-fl; 8pdcrco)q kcrrd Tqv Cn1Xc[p1jG1jv IrII)pa6q F', 2 
EVETE[tPP[01) 1949', (Report of air force during Operation Torch C, 2 September 1949), vol. 15, keim. 
(text) 36, pp. 473-74. 
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to the boast made by the KKE Politburo that 'Grammos will be the tomb of monarcho- 
fascism' the Torch C operation proved to be the epitaph of the Democratic Amy. 83 
On 16 October 1949 Radio Free Greece announced: 
The Greek Provisional Government is ceasing hostilities to 
prevent the total destruction of Greece. The Democratic Army 
has not laid its weapons aside, but has suspended its operations 
for the time being. This should not bet aken to rn ean that the 
Greeks a re g iving upt he s truggle for t he r ights of the people. 
The Anglo-American Imperialists and their monarcho-fascist 
agents would be mistaken if they assumed that the struggle was 
over and that the Democratic Army had ceased to exist. 84 
Notwithstanding this empty Communist bluster, on 27 October 1949, the Labour 
government announced that the British army would withdraw from Greece because the 
85 
civil war had come to an end. On 7 November, the Intelligence Division of the 
American Army General Staff issued an estimate of the situation in Greece declaring 
that the Greek government was 'able to control' any 'guerrilla' threat. 86 In the same 
month President Truman announced to Congress victory in Greece. All sides agreed that 
the Greek civil war was over. 
The National Army had suffered about 13,000 casualties, either dead or missing, 
and over 26,000 wounded. Approximately 38,000 communists were dead and over twice 
that many wounded. In addition a mixture of mines and massacres, by both sides, had 
killed some 80,000 civilians. Almost 40,000 leftists were in detention. Over 5,000 had 
received death or life sentences. On top of that, large numbers of Greeks had been 
displaced and were homeless. Almost 10 per cent of the population had taken refuge in 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and the Soviet Union. If one considers that the National 
Army had lost 37,000 men in the Asia Minor Expedition, 8,000 in the Balkan Wars and 
83 Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 283. Cold War exaggeration did not cease to exist for the 
American Ambassador in Moscow, Alan G. Kirk insisted that the cease-fire was 'a Soviet tactical lull' and 
thus the Americans should push the rehabilitation of Greece. Jones, 'A New Kind of War', p. 220. 84 Eudes, The Kapetanios, p. 354. 85 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128/16/CM 62(49), 27 October 1949. 16 Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 241. 
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15,000 during the Second World War then the civil war was the most costly struggle of 
twentieth century Greece. There is little wonder that it cast a long shadow over Greece's 
post-war political development. 87 
The manner and nature of this victory was pregnant with future importance. The 
explanation for the success of the National Army forces has long been the subject of 
debate. Some observers tied the victory to the Stalin-Tito split. According to this 
argument the crucial ingredient was the shift in Balkan alignments that ultimately forced 
Yugoslavia to withdraw support from the Democratic Army combatants . 
88 There can be 
little doubt that this created problems to the KKE troops. Yet the remainder of the 
Communists' Balkan allies remained steadfast. The Democratic Army was able to fight 
a very tough war after the closing of the Yugoslav border. The KKE's change in tactics 
from guerrilla to conventional warfare has been emphasised by numerous writers. 
89 The 
conventional tactics used in Konitsa a nd N aousa c ost t he K KE p opular s upport. T he 
most important single factor in the defeat of the Democratic Army, however, was the 
improvement in the morale, discipline, combat-worthiness and equipment of the 
National Army. In the final Grammos and Vitsi operations the government forces fully 
exploited their material and manpower advantages. America's Cold War strategy and 
massive American economic and military aid to Greece all played an outstanding role in 
this transformation. Victory without American support is almost impossible to 
imagine. 90 However, the presence of British troops, training personnel and advisers 
97 Clogg, A Short History ofModern Greece, p. 164; A. Laiou, 'Population Transition during the Civil 
War', in Baerentzen et all (eds. ), Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, pp. 55-105. 
Logistics and numbers are usually an unreliable source. The history of the KKE notes that the NA had 
15,969 killed, 37,557 wounded, 2,001 missing; in total 55,527 men. The Democratic Army lost 
approximately 30,000 lives. The civilians were: 154,000 killed, 800,000 homeless, 24,626 totally 
destroyed houses. History of the YXE-JOKIP10 Iaroplaqrot) KKE, p. 619. 
8' O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, pp. 195; McNeill, Greece, p. 42. 89 Kousoulas defines Zahariadis' decision for conventional warfare the 'most basic error' made in the war, 
in Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 27 1; Wittner, American Intervention, p. 253. 90 Indeed, by the end of 1949, the American military programme had channelled $353,6 million worth of 
military aid, including hundreds of war equipment, warplanes and ships, 4,130 mortar and artillery pieces, 
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played a vital role as well. Some commentators have, rightly, drawn attention to the 
contribution made by the RHAF, an organisation tied particularly closely to its British 
patrons. 91 Without the British and the Americans the Greek forces would have been 
quite unable to encompass the 'continuous, relentless' pursuit of the Communists so as 
to 'exhaust them and to force them to disintegrate' that Papagos identified at lying at the 
head of victory. 92 
Although the Communists had been defeated the Greek state had been hollowed 
out. The British and the Americans had repeatedly committed themselves and attempted 
to aid moderate governments of the Centre. Yet this commitment had been just as often 
undermined by the egregious behaviour of centrist politicians. They had squabbled and 
intrigued in Athens whilst the war was won by their American-supplied and Anglo- 
American trained army in the rest of the country. The British and the Americans did all 
they could to retain civil control and democratic norms. It was inevitable, however, that 
the prestige of the army should rise, both in its own eyes and those of others, as the 
reputation of politicians waned. The British government hoped to disengage gently from 
Greece offering encouragement from the sidelines as the Greek body politic 
89,438 bombs and rockets, 159,922 small weapons, 7,7 million artillery and mortar rounds, and 344 
million small arms rounds. Wittner, American Intervention, p. 253; Jones, 'A New Kind of War% p. 197. 
91 See: Campbell (et. all), The Employment ofAirpower. 
92 The importance of Papagos as the central constant in the defeat of the KKE is emphasised at Papagos, 
'Guerrilla Warfare', in Osanka, (ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 228-242. Matthews also stresses 
Papagos' Command in Matthews, Memories ofa Mountain War, pp. 261-63; Woodhouse is not 
enthusiastic about Papagos' contribution. He notes that the Greeks 'had won the war' before he took 
command and before the deployment of Napalm bombs, which arrived in Greece too late. Woodhouse, 
The Strugglefor Greece, p. 276. 
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reconstructed itself Yet the morbidity of Greek politics drew the British in once more 
as, having won the war for the Greeks, they attempted to win the peace as well. 
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IV Post-Civil War Politics, the Korean War and NATO Security 
Considerations: 1950 
The Period of Unstable Coalitions 
The end of the Greek civil war did not bring stability to Greece. As Sir Clifford 
Norton, the British Ambassador in Athens, put it at the end of 1950: 'if 1949 was the 
year of victory over the communist rebels, 1950 may well be labelled the year of hope 
deferred, so far as political stability and economic progress are concemed. 'I Te 
struggle between the communists and the non-communists was replaced by competition 
between liberals and conservatives and rivalry amongst politicians of the Centre. The 
result was the collapse of successive govemments. The failure of the political parties to 
create stable alliances meant that six different coalition governments were formed 
during 1950 alone. Historians have placed the blame for this instability in various 
places. Some highlight the role of the Palace in political intrigues. Others see Greece as 
a penetrated political society. Constant meddling by foreign powers lie, for them, at the 
root of the problem. The aftermath of the civil war is also seen as important: for the Left 
the harsh treatment of the defeated Communists - who still commanded considerable 
popular support - poisoned the body politic by encouraging the growth of an anti- 
democratic police state. Historians of the Right regard the leniency shown to the 
Communists as a destabilising influence on politics. A close study of Greek politics in 
the immediate post-civil war period confirms that all these factors had a part to play. 
More immediately, however, such a study reveals that the Greek situation can be 'over 
ideologised'. One is struck by the fact that the most obvious and recurrent problem was 
the overweening ambition of the leading Greek politicians. It was not ideology but a lust 
for place and power that constantly destabilised the political situation. There were no 
1 PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 95106, Annual Review for 1950, Norton to Bcvin, 
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Greek political leaders who might be described as statesmen. None had a vision that 
stretched beyond the next deal or cabinet reshuffle. The Greek electoral system had been 
designed to allow these pygmies to ply their trade. 2 
On 6 January 1950, John Theotokis, a former leading Populist, ex-Speaker of 
the House and King Paul's confidant, was appointed Prime Minister of a caretaker 
government. 3A debate arose over the electoral system under which the elections would 
be held. King Paul proposed a 'photographic system' based on the majority principle. 
There would be a separate ballot for each candidate with his photograph printed on it. 
This system would strengthen personalities, weaken parties and enable the King to 
dominate the cabinet. For that reason, of course, the parties rejected this system. They 
threatened to boycott the election unless it was held according to the existing system of 
proportional representation. 4 
Norton would not support King Paul's plans. He reported to the Foreign Office 
his belief that King Paul was trying to impose a political system based around 
personalities that the King could dominate. Norton foresaw further political upheavals if 
the King continued to demand the creation of a new electoral system. Norton did not 
merely report his views to London; he told Paul quite bluntly that the foreign a ies 
13 January 195 1. 
2 Respectively in Markezinis, Political Hlsto? Y-17021TIKý IoTopla; E. Nikolakopoulos, Parties and 
Parliamentary Elections-K6, uyara Kai Bov)xvriKtq; P. Paraskevopoulos, Liberal openings-01WE60cpa 
Avoiypara (Athens, 1987); S. Linardatos, From Civil War to Hounta -A; rorov EpýpUio arl Xo6vra 
(Athens, 1977). Thereafter cited as From Civil War- A; ro Tov Ep(p6Aio. See also Appendix C, p. 185. 3 Following Sofoulis' death on 24 June 1949, Alexandros Diomidis, Vice-President of Sofoulis 
government, ex-Governor of Bank of Greece, formed a coalition government with conservative 
Konstantine Tsaldaris and liberal Sofocles Venizelos as Deputy Premiers. The coalition increasingly 
suffered from the rivalries between these dominant partners from opposing parties. The four years after 
the last elections of March 1946 were about to come to an end and elections would be held in spring 1950. 
On 5 January 1950, Venizelos and his liberal ministers resigned from the coalition to push for early 
elections before republican General Plastiras returned from Paris and organised his own political party of 
the Centre, which would threaten the Liberals' unity and strength. Consequently, the coalition dissolved 
and Diomidis on 5 January 1950 also submitted the King his own resignation. On 14 January 1950, 
Plastiras and Tsouderos founded EPEK (National Progressive Union of the Centre). Papandreou renamed 
his 'Democratic Socialist' into 'Party G. Papandreou'. 
4 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87660, R 10110/12, Norton to Foreign Office, 9 
January 1950; History of the Greek Nation-Io-ropla Tov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 173. 
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would not support his political gambit. 5 Without t he s upport ofB ritain a nd A merica 
King Paul had little chance of imposing a new electoral system in the face of the furious 
opposition of the political parties. He had little choice but to withdraw his constitutional 
reforms. The existing system of proportional representation would, therefore, be applied 
in any future election. 6 
The organisation of the state was still dominated by the system that had been 
created during the civil war. The anti-Communist Resolution 'C' of 1946 - under which 
any political activity endangering the 'security of the state' was penalised was still 
active. The Emergency Law 509 of 1947 banned any Communist activity. Special court- 
martials existed with the jurisdiction to deal with crimes against the state. Directives 
introduced since 1947 restricted basic civil rights such as freedom of the press. The 
creation of a truly democratic state faced, therefore, major obstacles. The Gendarmerie 
and the various units of anned civilians created during the civil war for counter- 
insurgency operations still dominated the countryside. There were also several thousand 
political prisoners held without trial in concentration camps. 7 Most of the country was 
still governed under the martial law, which had been introduced in November 1948.8 
British and American officials stationed in Greece regarded political repression 
in Greece to be excessive. Given that the civil war was over, they believed that the 
continuation of these punitive anti-Communist policies undermined democracy and 
prevented nonnalisation. The allies' representatives continuously expressed the view 
that the Theotokis government and the Greek military leadership constituted an obstacle 
5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87660 RIO 110/4, Norton to Foreign Office, 6 
January 1950. This is one of the cases that illustrated that the Foreign Office did not follow a particular 
policy to back the Palace unconditionally, as often supported. On that see: Markezinis, Political History- 
HoAmKý IoTopla, p. 298. The broader spectrum of the cases of Iraq and Egypt as well as the microworld 
of Greek politics demonstrated that there was not consolidated British policy to support kingship. W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (London, 1988), pp. 263,694-699. Occasionally, 
the Foreign Office put aside the power of the King if this did not promote British policy. 6 On Greek internal situation and elections Linardatos, From Civil War-AX0 Tov EPý0611o, pp. 72,87. 7 Alivizatos, 'The Emergency Regime and Civil Liberties' in Iatrides (ed. ), Greece in the 1940s, pp. 223- 8. 
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to Greece's return to a nonnal, stable and unified political life. 9 As a result of Anglo- 
American pressure martial law was lifted on II February 1950. Restrictions on travel 
were removed in most parts of the country. Resolution 'C' was also abolished. 
However, Emergency Law 509 remained intact. The military tribunals also remained in 
operation. 10 
New political forces emerged for the forthcoming election. On the Right the 
Populist Party faced a challenge from a new right-wing formation, the Independent 
Political Camp (PAP), which was led by former collaborators of the dictator Metaxas. 
The National Unity Party of Kanellopoulos also challenged moderate conservatives. The 
Liberal Party of Venizelos in the Centre was reinforced by the adherence of the National 
Liberals of General Stylianos Gonatas, who, in the 1946 electoral campaign had co- 
operated with the Populists. Tsouderos' Democratic Progressive Party and George 
Papandreou's Party also competed for the traditional Liberal vote. Another new political 
force was EPEK - the National Progressive Union of the Centre led by General 
Plastiras. Plastiras' republicanism had endeared him to the greater part of the republican 
and left-wing supporters of Eleftherios Venizelos, particularly the refugees from Asia 
Minor. " EPEK would form a join coalition of the Centre together with the parties of 
Tsouderos and Papandreou. The Left was represented in the election by an alliance of 
the various leftist groups: the Union of Democratic Leftists, the Socialist Party, the 
Leftist Liberals and the Politically Independent Camp. All favoured amnesty for 
8 To Vima, 28 January 1950. 
9 FRUS (1949): 6,465: Minor (Chargi at the Embassy in Greece) to Acheson, 16 December 1949. 10 Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6pp= Kai Bov)xurmtq Woyts, pp. 157-8. 
Resolution 'C' of June 1946 introduced a series of new crimes and reinforced the powers of the executive 
for the persecution of the Left. Emergency Law 509 of December 1947, outlawed the KKE and the 
organisations that were under its influence and penalised any type of communist activity. 11 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87668 R 10 113/15, Norton to Rumbold, 12 May 
1950. EPEK's drawback was that it suffered the enmity of the Palace, because Plastiras had been 
instrumental in the ousting of two kings, Paul's father, Konstantine I in 1922 and Konstantine's I son George II in 1924. 
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communists and abolition of restrictive measures. 12 
Although this plenitude of parties created an apparently divergent political 
spectrum, in reality there were no substantial differences on either domestic or foreign 
policy issues. All the parties supported Greece's detennination to side with the West and 
contain Communism with British and American backing. In terms of political 
programmes, t hey a 11 s upported af airer d istribution ofw ealth a nd c laimed to have a 
special interest in the welfare of the rural class. 13 As Norton noted wearily these 
political forces afforded little hope for change. 14 
The elections were held on 5 March 1950. No less than twenty-nine parties and 
alliances contested 250 seats under a system of proportional representation. ' 5 The 
election left the Populists with 62 seats, the Liberals with 56 seats, EPEK with 45 seats 
and Papandreou with 35 seats, as the strongest parties. 16 No party was powerful to fonn 
even a minority government strong enough to resist probable post-election alliances. 
Thus a one-party government could not be formed. The formation of a coalition was, 
therefore, inevitable. The combined vote of the three Centre parties of Venizelos, 
Plastiras and Papandreou taken together gave them the majority of the seats - 136 out of 
250. As a result the three men agreed to set aside their differences and form a centrist 
coalition. Plastiras would take over premiership as the 'newest' and most appealing 
liberal politician in the Parliament. The aim of Plastiras coalition would be to displace 
the Populists. As a result Norton concluded that General Plastiras was 'the moral victor 
in the election'. 17 
King Paul, however, was reluctant to offer Plastiras the Prime Minister's chair 
" Linardatos, From Civil War-Aw Tov EuqRio, pp. 83-84; Charises, Elections-EkAoyts, p. 230. 13 The Times, 4 March 1950. 
14 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87661 R 10110125, Norton to Foreign Office, 16 
February 1950. 
15 Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, pp. 22-24. 16 For an account of the election results see: Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections- K6, q, qaTaKaiBovAcvTiKtq EKAoyts, pp. 394-5; Clogg, Parties and Elections, pp. 22-26. 
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due to his anti-royalist past. 18 It was not just Plastiras' past that worried the King. As 
premier Plastiras would threaten the rule of the Army. Not only the Palace but its main 
ally, the national forces and Field Marshal Papagos, would be put under the command of 
the goverment, turning the royal order upside down. Inevitably King Paul disliked the 
idea of risking his own status and power by swearing in Plastiras as Prime Minister. As 
a result of the King's disapproval, there was a delay in forming a cabinet. 
Clifford Norton 'did not entirely trust Plastiras' entourage' because it was 
dominated by leftists. Nevertheless, he believed that a Plastiras-Venizelos coalition 
government would correspond to the 'will of the people'. A government aligned with 
popular sentiment as expressed through the ballot box offered the best chance of 
cnduring pcace and s tability. T hc F orcign 0 ffice i nstructed N orton tot ry toi mprove 
King Paul's poor relations with General Plastiras. The British Ambassador in his turn 
advised King Paul that Plastiras' coalition govenunent would constitute the 'best 
solution'. 19 The British embassy calculated that EPEK's leniency programme directed at 
the Communists might help to bring the stability necessary to normalise the situation in 
Greece. Britain was still interested in securing a democratic government politically 
acceptable to the Greek people as well as in keeping Greece under the western 
umbrella. 
20 
Attempts to coax King Paul to accept the 'moral' outcome of the election were, 
however, derailed almost as soon as they had begun. Venizelos betrayed his allies 
Plastiras and Papandreou by conniving with the Palace. He accepted the King's mandate 
to form a government himself. He was hastily sworn in as prime minister before he had 
17 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87661 R 10110/33, Norton to Bevin, 10 March 
1950. 
18 Linardatos, From Civil War-krowv EpV6bo, pp. 97-8. See footnote 11. 19 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87661 RIOI 10/ 33, Norton to Bevin, 10 March 
1950; FO 371/ 87661 RIO 110/40, Norton to Rumbold, 9 March 1950. 20 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87662 R 10110/46, Norton to Foreign Office, 16 March 1950. Grady replaced Mac Veagh in July 1948. 
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even had the chance to produce a full list of ministers. The public 
justification of this 
manoeuvre of creating a 'cabinet of the King's mandate' was that the Liberal Party was 
the strongest party at the election. The turn to Venizýlos was, however, ar isky o ne. 
Without EPEKs and Papandreou's support the cabinet would have little chance of 
survival. 21 
Not only did the British and Americans deprecate the formation of the Venizelos 
ad hoc minority government but it was assailed from all comers of the Greek political 
world. T he p apers oft he C entre a nd C entre-left inG reece - To Vima and Ta Nea - 
denounced it for frustrating the freely expressed will of the people. They found it 
troubling that the Premier would have to rely upon the support of conservatives. The 
Populist leader, Tsaldaris, announced the 'unconditional' support of his party for any 
cabinet that would prevent Plastiras and Papandreou from taking over. EPEK had 
emerged as Tsaldaris' main political rival during the elections. 
22 Papandreou 
condemned Venizelos. Prominent members of the Liberal Party declined to accept posts 
in the new cabinet on the grounds that this government was an attempt by the Palace and 
the Right to weaken and divide the Liberal world. 23 
The British and American Ambassadors were as one in their aim of establishing 
a stable cabinet. The British Ambassador stressed the danger that the new government 
would provoke the 'bitter enmity of the Right' as well as dividing the Centre. 
Nevertheless, he made clear to King Paul and Queen Frederica that, despite his 
objections, he did not intend to interfere in the Greek internal political affairs, let alone 
21 FRUS (1950): 5,351-52: Minor to Acheson, 23 March 1950. In this light, the theory that the Palace 
acted arbitrarily was justified. For such views see Linadratos, From Civil War-AZO Tov EpýpQo, pp. 84- 
87,146-147. American Ambassador Grady was absent to the United States. 
22 FRUS (1950): 5,346: Grady to Acheson, 15 March 1950. This is one of the few cases that the whole 
political world agreed upon an issue, as a result of personal, political ambitions. 
.3 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87662 R101 10/62, Commonwealth Relations 
Office, 29 March 1950. 
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prevent the government from taking over. 24 The British thought that the Venizelos 
experiment was misconceived but did not think it in their interest to constantly interfere 
in Greek politics. The Americans were, however, much less diplomatic. They started to 
mutter darkly that instability and autocracy would put at risk the chances of future 
American aid. 
25 
Indeed both the British and the Americans had every intention of drawing down 
their aid, whatever the twists and turns of Greek politics. The end of the civil war and 
the consequent surrender of the Democratic Army forces confirmed the supremacy of 
the National Army and its allies. The national forces had not only proved themselves 
competent in defeating the insurgents but had also emerged as an effective and 
technologically advanced army. Both the British and the Americans believed that a 
smaller National Army was desirable once the emergency was over. As early as 23 
October 1949, when the tide of the combat shifted in favour of the National Army, the 
Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group proposed a reduction of the 
Greek military and security forces from 250,000 to 123,000 by the end of 195 0.26 
At the same time JUSMAPG also proposed that its own size should also be 
reduced. 27 On 6 March 1950, the Under-Secretary of State, James Webb, proposed to 
the Executive Secretary of National Security Council, James Lay, the reduction of 
American aid to Greece. JUSMAPG would be reduced from 274 advisers in August 
1949 to 128 by the end of 1950. Indicative of American perceptions was that in June 
1950 the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece became 
Joint United States Military Aid Group in Greece, eliminating the advisory and planning 
24 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87662 R 10110/46, Norton to Rumbold, 23 
March 1950. This is one of the cases that illustrated that the Foreign Office did not support the Greek Palace unconditionally. Similarly there was no particular policy to assist the policies of the Crown. 25 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87663 RIO 110/72, Chancery to the Southern 
Department-Foreign Office, 3 April 1950. 
26 FRUS (1950): 6,440442: Grady to Diomidis, 23 October 1949. 27 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues, Section 1, US Military Assistance, Reel II, Frame 032 1, 
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nature of the mission. The lower ranking Major General Reuben Jenkins replaced 
Lieutenant General James Van Fleet on 30 June 1950.28 
This policy was mirrored by Britain. In November 1949 the Chiefs of Staff 
approved the withdrawal of the last British brigade from Greece. The last battalion was 
departed from Salonika in February 1950.29 The four British Military Missions remained 
in Greece, however. On 20 January 1950, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the British 
Naval, Military, Air Force and Police Missions in Greece were still engaged in training 
and organising the Greek armed and Police forces. 30 On 24 January 1950, a common 
proposal d rawn upbyt he Chiefs of Staff in London and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Washington suggested that the British Military Mission should be reduced in parallel. 31 
As a result, on 3 March 1950, the strength of the British Military Mission was reduced 
from 200 to 60 relatively high-ranking officers. 32 
The newly-formed Venizelos government's most immediate problem was not, 
however, the chilly attitude of Greece's allies. Rather it was the split of the Centre that it 
itself had created. Prime Minister Venizelos asked the prominent leaders of the Centre 
parties of Papandreou and of Plastiras to join his cabinet. Papandreou refused and told 
Venizelos tor esign. P lastiras w as u nwilling too ffer s uccour to his treacherous rival, 
Venizelos. On the other hand Kanellopoulos, the Deputy Premier and Minister of 
Defence, himself resigned because he was offended that a deal of any kind had been 
1801/27, Memo by the COS, US Army for JCS, 3 February 1950. 
28 FRUS (1950): 5,410-411: NSC 42/1 Paper, 19 September 1950; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW 
(PRO), FO 371/101818 RI 192/23, History of the British Military Mission to Greece. 
29 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, Reel II, Frame 0267,1801/27, Memo by the 
COS, US Army for JCS, 16 November 1949; Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, Reel 
II, Frame 0321,3 February 1950. Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949, p. 236. Stefanidis, Britain, the United 
States and Greece, p. 58. 
30 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO/37187755 R 1202, from the Ministry of Defence to the 
Chiefs of Staff, 20 January 1950. 
31 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 21/1966, Telegram from Washington to Ministry of 
Defence in London, 24 January 1950; Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, Reel 11, 
Frame 0321,1801/27, Memorandum by the COS to the JCS, 3 February 1950. 
32 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, Report by Major General Packard C. D., 
BMM Athens, 3 March 1950. 
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offered to the republican Plastiras. On 14 April 1950, having failed to garner any 
worthwhile support, the Venizelos government resigned. 33 Contrary to the view 
expressed by some historians it was not the Americans who were to blame for the 
collapse of the Venizelos cabinet. It was other domestic political leaders who crushed 
Venizelos. As Ambassador Grady noted the resignation of Venizelos' government was 
due to 'its innate weakness primarily and to likelihood that it would not get from 
parliament a vote of confidence'. 34 King Paul was left with no alternative but to offer 
the loathed republican Plastiras the mandate. A new coalition of the Centre was sworn 
in on 15 April 1950. 
The Plastiras administration was based on another broad coalition. Despite his 
treachery Venizelos was offered the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and M inister of 
Foreign Affairs in an attempt to appease the Palace. He declined Plastiras' offer, 
however, and the posts remained vacant for the rest of Plastiras' short premiership. The 
Populists too were excluded from this formation. Field Marshal Papagos told both 
Norton and Grady that he would accept the Plastiras govenunent as a 'necessary stage' 
in Greece's political evolution. However, he would immediately resign from the 
position of the Commander-in-Chief if the Plastiras administration attempted to curtail 
his powers and put the army under the authority of the government. Papagos was still in 
aubsolute control of the armed forces, which had been entrusted to him at the climax of 
the civil war. 
35 
33 Stefanidis noted that Venizelos' resignation came as a result of American intervention, discontent over 
his economic policy and determination to impose a government of the Centre. Stefanidis, The United 
States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 139. Linardatos as well, believes that the government was brought 
down because of Grady's intervention against the Venizelos' political measures. Linardatos, From Civil 
War-Azo -rov Ey(p6Aio, pp. 104-107. The foreign factor was decisive. However, the Greek politicians 
themselves proved unable to sustain their government. It was not foreign pressure that brought down the 
Venizelos government, because Venizelos would form another three different cabinets in the months to 
come. 
34 FRUS (1950): 5,364-365: Grady to Acheson, 17 April 1950. Grady had anyway not exceeded the State 
Department's policy of technical 'non-interference' in Greek internal political affairs, though did not go to 
the limit of this direction either. 35 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87663 R101 10/93, Norton to Rumbold, 28 April 
118 
Plastiras himself had no intention of deviating from a pro-Western line. Contrary 
to popular belief Plastiras was not a left-wing politician: he devoted to maintaining the 
alliance with the western powers. In the case of Britain this was best illustrated by his 
attitude to the Cyprus question. By spring 1950 agitation among the Greek public over 
the question of Enosis with Cyprus was strong enough to seriously concern British 
observers. 36 Yet Plastiras declined to endorse the Greek-Cypriot demands for support of 
their struggle on the grounds that the time was inopportune for raising the question. His 
government was anxious not to strain Anglo-Greek relations and the British would not 
depart from the view that the question of sovereignty over Cyprus was closed for the 
foreseeable future. 37 
Despite its pragmatic approach to international relations the Plastiras coalition 
enjoyed neither unity nor stability. Very soon disputes arose over programmes in favour 
of the communists. Plastiras w as n ot ah ard-core I eft-wing p olitician. Hew as t rying, 
38 however, to bring society into a balance. In June 1950 Plastiras' government passed 
five 'leniency' bills and was about to close the concentration camps. 39 With the outbreak 
1950. 
36 On 15 January 1950, an unofficial plebiscite among the Greek-Cypriot population of the island was held 
in Cyprus and resulted in a 96 per cent vote in favour of Enosis. This further alarmed the British about 
Greek foreign policy. 
37 pLTBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87722 R1081/169, Report in'Activitics of the 
Cypriot Delegation to Greece', 8 August 1950. Plastiras' pro-westem foreign policy contradicts historians 
who support that the General was a left-wing politician as considered in: Markezinis, Political History- 
NoAirwý Iaropla. In practise there was no difference between conservatives and liberals in Greece 
towards foreign policy issues. Field Marshal Papagos who supported agitation strengthened Enosis 
sentiments. According to General Grivas, leader of EOKA pro-Enosis and anti-British organisation, 
General George Kosmas, the Chief of General Staff in Cyprus was in the confidence of Marshal Papagos 
and hoped to win official backing for the Enosis plans. However for the time being Papagos noted that the 
Cypriot liberation campaign was 'premature' and at this moment he would do nothing to risk exposure as 
a revolutionary plotting against Great Britain. Ch. Foley (ed. ), The Memoirs of General Grivas (London, 
1964), p. 13. 
38 Around 13,000 detainees were in exile (Makronisos island), around 17,000 sentenced and 2,289 
sentenced to death for political reasons, and 5,500 pending trial. Histor .y of 
the Greek Nation-loTopla Tot) 
E, UqVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 173. 
31 In July 1950 the initiatives of the Premier Plastiras to release ailing detainees caused great opposition to 
the government. Vice-Prcsident Papandreou and some liberals accused Plastiras of being too tolerant with 
the communists. The Premier announced that he was obsessed with reconciliation. Failing to succeed he 
would resign. Venizelos as well turned against Plastiras with the aim to overthrow the government. 
Linardatos suggested that Plastiras government was brought down because the Palace and the Americans 
disliked 'communist' Plastiras. Linardatos, From Civil War-A7ro Tov Eyqblio, pp. 140-141. 
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of the hostilities in Korea at the end of June, however, anti-Communist hysteria grew 
and it became more difficult to make a case for national reconciliation measures. 
Pressure on the Greek cabinet by the Greek moderate parties to abandon measures of 
leniency increased. 40 In August the Liberal Party ministers resigned from the Plastiras 
coalition supposedly over the issue of leniency measures. This, however, was only the 
official excuse. The real reason was that Venizelos' party was offered more posts in a 
new Liberal government by the King. Anti-Communist rhetoric was merely a cover for 
the personal ambition of Venizelos and the Liberals. General Plastiras submitted his 
resignation on 18 August 1950 after 125 days as prime minister. The withdrawal of the 
Liberal Party's support from the coalition brought the third governmental collapse in the 
first eight months of 1950.41 The Foreign Office was under no illusions as to the real 
driving force - personal ambition - that dominated Greek politics. The new royal plans 
did not enjoy the approval, let alone the consent, of the British government. Norton once 
again tried to discourage King Paul and the royal establishment from undermining 
stability in Greece. 
42 
The Venizelos Governments: A Marginal Stability 
King Paul entrusted the mandate for the formation of a new government of 
cnational unity' to Sofocles Venizelos who was sworn in on 21 August 1950. A new 
coalition based on the Liberals, the second strongest party, was fonned. The King 
wanted this coalition to include the Populists. Venizelos, however, proposed an alliance 
with the moderate politicians Papandreou and Tsouderos, hoping that they would both 
support him and form a purely Centre coalition. Tsouderos, however, refused to betray 
40 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87664 RIOIIO/101, Norton to Younger, 7 July 
1950. 
41 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87664 RIO 110/125, Norton to Atllee, 22 August 
1950; Linardatos, From Civil War-kro Tov Ep(pbAto, pp. 143-147. 42 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87701 R1054/3, Conversations between Ernest 
Davies and King and Queen of Greece and Field Marshal Papagos, 14,17 July 1950. Dafnis, The Greek 
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his electoral ally Plastiras. The Democratic Progressive Party and EPEK deputies 
decided not to give a vote of confidence to the Venizelos govenunent. The Populists 
refused to tolerate an administration in which they themselves were not strongly 
represented. On its own Papandreou's support was not enough to give the government 
the necessary majority in Parliament. Consequently, Venizelos failed to receive his vote 
of confidence. He was forced to submit his resignation. His suggested solution to the 
impasse was the holding of fresh elections under the majority system. 43 The failure of 
the Venizelos government to receive a vote of confidence signified a new period of 
political unrest and re-ignited calls to set up a single strong party that could command a 
stable majority in Parliament. 
King Paul, in particular, had a preferred solution to the power vacuum created by 
party infighting. He wanted his confidant Papagos to assume power. The combination of 
royal and military power would, in the King's opinion, not only guarantee political 
stability but also the safety of the monarchy. Yet Papagos, royalist though he was, was 
far from being a royal poodle. In August 1950 Papagos and King Paul seriously 
discussed the creation of a royal-military government. Their negotiations, however, did 
not, at this stage, reach fruition. Indeed they ended in deadlock. Papagos demanded an 
unconditional Premiership - untrammelled control wielded in the royal interest but not 
by the Palace. Naturally enough King Paul shield away from the possibility that he 
would become a powerless figurehead in a regime in which the real leader was a 
military dictator. His thoughts started to turn instead to the creation of a government that 
was devoted to the Court. The Anny was to be the bulwark of royal power rather than a 
Political Parties-Ta E. UlviKit HoAnKd K6pyaTa, p. 470. 43 Vcnizclos' Liberal Party received 106 votes for and 124 against. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW 
(PRO), FO 371/87664 R 10110115, Norton to Rumbold, 6 August 1950; History of the Greek Nation- 
Iaropia Tov EU11VIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 175; Markczinis, Political History-IMAITIKý Iaropla, p. 360. 
The majority system would restrict participation in parliament to the parties with the largest share of votes 
and offer the first party massive parliamentary majority. 
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threat to it. 44 
Neither the Papagos solution nor a royal puppet government attracted much 
support from Britain. As usual the British wanted an efficient and sustainable 
government to take over. The Head of the Southern Department, Sir Anthony Rumbold, 
described Papagos' entry into politics as the last card to be played. Papagos acted as a 
guarantor against the recrudescence of Communist power. His intervention in politics at 
a time of anything other than acute crisis was, however more likely to further increase 
rather than suppress long-term instability. British interest in the developments in Greece 
was expressed in discussions between the Foreign Office and State Department officials 
in September 1950. Ernest Davies and the American Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Near East, South Asia and Africa, George McGhee, discussed a closer co-ordination of 
British and American efforts to support political stability in Greece. Both decided that a 
joint Anglo-American front was needed to prevent King Paul from arbitrary attempts to 
impose his own ideas and solutions to the political instability. 45 
With spectre of the 'Papagos solution' hanging over him Venizelos renewed his 
46 
efforts to form a new coalition. The Populists would be included . 
On 13 September 
1950, the fifth cabinet of 1950, a tripartite coalition administration, was sworn in, 
headed again by Venizelos. Papandreou and Tsaldaris were appointed Deputy 
Premiers. 47 This tripartite coalition proved a difficult test of the cohesion of not only the 
44 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87663 RIO 110/93, Norton to Rumbold, 28 April 
1950; Linardatos, From Civil War-A7ro rov EpýpQo, pp. 147-150. Papagos' detern-dnation to form the 
cabinet he would have liked is also justified in Dafnis, The Greek Political Parties-Ta WIvwd I70AITIK4 
K6ypaTa, pp. 474475. 
45 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87664 RIO1 10/118, Norton to Rumbold, 8 
September 1950; FO 371/87665, R 10110/ 125, Rumbold to Norton, 9 October 1950. Giannoulopoulos 
supports that the Americans supports Papagos' solution on the grounds that he would form a strong 
government; in Giannoulopoulos, Post- War World-O McrazoAzyw& K6apoq, p. 289. Dafnis, The Greek 
Political Parties-Ta EUqviK6tl7oAiTiK6 K6ppara, pp. 474-475. 
46 Linardatos suggests that Papagos solution was a King's trick to avoid new elections and probable 
victory of Plastiras. Linardatos, From Civil War-Axo Tov EpýpQo, pp. 147-155. However, this conspiracy 
theory should be treated with caution for it was the Centre's power clashes and desire to exclude the 
Populists that had mainly caused goverrunental making and dissolving. 47 The Liberals were given ten ministries, the Populists and Papandreou's party nine. History of the Greek 
Nation-IoToplarov EUqviKob EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 175. Linardatos, From Civil War-Airo Tov EpqQo, pp. 
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cabinet but also the Liberal Party itself. The co-operation with Tsaldaris and the Populist 
Party was bitterly opposed from within the Liberal Party. Twenty out of fifty-seven 
Liberal deputies voted in favour of immediate elections. Two prominent leaders of the 
Liberal Party, the former ministers, Konstantine Rendis and Ioannis Zigdis, left its ranks 
to join Plastiras. In mid-October the liberal newspaper To Vima began a strong 
campaign against Tsaldaris' son over charges of misuse of public money. In reality this 
was an attack against the leader of the Populist Party himself and an attempt to exclude 
the Populists from the government. Papandreou declared that the dealings in which the 
name of the Populist leader was involved were 'too strong to be ignored'. With the 
consent of Venizelos he tried to convince Tsaldaris to withdraw from the government 
until the scandal had passed off 48 Tsaldaris, however, refused to resign. Therefore, on 2 
November 1950, the Prime Minister submitted his own resignation to the King. He 
claimed that his resignation was a sign of 'political responsibility and sensitiveness'. In 
reality d issent inh is o wn p arty had forced him to try and exclude the Populist Party 
from the cabinet. 49The tripartite government was dissolved after just fifty-one days. 50 
Venizelos and Papandreou intended to continue the government with a reshuffled 
bipartite cabinet. 
On 3 November 1950, Venizelos took over Premiership for fourth time in the 
same year. Papandreou became Deputy Premier and Minister of Co-ordination. 
Portfolios were distributed amongst the Liberals and Papandreou's Party members. 51 
156-157. 
48 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87665 R 10110/139, Norton to Bevin, 29 
November 1950. 
49 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87665 RI01 10/138, Norton to Rumbold, 15 
November 1950. Clogg supported the view that the Populists withdrew their backing to provoke new 
elections. In Clogg, A Short History ofModern Greece, pp. 166-7; Markezinis noted that the Liberals 
withdrew as a result of the scandals. Markezinis, Political History-HoAITIKý IcTopla, p. 360. 50 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87665 1110110/139, Norton to Bevin, 29 
November 1950. 
51 On 16 November, the Populist Ministers, who had been left out of Venizelos cabinet, twenty-seven of 
sixty-two of the Populist deputies (Stefanopoulos, Karamanlis and Rallis included) joined forces with 
Kanellopoulos' National Unity Party and formed the Populist Unity Party (LEK) headed by both 
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The bipartite cabinet could, in fact, command a workable parliamentary majority. Thus, 
on 16 November 1950, Sofocles Venizelos and George Papandreou managed to secure a 
vote of confidence in Parliament of 164 for to 54 against. Simultaneously, strong anti- 
Communist measures were revived. Resolution 'C' was re-imposed and left-wing 
newspapers were suppressed. 52 
As these events unfolded Clifford Norton and the new American Ambassador in 
Athens, Jo hn P eurifoy a greed t hat itw as d angerous for the government of Greece to 
continue with its hand-to-mouth parliamentary existence. This existence depended on 
the whims of a group of political power brokers. These political leaders disliked and 
distrusted each other. They were happy to betray one another in order to gain a marginal 
political or personal advantage. The British and Americans thought that this circus had 
to end. One group of politicians had to triumph whilst other faded from the scene. It was 
not particularly important in the grand scheme of things, which group turned out to be 
winner or loser. Each was anti-communist enough for Anglo-American purposes. The 
tendency of some centrists to flirt with the left-wing was offset by the tendency of some 
politicians of the right to engage in capricious and destabilising persecutions. Thus, the 
Foreign Office could support Plastiras' government whilst rejecting Papagos' entry into 
politics or Tsaldaris' premiership despite the fact that Plastiras was considered a 
communist sympathiser whereas Papagos and Tsaldaris were out-and-out anti- 
Communists. Norton and Peurifoy had little confidence that the Venizelos-Papandreou 
coalition would last much longer than its predecessors. They believed the best thing that 
could happen o nce itc ollapsed w as for e arly e lections tobeh eld u nder t he m ajoritY 
system. The result should empower the big parties and make possible a stable 
Kanellopoulos and Stefanopoulos, on 6 January 195 1. History of the Greek Nation-IoTopla Tov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 176. 52 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87665 R101 10/139, Norton to Rumbold, 29 
November 1950; History of the Greek Nation-IoTopiarov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 179; Linardatos, From Civil War- A 7ro Tov Epýp6Aio, pp. 179,181-3. 
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government. 53 The probable alternative to a new electoral system was the emergence of 
an authoritarian regime under Field Marshal Papagos. Such a regime, they believed, 
would be at odds with the needs of post-civil war Greek society. On 27 November 1950, 
the Greeks were warned that only the formation of a strong government would make 
Greece's association with NATO possible. 54 The very fact that this warning was issued, 
however, suggested that the Western allies were moving back towards a more 
interventionist approach in Greek affairs. 
Greece Joins NA TO 
In October 1949 the Greek Foreign Minister, Panayis Tsaldaris, had prepared an 
aide-memoire to Acheson requesting him to consider some kind of security arrangement 
55 for the countries immediately to the east of the NATO area. In April 1950 Greece and 
Turkey made fon-nal applications to join NATO. Many existing members did not, 
however, welcome the application. Denrnark, Norway, and the Benelux states expressed 
apprehension about assuming responsibility for the defence of a region distant both 
geographically and culturally from Western Europe. Britain preferred the establishment 
53 FRUS (1950): 5,433435: Acheson to Peurifoy, 9 November 1950; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW 
(PRO), FO 371/87665 R101 10/138, Norton to Rumbold, 15 November 1950. The Foreign Office 
disagreement with royal tactics further weakens historians who believe that the Court was fully backed by 
the Foreign Office. In Markezinis, Political Hlstory-HoAirwý laropla, pp. 295-300. 54 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87665 R101 10/138, Minute to Norton, 27 
November 1950. The Foreign Office had an additional reason to discourage Papagos from entering 
politics and taking over power, as Field Marshal was in favour of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece. From the 
Foreign Office's point of view D6tente in Greek-Turkish relations would reinforce stability in the area and 
keep Cyprus' issue dormant; that excluded the take over of a military government, in PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95106, Annual Report for 1950, Norton to Rumbold, 13 January 195 1. 
53 FRUS (1949): 6,447449: Tsaldaris to Acheson, 28 October 1949. Greece's entry into NATO was a 
dividing issue among Greek historians. For an account of both the right and left-wing arguments see: Th. 
Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NA TO Influences (London, 1966), pp. 40-41. An 
official source is that by Major General A. Siapkaras, 'The Importance of Greece to NATO' Military 
Review, August (1961), 90-97. The author states that Greece's inclusion into NATO was the result of its 
affluent material resources (minerals, agriculture, trade, industry), land-sea and air space, 'moral strength' 
of the Greeks and 'outstanding place among Europe's modem armies' and finally the convincing 
argument of its strategic importance. He totally neglects the impact of the Korean War in pointing 
Greece's importance to the western security. Despite both right and left-wing views that the West was by 
definition interested in Greece's entry into NATO, the process of its incorporation was longwinded and 
precipitated by the Korean War. 
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of a separate Middle East Command. 56 
In the spring of 1950, however, more auspicious signs for the Greek petition to 
join NATO emerged. 57 In May 1950 at the tripartite discussions held in London 
between the United States, Britain and France the situation in Greece and its strategic 
importance was discussed. Acheson and Bevin reaffirmed the determination of the 
United States and Britain to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of 
Greece. 58 The volatile situations in Egypt and Iran suggested the need for action to firm 
up the western position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The British 
and American approach was, however one of caution. 59 Both allies were still undecided 
regarding the necessity of including Greece in NATO. The limited American defence 
budget and limited British resources were devoted to making good NATO commitments 
to secure Western Europe. Moreover, opposing Anglo-American interests in the Middle 
East complicated matters. The British plan for a Middle East Command faced American 
scepticism. Endless conversations seemed likely to produce stalemate rather than action 
in this area. 
60 
This rather sluggish approach to Mediterranean security was, however, 
galvanised by the outbreak of the Korean War. Within this context the need to broaden 
NATO's geographical borders was re-assessed. 61 Greece and Turkey were included in 
56 S. Papacosma, 'Greece and NATO', in L. S. Kaplan, R. W. Clawson, R. Luraghi (eds), NATO and the 
Mediterranean (SR, 1985), p. 19 1. The containment of Soviet power in the Middle East was agreed as a 
shared Anglo-American objective in as series of talks held in 1950. See: Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power, pp. 192-197. In these talks British goal focused on securing American support in the Middle East. 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/9, DO (50) 40,19 May 1950; CAB 131/8, DO (50) 
5 Meeting, 23 March 1950; CAB 131/9, DO 45, Report by the Chiefs of Staff on Defence and Global 
Strategy, 7 June 1950; Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) Series II, vol. 4, (London, 1991), 
pp. 411-434. On the British attempt to establish a MEC consult: D. Devereux, The Formulation ofBritish 
Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948-56 (London, 1990), pp. 43-75. 57 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 91-9,109-110 58 FRUS (1950): 5,414: Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (J. E. Webb) to the Executive 
Secretary of the NSC (Lay), extract 19 September 1950; FRUS (1950): 3,1076: Report of the Tripartite 
Preliminary Meeting, 6 May 1950. 
59 Leffler, A Prependerance ofPower, p. 348. 60 McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO, p. 65. 61 L. Kaplan, The UnitedStates and NATO (Kentucky, 1984), pp. 9-10. The Berlincrisis, Prague's coup, 
the conununist invasion of South Korea, the explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb and the victory of the 
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this re-assessment. On 6 July 1950, Premier Attlee intimated to President Truman his 
fears of a possible Soviet initiative to 're-light the fire' in Greece. 62 On 26 July, Reuben 
Jenkins, the new Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece, 
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he and Ambassador John Peurifoy had revised 
their estimate of the amount of aid required by Greece. They proposed that Joint United 
States Military Aid Group should be authorised to programme for a 200,000 men force 
with the possibility of expanding the national forces to 400,000 men. 63 Even at the peak 
of the civil war the government had not had such a strong national defence force. In the 
summer of 1950 the policy of demilitarising Greece was thrown into reverse by the 
Americans. 
Although the American and British diplomats were reluctant to encourage a 
military autocracy this change in military policy inevitably increased the importance and 
power of Field Marshal Papagos. Papagos had been politically weakened by the decision 
to reduce the size of the armed forces and the military missions. He could no longer 
pose as the sole conduit or arbiter of Anglo-American aid to Greece. In July 1950, 
however, he was able to suspend dernobilisation. The whole Greek political world 
agreed that because of the deteriorating international situation the National Anny should 
be increased. In September 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Papagos that the 
Greek National Army should be increased to a strength of 147,000 men by the end of 
the year - as compared to the 122,000 serving in July 195 0.64 On 1 September 1950, 
Venizelos had announced to the Secretary General of the United Nations that the Greek 
communist forces in China had all increased the Soviet threat. 62 FRUS (1950): 5,314: Attlee to Tnunan, 6 July 1950. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 
371/ 87710 R1078/2, Foreign Office to Crossely, UK Delegation to UNSCOB, 19 July 1950; FRUS 
(1950): 5,408-409: Memo of informal discussions prepared in the embassy in London, 19 September 
1950. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece, p. 286. 63 FRUS (1950): 5,387: Reuben Jenkins to Joint Chief of Staff, 26 July 1950. 64 FRUS (1950): 3,240-241: Minor to Acheson, 24 August 1950. According to Jenkins the national forces 
would consist of a force of: 147,000 NA, 10,000 for RHN and 60 ships, 7,400 for RHAF. AMAG would 
remain in Greece. JUSMAG would have 266 personnel by 30 June 1950. FRUS (1950): 5,406: JCS to 
Jenkins, 15 September 1950; FRUS (1950): 5,410-411: NSC 42/1 policy on'US Objectives with Respect 
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government had unanimously decided to send a unit of brigade strength to join the 
United Nations Forces in Korea. 65 
A further boost to the power of the military and its allies was provided by the 
association of Greece with NATO. On 4 September 1950, during a tripartite meeting of 
Foreign Ministers in New York between the United States, Britain and France, it was 
decided that the security of Europe a nd t he M iddle E ast w ould bee ndangered ift he 
Soviet Union obtained control of either Greece or Turkey. Bevin and Acheson agreed to 
66 
announce the admission of Greece and Turkey to associate status with NATO . 
On 4 
October 1950, Greece was invited to co-operate with the Atlantic Treaty countries in 
military planning for the Mediterranean area. 
In the winter of 1950-51 there was a tension in British policy towards Greece. 
British analyses of Greek politics acknowledged its very personal nature. They 
concluded that the frangibility of politics caused by its personalisation could probably be 
fixed by changes in the structure of the political system. Political turmoil in Greece had 
little to do with the Cold War. Yet once instability in Greece was set in the context of 
international 'instability' it took on a much more ideological Cold War aspect. Co- 
operation with the Americans was desirable for Cold War reasons but inhibited British 
to Greece and Turkey', 19 September 1950. 
65 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87710 R1078/9, Norton to Foreign Office, 4 
September 1950. Turkey a Iso followed the s ame p ath. The Menderes government gathered over 5,000 
troops to embark for Korea on 18 October 1950. This battalion eventually departed for Korea on 
Christmas day 1950. F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (London, 1977), pp. 
390-392. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95106, Annual Report for 1950, Norton to 
Bevin, 13 January 1951. 
66 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87466 R1074/8, Tripartite Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in New York, 4 September 1950. There are various explanations to explain the entry of Greece 
and Turkey into NATO in the beginning with associate status and finally as a full member. It has been 
noted that the Korean War was the turning point, creating the need for massive increase in military 
assistance, expanded geographical territories under NATO, defence of Europe and the creation of a 
Mediterranean command. In Kaplan, Clawson, Luraghi, NA TO and the Mediterranean, pp. 9-19; 
Rearmament efforts, political and economic interests in the Middle East. In Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power, pp. 419-425; For an account on the Middle East Command negotiations see Devereux, The 
Formulation ofBritish Defence Policy. Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower, p. 420. American isolationists 
feared that the opening wedge for a vast program of assistance would destroy the American economy 
before it damaged the Russians. In Kaplan, Clawson, Luraghi (eds. ), NATO and the Mediterranean, p. 35. 
The creation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers of Europe and of American military air bases in 
Turkey overcame objections to their membership because Europe's southern flank defence had been 
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freedom of manoeuvre in regional affairs. Whilst the British wished to discourage Field 
Marshal Papagos from emerging into politics the strengthening of the army, to which 
they acquiesced, was likely to make this a possibility. The Greek problem could not be 
placed on the back burner because internal crises were likely to continually reoccur until 
some kind of solution had been found. 
These dilemmas were soon brought to a head. The Venizelos administration 
faced a decisive crisis in late February 1951. The leaders of the Populist Unity Party 
(LEK), Panayiotis Kanellopoulos and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, announced that their 
party was withdrawing its support from the government. 67 This meant that the 
Venizelos-Papandreou coalition could no longer muster a parliamentary majority. The 
motives of Kanellopoulos and Stefanopoulos were difficult to comprehend. There were 
allegations that Field Marshal Papagos was behind the defection. The prospect of the 
LEK and Papagos forming a new right-wing cabinet was rumoured. A political power 
play by both leaders was another possibility. They may have wished to force the LEK's 
way into the government from a position of strength after it had demonstrated the 
government's dependency on its support. 68 Whatever LEK's motives their manoeuvre 
simply confirmed British scepticism that under the political system as it existed in 1950 
any coalition, even one with a large majority, could hold on to power for any length of 
time. 
The National Progressive Union of the Centre (EPEK) skilfully exploited the 
crisis. As the government was dragged into a test of confidence in the Chamber, General 
Plastiras, offered the support of his party on two conditions: that an all-party committee 
strengthened. Kaplan, Clawson, Luraghi (eds. ), NA TO and the Mediterranean, p. 9. 67 LEK had won deputies from the Populist Party and turned powerful conservative party. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 95116 R101 14/5, Chancery to Southern Department, 21 
February 195 1. Linardatos suggests that the aim of LEK seemed to be the formation of a new cabinet with the new force sharing power. Linardatos, From Civil War-AX0 Tov EqV6A1o, pp. 196,199. 61 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95116 R101 14/3, Norton to Foreign Office, 8 February 195 1. 
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be set up in order to draft a new electoral law and that the goverranent should propose to 
the King that general elections be held. Prime Minister Venizelos accepted these terms 
and his goverranent received a 133-to-91 vote of confidence on 22 February 195 1.69 The 
issue of the conduct of general election came to the foreground once again. Efforts 
would concentrate on the reconstruction of the traditional 'big parties'. 
69 PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95116 R101 14/5, Chancery to Southern Department, 21 February 195 1; Linardatos, From Civil War-A 7ro Tov EpVbAio, p. 199. 
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V Stabilisation Era: 1951-1952 
Papagos Enters Politics 
As a result of the announcement of the elections the political temperature rose 
once again. Papagos' steps to enter politics stoked up the heat even further. On 10 
January 1951, Papagos made his first attempt to present himself as the best solution to 
the p olitical c risis. Inani nterview w ith C harles Y ost -t he USC harge dAffaires in 
Athens - the Field Marshal denounced the Venizelos government. He stated that a 
'strong administration' was needed to secure a parliamentary majority. The statement in 
itself was of no p articular i mportance. W hat w as s ignificant, h owever, w as P apagos' 
portrayal of himself as potential saviour. The Field Marshal told Yost of his intention to 
become prime minister. He intended to enter the election at the head of a slate composed 
of candidates of his own choosing. His ticket would be drawn from 'all groups and 
classes'. ' 
Some conservative and liberal politicians favoured the Papagos solution. Indeed 
Markezinis, head of the conservative New Party, Papagos' friend and main counsellor 
proposed his own version of the Papagos solution. Markezinis favoured Papagos' 
participation in the next elections as the head of a wider right-wing coalition of 
individual politicians. Markezinis wanted to renovate the traditional Right and secure a 
2 conservative cabinet to replace the failing coalitions of the Centre. At the other end of 
the political spectrum the liberal newspaper To Vima spoke of 'the need' for Papagos' 
entry into politics. For the liberals Papagos' appeal to all groups and classes appeared to 
guarantee liberal participation in the government. If Papagos appeared to be able to 
attract substantial support from within the traditional parties he had also gained a new 
1 FRUS (1951): 5,445: Yost to the State Department, 4 January 1951; In Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal 
A-Papagos-. rrpa*Xqq A. U&vJpoq 1767r6yoq, p. 372. 
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and important opponent. By the beginning of 1951 the Palace had swung from its 
initial 
enthusiasm for the Field Marshal to outright opposition. 3 The falling out had its origins 
in the rift between Papagos and the Palace over the issue of the distribution of power, 
which had arisen in 1950. The clash became more intense in the months that followed. 
If the King's enthusiasm for Papagos had waned then that of Greece's allies 
remained low. The British and American embassies believed that the international and 
domestic situation in Greece called for a 'strong government'. However, they 
considered that there were still 'overriding' arguments against the Field Marshal. They 
feared that his entry into politics would foreshadow the creation of a dictatorship. 
Peurifoy announced that Papagos' entry into politics should not be encouraged. 
According to Norton Papagos might be 'acceptable' only if he headed a broad and 
moderate coalition and formed a 'right of centre' party. 4 
On 28 May 195 1, Papagos submitted h is r esignation from t he p osition oft he 
Commander-in-Chief of the National Army. Two d ays; I ater, a fter a fruitless m eeting 
with King Paul, the Field Marshal submitted his formal resignation letter to Prime 
Minister Venizelos citing 'ill health' as his reason for dernitting office. King Paul was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief in Papagos' place according to the protocol set out in 
the constitution for such emergencies. The Field Marshal himself told Peurifoy that is 
resignation was the result of the rift with the Palace. ' Papagos' resignation from the post 
of Commander-in-Chief, however, was dictated by his personal ambitions. By resigning 
2 FRUS (1951): 5,445: Yost to the State Department, 4 January 195 1. 
3 To Vima, 22 February 195 1. 
4 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95116 RIO 114/2, Norton to Noble, 31 January 
195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,470: Peurifoy to the State Department, 9 March 195 1. 
5 FRUS (1951): 5,477: Peurifoy to the Department of State, 5 June 195 1. This reason is also supported by 
some historians. According to this argument Papagos accused Paul of trying to limit his army powers by 
re-organising the General Staff officers. Verernis, 'The Military' in Featherston, Katsoudas (eds. ), 
Political Change in Greece, p. 218; Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 172. This 
was not the case though, because, despite the change of officers, no policy was scheduled to limit the 
Field Marshal's authorities. Papagos had under his control all three armed forces and the police up until 
he resigned. On Papagos resignation see next footnote. 
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from the Army, the road to enter politics was opened. He eliminated accusations that he 
was trying to create a military dictatorship. 6 
The Greek government was alarmed by this new development. The resignation 
of the Field Marshal caused a variety of reactions across the Greek political world. No 
one doubted its importance, however. All political parts stressed the appointment of the 
King as C-in-C and the effect of the subordination of the army to the government. 
7 
Venizelos asked Papagos to reconsider his decision. He was particularly fearful of the 
response of IDEA to the resignation. The Holy Bond of Greek Officers, Iep0q Awyk 
E, Uývcov AýtcqpaTIK05V (IDEA), was a powerful group of right-wing officers in the 
armed forces. The organisation had been created in October 1944 as a result of the anny 
mutiny in the Middle East. 8 
In the early hours of 31 May 1951 high-rankingofficers and members oft he 
Higher Military Committee met unofficially to discuss the issue of the resignation. 
Many were prominent members of IDEA. As a result of the meeting most major military 
garrisons in the country were put on alert. A number of military units moved into the 
city of Athens. The main routes into Athens were put under military control. Brigadier 
Christeas 'occupied' the General Staff building situated at the Old Palace in the centre 
of Athens. 9 According to Lieutenant General Karayannis, an IDEA member, Papagos' 
resignation was seen as a reaction against the Venizelos goverru-nent's attempts to 
6 Linardatos, in a rather exaggerated form, suggests that Field Marshal's resignation was sudden in the 
hope of catching by surprise the Greek politicians and consolidating his strength. Linardatos, From Civil 
War- A7rorov Ey(pQo, p. 227. On the contrary, Papagiannopoulos writes that Papagos had made clear to 
the public his entry to politics in order to 'bring the real change the Nation's needs' and so the government 
was prepared for Papagos' resignation. In Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A. Pqpagos-ETpaT6PxjC 
AWavbpo,; 17a7rdyo,;, pp. 443-444. Stefanidis writes that the reason was over the control of the armed 
forces. Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 177. Veremis notes that Papagos 
resigned 'following a disagreement with the royal court' due to King's interference in army affairs. Th. 
Veremis, 'The Military', in K. Featherstone, D. Katsoudas (eds. ), Political Change in Greece (London, 
1987), p. 218. Haralampes writes that the disagreement of the Palace and Papagos over army command 
brought Papagos' resignation. Haralampes, Army and Power-E=T6,; Kai 17011TIK4 Eýovala, pp. 3941. 
This argument, however, does not explain Papagos' entry into politics later on in August. 7 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143 RI 195 1/1, Norton to Foreign Office, 31 May 
195 1. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143 RI 195/5, News Review, I June 195 1. 
' Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill-Aro Tjv KopWP4 TOv A6Vov, pp. 446-448. 
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reduce the anny's powers. This triggered a coup to secure the independence of the 
army. 10 The plotters established themselves in the Ministry of Defence (located in the 
Parliament building). In the confusion that followed Papagos' resignation it was the 
IDEA organisation that was able to act most quickly in speaking for the army. " Within 
hours, however, the Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Grigoropoulos, asked from the 
putschists to return to order. The rebels made clear that they would only obey the Field 
Marshal's orders. Grigoropoulos asked for Papagos' intervention. The Field Marshal 
visited the Ministry of Defence and asked the officers there to return to their normal 
duties. By noon of 31 May 1951 order had been restored in Athens, after the putschists 
had been reassured by Papagos that there would be no sanctions against them. The 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Venizelos attributed the settlement of the coup 
to Papagos' decisive intervention. 12 
The existing literature on the coup of 31 May has gaps despite the credible but 
biased accounts of the officials involved in the incident. There is no clear evidence as to 
who organised the coup, why and when. According to the official findings of Zozonakis, 
the Counsellor of the Military Defence, who carried out an investigation in January 
1952, the plotters were mobilised by IDEA. It is not clear at what stage Papagos himself 
became aware of the initiative of the plotters. However, no matter what the extent of his 
support might have been, the truth is that the coup ended only after the Field Marshal's 
intervention. His willingness to stand down his admirers suggests that he was not 
aiming at military dictatorship. Rather he was confident that he could obtain power by 
9 Linardatos, From Civil War- Aro Tov EyVUio, p. 229. 10 On the military coup there is a detailed account in Karayiannis, The Greek Drama- To. Jp6'Ua'rqc 
E, Ud&oc (Athens, 1964), p. 265. 
11 It has been estimated that in winter 1945-1946 seventy-five per cent of the army officers were IDEA 
members. Karayannis, The Greek Drama-ToJp6pa Tqc ERMoc, pp. 210-211. 12 After the end of the rebellion Lt. Gen. Grigoropoulos was appointed C-in-C of the General Staff 
National Defence (rEEE)A), Tsakalotos Chief of the Greek General Staff, Kitrilakis General Inspector of 
the Army. Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill-Ax6 T? jv Kqpv(p4 rov A6(pov, pp. 451-3; Lieutenant- 
General and member of IDEA- Karayannis, The Greek Drama-Todp6ya rqc EU6c&o,;, pp. 266-267. 
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political means. 13 He was even willing to acquiesce to moves that the govermnent took 
against the plotters. The Field Marshal had asked Venizelos not to impose sanctions 
against the insurgents as he himself had promised them. He even proposed that the 
events should be described as an alarm drill. Venizelos, however, expressed his 
government's intention to gradually remove the most important of the IDEA officers 
from key positions. Lieutenant General Grigoropoulos put the participants of the putsch 
under detention and ordered a preliminary examination, while the ringleaders of the 
coup were placed under house arrest. 14 
Papagos' resignation and the ensuing events of 31 May came as a blow to the 
British and Americans. Norton and the British embassy believed that the deterioration in 
the relations between King Paul and Papagos was a serious cause for alarm. Instead of 
acting as guarantors of Greece against Communism, their personal ambition was 
pressing them forward into the front-line of politics thus removing the safety net that 
had underlain the unpredictable political situation. Norton believed that the most 
important act was to try to reconcile the Palace, the Field Marshal and the Venizelos 
government. 15 The American Ambassador agreed with his British colleague. Peurifoy 
reported that the resignation of the Field Marshal was a great blow to Greece at time 
when some formal security arrangements for the country with NATO were being 
13 Based on the available sources it is not clear whether Papagos directed the coup or if so the extent of his 
influence. He might have caused it as a direct attempt to demonstrate his power to the public, militia and 
government or as an indirect way to underline his power without being accused of having planned it. Lt. 
Gen. Grigoropoulos, Chief of General Staff, writes in his memoirs that the Field Marshal knew in advance 
the intentions of the plotters. For an account of the coup, see Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill- 
Aro Tqv Kopvýp4 Tov A6ýpov, pp. 445-64,468-72. Veremis supports that IDEA members did not only want 
to support Papagos but attempted to overthrow the government after the Field Marshal resigned as 
Commander in Chief. Veremis, 'The Military', in Featherstone, Katsoudas (eds. ), Political Change in 
Greece, p. 218. A hard-core right-wing version claims that Papagos had no relation in any way with IDEA, 
which had anyway dissolved itself after the end of the civil war. In Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A 
Pqpagos-ETpaT6pXj; AMýav6poq 17a7r6yo;, p. 44 8. 14 FRUS (1951): 5,475-6: Yost to the Department of State, I June 195 1; Brigadiers Kontopoulos, 
Christeas, Tavoularis, Colonel Papadopoulos, Anagnostopoulos were among those who had been 
demobilised. Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov EyVQo, p. 238; Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the 
Hill- A; ro T? jv Kopv94 rov A6Vov, pp. 460-1; FRUS (1951): 5,48 1: Peurifoy to the Department of State, 
II June 195 1. 
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discussed. General Jenkins and Peurifoy believed that Papagos' resignation involved the 
morale and efficiency of armed forces and hence the security of Greece and the West. 16 
The British agreed. 17 Upon his return to Greece on 2 June 1951 Peurifoy undertook a 
sustained effort to mend fences. In a discussion between himself, the Prime Minister, the 
King, and Papagos, the American Ambassador proposed to them to bury past grievances 
and try to bring the Field Marshal back to his post. From the allies' point of view, the 
Field Marshal as Commander-in-Chief would guarantee the military stability required 
for Greece's entry into NATO. 18 Regardless of Ambassadors' negative responses, 
however, P apagos was determined to stay away from his military duties. There is no 
evidence that the British and the Americans had any direct influence on the events of 
May 1951.19 The Field Marshal was content to have demonstrated his power whilst 
Venizelos believed that he had skilfully outmanoeuvred IDEA. 
In the aftermath of the coup the next bone of political contention was the system 
that would govern the elections. The fon-nal discussions about the electoral law lasted 
from 10 to 26 July 1951. Venizelos and Plastiras were in favour of a kind of modified 
proportional representation, which would favour the two or three parties heading the list. 
Both Plastiras and Venizelos e xpected t hat s uch as ystem w ould b enefit t heir p arties 
whilst opening up reasonable prospects for creating working majorities in Parliament. 
Tsaldaris advocated the introduction of the majority system as a means of achieving a 
strong government. Papandreou, on the other hand, wished to see the existing system of 
15 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143 RI 195 1/1, Norton to Foreign Office, 31 
May 1951. 
16 FRUS (1951): 5,4 82: Peurifoy to the Department of State, II June 195 1. 17 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143 RI 195n, Norton to Morrison, 7 June 195 1. 18 FRUS (1951): 5,482-483: Peurifoy to the Department of State, II June 195 1. 19 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143 RI 195/8, Norton to Morrison, 20 June 1951. 
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simple proportional representation maintained. The system favoured his own small party 
and increased the probability that he would be included in any coalition cabinet. 
20 
Knowing that the electoral system proposed by Venizelos and Plastiras would 
weaken his party Papandreou tried to scupper its chances. He decided to resign from the 
cabinet with immediate effect. Papandreou calculated that his resignation would trigger 
an immediate election under the old system. 21 In order to cover his tracks he 
manufactured a dispute with the Americans o ver t he p rice ofw heat a nd t he s cale of 
government subsidies to wheat producers. On I July 195 1, Papandreou and the ministers 
politically close to him such as Lagakos, Minister of Justice, Makkas, Minister of 
Industry, Yiannopoulos, Minister of Transportation, Labropoulos, Minister of 
Agriculture as well as their junior ministers handed in their resignations. The 
government was left with insufficient parliamentary support and collapsed. On 28 July, 
Venizelos was forced to offer his resignation as well. 22 
The King, however, objected to the prospect of early elections. He was still 
averse tot he i dea ofa ccepting P lastiras b ack i nto p ower. Hea Iso w anted top revent 
Papagos from entering politics. He grasped the opportunity of Papandreou's resignation, 
therefore, to form another stop-gap cabinet. He asked Venizelos to form a broader 
coalition and thus forestall rushed elections. Venizelos agreed to take over until the 
planned elections. Venizelos promised that he would safeguard the rights and powers of 
the Crown in the coming revision of the constitution. He was able to form such a 
government because Tsouderos was willing to betray his ally Plastiras. The Populist 
20 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/14, Norton to Morrison, 9 May 
1951; FRUS(1951): 5,473: Yost to Department of State, 12 May 1951. Modified proportional 
representation would grant to three parties receiving largest popular vote all parliamentary seats not 
allotted in first distribution. 
21 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/16, Norton to the Foreign Office, 4 
July 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,473: Yost to the Department of State, 17 May 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,48 1- 
483: Peurifoy to Department of State, II June 195 1; A. Raikou, Lectures on Constitutional Law- 
1TqpaJd5aciq EvvraypaTIK06 A walov, vol. 5 (Athens, 1978), pp. 148-15 8. 22 Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov Ep(p6Aio, p. 253. 
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Unity Party (LEK) left EPEK and went over to the Liberals. 23 Tsouderos became Deputy 
Premier and Minister of Co-ordination of the Venizelos' caretaker government on 3 
AuguSt. 24 
On 27 Ju ly 195 1, t he G reek P arliament i ntroduced t he n ew e, lectoral I aw t hat 
would create a system of modified proportional representation. Its main stipulation was 
a threshold of votes that would allow a party to take part in Parliament. Under the new 
law a party would need seventeen per cent and a coalition of parties twenty in order to 
participate in Parliament. Smaller parties would have to be wound up to combine 
together in bigger organisations in order to survive. 25 
On 3 August, the King signed the decree dissolving the Parliament and 
proclaiming the elections. Three days later Papagos officially announced the creation of 
his party: The Greek Rally. Its aim, he claimed, was to provide the country with 'the real 
change the Nation needs'. He advocated both 'change' and 'stability', catchwords that 
would prove effective in the party's electoral campaign. 26 Papagos decreed that the 
Greek Rally would accept politicians of all persuasions. It would only do so, however, if 
they agreed to serve under his banner. He wanted to attract and accommodate both 
conservative and liberal adherents in a right-wing party. The Rally was avowedly hostile 
to co-operation with other parties. 
23 In July EPEK split. On 13 July Enimanouel Tsouderos and his friends and MPs St. Merkouris, K. 
Maris, G. Tsouderos, among others, left the party. The official excuse given by Tsouderos for the 
resignation from the party was the disagreement with N. Plastiras over the organisation of the party and 
particularly the combinations in the electoral districts. Plastiras attributed Tsouderos' resignation to his 
own 'hidden ambitions'. Linardatos, From Civil War- A7rorov Epýpblio, p. 258. In fact, Tsouderos shifted 
to the conservative party eventually to take part to the government. 
24 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/16, Norton to the Foreign Office, 4 
July 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO1 14/2 1, Norton to Foreign 
Office, 3 August 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,489-490: Peurifoy to Department of State, 28 July 195 1. Dafnis, 
The Greek Political Parties-Ta EUjviK6c HoArrmi K6, qpara, pp. 486488. 25History ofthe Greek Nation4aropla Tov EUlviKob EOvovc, vol. 16, pp. 176-177; Nikolakopoulos, 
Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6pyaTa Kai B0V)XVT1Ktq, pp. 149-19 1. 
26 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/2 1, Norton to Foreign Office, 3 
August 1951; FRUS (1951): 5,490491: Peurifoy to Department of State, 31 July 195 1. 
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Papagos' candidature caused, as might be expected, a furore. 
27 The King was 
outraged and threatened to 'take steps' against the Field Marshal. According to an 
account given by the Chief of the Greek General Staff, Tsakalotos, King Paul asked him 
to arrest Papagos. The Palace maintained that according to military law any officer who 
resigned remained an army official for six months thereafter. Papagos was thus 
committing a breach of military discipline by defying his commander-in-chief. Papagos 
was debarred from politics unless he had the explicit consent of the King. King Paul 
believed he had the right to arrest the Field Marshal if Papagos defied him. Tsakalotos, 
however, had no intention of moving against Papagos. Tsakalotos refused to obey the 
King's order on the grounds that it was an extreme and unwarranted act. Paul's 
impotence merely served to reinforce Papagos' power in theArmy. 28 
The Populist leader, Tsaldaris, perceived Papagos as a formidable threat to the 
political existence of his conservative party. He described Papagos' entry into politics as 
an 'intrigue'. Papagos' purpose, Tsaldaris charged, was the disorientation of the Greeks. 
He w as p aving t he p ath toam ilitary d ictatorship. T saldaris w as r ight to be worried, 
although Papagos was far from preparing a dictatorship. 29 The Populists had failed to 
win a workable majority at the last two elections. The emergence of Papagos into 
politics offered the hope of new impetus for the Right. Many Populists were attracted by 
the prospect of a strong charismatic leader whose appeal stretched beyond their existing 
constituency. The same calculations were made further to the left. LEK dissolved itself 
27 The Greek historian S. Linardatos writes that Papagos' entry into politics had fallen 'as a bomb', that 
many had been caught by surprise and also that it had been a 'shock' to the King. Linardatos, From Civil 
War- A= rov EpV6Aio, pp. 262-263; Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 187. 
However, Papagos searns to have been preparing the ground for his entry into politics gradually since 
1950. Firstly with his careful plan to present himself as an independent and self-sufficient politician and 
eventually with his resignation in May 1951 from the Army. J. P. Carey, A. G. Carey give an over- 
idealised version of Papagos supporting that his entry into politics came as a result of 'his national pride, 
with the main aim to give an end to instability. In J. P. Carey, A. G Carey, The Web ofModern Greek 
Politics (New York, 1968), p. 149. 2' History of the Greek Nation-IcTopia Tov EAA? IviKo6 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 177; Linardatos, From Civil 
War- A7rorov EpýpbAto, pp. 263-265. 
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as party and joined Papagos banner. Papandreou too rapidly found himself in difficulties 
as some of his followers seemed to be preparing to join Papagos' bandwagon. The left 
of Centre press joined with their enemy Tsaldaris and embarked upon a campaign to 
prove that Papagos' ultimate aim was to impose a dictatorship. Papagos frightened and 
galvanised the hard Left as well. 
Simultaneously, the Left was given a new boost. A new left-wing formation 
appeared on 3 August 1951: the United Democratic Left (EDA). It was originated by 
former EAM members, members of the outlawed KKE and minor left-wing parties. Led 
by loannis Pasalidis EDA was intended to be the Rally of the Left. 30 This polarised 
scheme of the Greek Rally and EDA reflected the impact of the Cold War in Greece. It 
also proved the polarised character of the forthcoming election. The only leader who 
was confident enough to believe that he would not be entirely occluded by Papagos was 
31 Plastiras. He publicly welcomed the Field Marshal's candidature. 
As ever British diplomats feared for the stability of the Greek political system. 
Accordingly Norton's first priority w as to prevent open conflict braking out b etween 
Papagos and King Paul. Along with his American colleague, Peurifoy, Norton 
persuaded King Paul to relinquish the office of Commander-in-Chief. Lieutenant 
General Grigoropoulos was raised to the office in his stead. The King, however, would 
not leave the matter alone. He believed that Papagos was potentially a threat to the 
29 Conservative newspapers on 31 July 195 1, in Linardatos, From Civil War- Ano Tov Ep(pQo, p. 266; 
Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A. Pqpagos-ETpaT6PXr7q AM&v6poq 17a7r6cyoq, p. 4 84. 30 Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro rov EpVblio, pp. 270-27 1; History of the Greek Nation-loTopid Tov 
E, U)7VIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 178; Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6pp= Kai 
BoV1CVT1K9S, P. 179. EDA was a coalition of the Left and the only communist voice in the political scene 
until 1956. It represented a coherent effort of the Left to give itself a new blow, similar to the right-wing 
parties. After failing to co-operate with General Plastiras, EDA took a hard-core stance and incorporated 
in its list a number of deportees and imprisoned KKE members. 31 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/21, Norton to the Foreign Office, 3 
August 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,490-491: Peurifoy to the State Department, 31 July 195 1. 
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32 
monarchy itself because of his relationship with the Army. On 4 August 1951, King 
Paul responded to this threat. He ordered the Chief of the General Staff, Tsakalotos, to 
sound out army commanders about the desirability of the armed forces being permitted 
to vote in the forthcoming elections. The issue was of great importance since in the 1950 
elections the military had represented more than ten per cent of the electorate. King Paul 
was afraid that the great majority of the army officers led by IDEA would vote for 
Papagos. Tsakalotos conceded that Papagos' entry into politics was 'a grave test' for the 
armed forces. He was particularly concerned about 'the deleterious influence of IDEA' 
and warned that the organisation 'should not be underrated'. Tsakalotos admitted that 
officers would not hesitate to guide their men towards voting in Papagos' favour. Once 
again, however, Tsakalotos defied the King's wishes. He refused to exclude the Army 
from voting in the forthcoming elections. He feared that such a move would merely 
precipitate another IDEA 'reaction'. 33 
Once again the allies backed Tsakolotos in his attempts to prevent the King 
stirring up the Anny. Norton told King Paul to practice restraint. Peurifoy was even 
more active on this issue. The American Ambassador obtained an assurance from 
Venizelos that the soldiers would be allowed to vote. Peurifoy asked General Frederick 
(Head of JUSMAG) to ensure that all legal steps were taken to permit the soldiers to 
exercise t eir ght to vote. He went on to tell the King to stop interfering with the 
electoral campaign. 34 On the other hand Peurifoy visited Papagos and urged him to 
avoid any action that might make the King's position 'difficult' in case he was elected. 35 
32 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118 R101 14/39, Norton to Morrison, 5 
September 195 1; Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6, uyara Kai Bovlcmwtc, p. 178; 
Karayiannis, The Greek Drama-Tojp6pa TIC E. Wboc, pp. 262-264. 33 Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov EyqQo, pp. 280-281. 34 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118/10114/36, Norton to Foreign Office, 29 
August 195 1. 
35 FRUS (1951): 5,501-506: Peurifoy to the Chief of the JUSMAG G (Frederick), 22 August 195 1. The 
leftist historians suggest that Papagos formed a semi-dictatorship supported by the United States. In N. 
Psyroukis, History of Contemporary Greece- Iaropla TqC Nc6Tcpqq E. U66aq 1940-1967, vol. 2, (Athens, 1975), pp. 50-55. Giannoulopoulos suggests a more balanced account: that the Americans supported 
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These Anglo-American manoeuvres avoided the prospect of the King and the Field 
Marshal fighting for the soul of the Ariny in the event of Papagos' election. 36 
Although the attempts to head off a Paul-Papagos clash by restraining the King 
suggest that the Western powers favoured Papagos this was not entirely the case. The 
British were reluctant to support Papagos. Sir Clifford Norton felt uneasy about the 
connections ofP apagos' entourage with IDEA. He felt even uneasier about Papagos' 
support for Enosis. The combination of Papagos' influence over the military and his 
revanchist goals concerning Cyprus threatened to shift the axis of Greek foreign policy. 
The pro-Western aspect of the military might be replaced by its anti-British aspect. 
Anglo-Greek conflict would 'neutralise' t he v alue ofG reece asap rospective N ATO 
ally. Peurifoy shared Norton's reservations about Papagos. Not only did he warn of the 
consequences of a Palace-Amy split he also feared the polarisation of Greek politics 
into two camps: one led by Papagos the other by Plastiras. Although the American 
Ambassador conceded that Papagos' initiative might form a possible answer to the 
problem of political instability, he expressed concern about the 'artificial and probably 
temporary crystallisation of political forces' which might create a 'meaningless' 
reconstruction of the traditional conservative party. 37 Papagos' connection to IDEA was 
a further complication in his mind. Both the British and American embassies feared that 
the Field Marshal's entry into politics might lead to the establishment of a military 
regime. Neither, however, planned any serious intervention in Greek politics except for 
emollient and ameliorative measures such as the change in Commander in Chief. This 
was, in part, an admission of impotence. Diplomats recognised that Papagos was a 
popular figure. Any attempt to strangle his movement at birth was likely to provoke a 
Papagos because he could provide strong political government backed by the army. Giannoulopoulos, 
Post War World-O MeTa; ro2, cuiK6q K6apoq, p. 289. 36 Thus King Paul failed to strengthen his power in 17EEGA, which was headed by the Gin-C. 37 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117 RIO 114/24, Norton to Mason, I August 
195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,492493: Peurifoy to the Department of State, I August 195 1. 
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dangerous backlash. Furthermore British and American officials in Greece admired 
Papagos as an energetic and competent figure. He was neither weak enough nor 
dangerous enough to move against. 38 
Indeed the new electoral law transformed the Greek political scene in the 
elections held on 9 September 1951. As a result of the modified proportional 
representation only nine parties contested the election. The main contestants were The 
Greek Rally headed by Papagos, the Populists headed by Tsaldaris, the Liberals headed 
by Venizelos, National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK) headed by Plastiras and the 
United Democratic Left (EDA) headed by Pasalidis. The poll was declared seventeen 
days later. It returned the Greek Rally as the strongest party. The Rally did not, however, 
gain an absolute parliamentary majority. The Rally received 36.53 per cent of the vote 
and 114 seats out of 258. EPEK came second with 23.49 per cent and 74 seats. 
Venizelos polled 19.04 per cent and secured 57 seats, EDA received 10.57 per cent and 
elected ten deputies. Tsaldaris managed only 6.66 per cent and two deputies. 
Papandreou's party failed to cross the threshold and neither he nor any of his supporters 
were re-elected. The borderland polling districts and the military polling stations in 
particular favoured the Field Marshal. Papagos received 53.43 per cent of the army 
votes. 39 The modified proportional representation system as well as the creation of the 
new bipolar system of the Right and the Left had obviously favoured the big parties. The 
elections of 9 September 1951 were a landmark for the future political development of 
Greece. The political alliances that had been formed dominated Greek politics for the 
38FRUS (1951): 5,491: Peurifoy to the Department of State, 31 July 1951. 39 FRUS (1951): 5,508: Peurifoy to the Department of State, 15 September 195 1; Meynauld, The 
Political Powers in Greece-Oi 17oAmKtqdvv6#ciq oTqv EUd&a, p. 92; Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6, upara Kai BoOzmwts, pp. 422-423. Clogg, Parties and Elections, p. 27. The Populist Party, which was all-powerful during the civil war, although it had lost its strength, reduced the 
strength of the Greek Rally. In this light, one can justify those who believed that Papagos' entry into 
politics was 'premature'. To Vima, the Centre newspaper noted that the elections after would be Papagos' 
success, whereas these ones were 'untimely'. To Vima, I August 195 1. Nevertheless, Papagos needed time to establish himself on the political scene and in this light his entry into politics in 1951 offered him the time to win the absolute majority in the elections of November 1952. 
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following two decades. Moreover, the elections showed that, contrary to the usual belief 
that the King headed the Right, the majority of the conservatives voted against the will 
of the Crown. 
Yet despite this momentous re-alignment there was a limit to change. As before 
it was impossible to forin a single-party government. Papagos' key goal had not been 
achieved. Indeed although the emergence of his Rally as the single largest party in this 
its first election was a major achievement the results demonstrated that there were limits 
to the Field Marshal's appeal. In fact the parties of the Centre had won an overall 
majority. Their problem was that these seats were still divided between two separate 
fonnations: EPEK and the Liberals. As a result there was a serious possibility that 
politics would return to 'business as usual'. Indeed King Paul proposed a tripartite 
coalition composed of the three major parties. Norton and Peurifoy, perhaps relieved 
that Papagos had not achieved an unalloyed triumph, also favoured the three party 
solution in order to create a 'strong and broadly acceptable government'. 40 
Papagos, however, in a typically uncompromising stand, excluded any 
possibility of taking part in a coalition cabinet. Instead he called for the formation of a 
caretaker government and the proclamation of new elections under the majority system. 
Naturally, King Paul and the Palace strongly opposed this prospect. 41 Instead, on 29 
September 195 1, Plastiras and Venizelos formed a government enjoying a parliamentary 
majority. Plastiras was Premier whilst Venizelos took on the posts of Deputy Prime 
40 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118 RIO 114/43, Norton to Foreign Office, 19 
September 1951; FRUS (1951): 5,508-509: Peurifoy to the Department of State, 15 September 1951. 41 On the rift between Papagos and the Palace there are different views. Papagiannopoulos writes that, 
despite the well known and well proven pro-royalist Papagos' beliefs, the clash between Papagos and the 
Palace originated from the end of 1950 when the former refused to be appointed the King's Premier. 
Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A. Papagos-Zrpar6pX? 1c AAt&v&poq I7a7rdyoq, pp. 469470. There is 
also the view that the relationship of Papagos and the Palace deteriorated because of disagreements with 
King Paul over the powers of the Army, which according to the King could 'awake' Ethnikos Dichasmos 
(National Schism) and this in turn would challenge again the position of kingship as in the case of 
Eleftherios Venizelos and King Konstantine I, father of King Paul, in 1920. Linardatos, From Civil War- 
A2rorov EpýpbAio, pp. 296,299. Indeed, both cases are justified. However, the uncompromising character 
of Papagos and mainly his political ambitions had brought the clash between the two men. 
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Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The cabinet consisted of EPEK and Liberal 
ministers in proportion to the parliamentary strength of the two parties. 
42 
The Plastiras Government 
The Plastiras government managed to remain in power for almost a year. 
Although Plastiras had always been considered to be a left-wing sympathiser politician 
he turned out to be a typical Cold War pro-westemer prime minister. He followed an 
anglophile foreign policy on the Cyprus issue. He confirmed the rights of the King by 
the introduction of a new constitution. The eventual fall of his cabinet was the result of 
the usual falling out between coalition partners over issues of personality and power 
rather than 'the contradictory policies towards the communists' as suggested by some 
historians. 43 
An important issue for Plastiras premiership was the constitution, which had not 
been reformed since 1911. On 27 July 195 1, at an ad hoc meeting at the Tatoi Palace 
between all party leaders, except for Papagos and the Lefl, it had been agreed that the 
new chamber would vote for a new constitution. The prime mover in maintaining the 
momentum for constitutional reform was the King himself. Paul was still smarting from 
his repeated humiliations during the rift between Papagos and the Palace. He was 
desperate to consolidate his status. 44 The role of the King and his authority to appoint 
ministers and dissolve governments were ratified in article 31 of the constitution. At one 
42 pLMLIC RECOp 'D OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118 RIO 114/54, Norton to Foreign Office, I 
October 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,511: Peurifoy to Department of State, 16 October 195 1. 
Papagiannopoulos argues that the King proposed the formation of the tripartite coalition to undermine 
Papagos' strength. Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal Ale-xandros Papagos- ZTpo: r6pXjqAAt&v6poC 
17=6yoq, p. 445. From another perspective, Linardatos notes that King Paul aimed at sustaining the 
Liberals in power as much as possible to please the Liberals and put down any liberal claims for 
republicanism. Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro, Tov Ep(pbAio, p. 301. Both historians are partly right. 
Papagos had strengthened his powers during Plastiras premiership through the new electoral law. 
Similarly, the new constitution under Plastiras cabinet would favour the King's rights. Claims for 
republicanism, however, were not a threat at that point for the King. 43 History of the Greek Nation4aropla Tov EU? IvIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 180. 
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stage Papagos had threatened to break the power of the Palace. Instead the result of the 
election led to the confinnation ofr oyal p ower inG reek p olitics. T his w as t he m ost 
important achievement from the point of view of the Palace. The new constitution was 
also framed to appeal to the Army. It prescribed inter alia: restrictions on the press and 
freedom of speech and that civilians should be court-martialled if they acted 'against the 
security of the armed forces'. The application of emergency laws in the case of a threat 
to national security even without parliamentary approval was ratified. The constitution 
banned the right of strike to civil servants. The constitution was a thoroughgoing Cold 
War document. It reflected the balance of power thrown up by the September 1951 
elections. There could be considerable dispute as to which political grouping had 
emerged best from this election. One thing was certain, however: the left was weak. All 
other parties could agree to measures that infringed civil liberties but helped guarantee 
their own political futures. 45 
The strengthening of the centre-right in Greek politics was entirely satisfactory 
to Britain. The Cold War politics of Greece could be seen as a triumph for British 
diplomacy. They had managed to achieve their objectives and stay friendly with both the 
Greeks and the Americans. Sir Charles Peake, Norton's successor as British 
Ambassador, considered that the allies were still 'on close and cordial terms'. 46 It was 
not just the embassy that provided a conduit for this cordiality. The British Military 
Mission was still in operation training Greek forces. British diplomats and soldiers 
attended political and military meetings and took part in decision-making. 
44 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101799 R1017/5, Peake to Eden, 5 February 1952; 
History ofthe Greek Nation4aropia Too EUqviKo6 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 179. 45 History of the Greek Nation-IoTopla Too F-UlviKob EOvovc-, vol. 16, p. 179. For an account of the new 
constitution see, A. Svolos, Vie Greek Constitution-To EaUqVIK6 Ebvrayua, vol. I (Athens, 1954), pp. 3-8. Svolos and Vlahos write that this new constitution 'was not new but just a deterioration of the old ones'. Linardatos, From Civil War- A 7rO Tov EyýpQo, p. 362. That constitution was applied until 1967, to be 
renewed in 1975. 
46 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 101899 R1017/3, Peake to Harrison, 6 February 1952. 
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Even the most difficult issue in Anglo-Greek relations - Cyprus - had been kept 
off the boil. Archbishop Makarios' demand that the question of self-determination for 
Cyprus should be institutionalised by the Greek government taking the issue to the 
United Nations alarmed the Foreign Office. William Strang, the Permanent Under- 
Secretary, had made clear to'Venizelos and Leon Melas, the Greek Ambassador in 
London, that 'there were no disposition on the p art ofH is M aj esty's G overnment to 
discuss the Greek proposals'. 47 On 14 May 1951, Venizelos had met with Norton and 
the British Ambassador and had stressed to the Greek Prime Minister that 'there is no 
Cyprus issue'. Five days later the Greek Prime Minister stated that the official Greek 
position towards the Cyprus issue was that 'the issue of Cyprus is always open' but 'the 
contemporary situation does not allow us to proceed to a solution' . 
48 Plastiras, in his 
turn, continued the same Anglophile foreign policy. In his pre-election programme there 
was no agenda for Cyprus. 49 On 22 November 1951, Averoff, the Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, cabled the Greek delegation to the United Nations led by George 
Mavros instructing them 'not to raise the Cyprus question'. 50 The Foreign Office in 
return recognised the efforts of the Greek government 'to minimise Enosis 
propaganda'. 51 
47 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 101793, Annual Report of 1951,24 January 1952. 
48 To Vima, 20 May 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101793, Annual Report for 
1951,24 January 1952. 
49 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 101793, Annual Report for 195 1; On the contrary, 
Valinakis supports that the Cyprus issue was one of the main pillars of Greek foreign policy, together with 
NATO and containment of communism. G. G. Valinakis, Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy- 
Eioraya)y4 oTqv EýU? jvzK4 E&rcpwý 1`7olmK4 (Thessaloniki, 1989), p. 45. 50 Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov Ey(p6lio, p. 350. On 12 November 195 1, Politis, the former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Archbishop of Athens, Spyridon, as well as the Greek delegation 
indirectly brought the question of Cyprus to the attention of the UN General Assembly in a speech about 
the interpretation of Article 73 of the Charter and self-determination rights. Simultaneously pro-Enosis 
student demonstrations were organised in Athens University on 22 November. PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101793, Annual Report for 195 1. All developments remained small-scale 
reactions easily controlled by the government itself. 51 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101807 R. 1051/2, D. F. Murray Minute, 14 May 
1952. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118 1110114/65, Peake to Mason, 10 
November 195 1; Linardatos suggests that the Americans were in favour of the British deterioration as a 
power and prefer to 'forward their status on the ruins of the British Empire'. Linardatos, From Civil War- 
Aro Tov Ep(p6Aio, p. 35 1. However, it seems that the Americans relied on British support still at that time. 
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The Plastiras government, however, faced serious practical drawbacks. On 10 
March 1952, Plastiras suffered a stroke, which incapacitated him for many months. Four 
days later Theodoros Havinis, the Minister of Public Works, resigned in protest against 
American pressure on the issue of the renewal of the contract between the Greek state 
and the American owned Athens Water Authority. At the same time, Kartalis, the 
Minister of Co-operation and Sakellariou, Minister of Defence, also resigned in protest 
of the reactions at the continuing executions of communists. A number of deputies 
resigned from both EPEK and the Liberals: as a result the Plastiras government lost its 
majority of the seats in Parliament. Plastiras announced that elections would take place 
in September 1952.52 Once again the Greek political system revealed its fissile nature. A 
potentially strong government of the Centre had been created. The hard Left had been 
reduced to a negligible political force. The militaristic Right had been contained. 
Political reform had reduced the number of parties to manageable numbers. Yet the 
leading politicians were simply unwilling to make the system operate. Instead of 
recognising its virtues their disagreements on a myriad of issues destabilised it once 
more. 
As a result the electoral system came to the fore once again. The majority system 
seemed to be as the only solution. Since Greek politicians were unable to get along with 
each other only the enforced dominance of one figure of party would provide the ballast 
the system needed. The electoral law, however, divided the Greek leaders. General 
Alternatively, Stefanidis believes that the Americans pressed the British to 'support' Greek leaders. In 
Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 207. 
52 FRUS (1952-54): 5,271-272: Peurifoy to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1952; PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101794 R1013/6, Peake to Foreign Office, 12 March 1952; History of the 
Greek Nation-Idropla Tov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 180. At the same time, anti-Communist measures 
and executions of communists had caused strong reactions in Greece and abroad. Telegrams from 
politicians, clergy and common people from across the world had been sent to King Paul to cancel the 
executions of eight communists. The case had become internationally known. Picasso had drawn the 
sketch of Belogiannis, one of the most famous convicts. However, Cold War rhetoric prevailed. 
Linardatos suggests that Minister of Defence Sakellariou has been forced to resign in order to smooth the 
upheaval of the executions. Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov EpýpQo, p. 395. This, up to a certain 
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Plastiras, re-affirmed his preference for the majority system. Papagos too favoured the 
majority system. King Paul and Venizelos, however, favoured the re-introduction of the 
simple proportional representation system, which would allow small parties the strength 
to gain seats in the Parliament. 
The risk of another prolonged and destabilising argument alarmed the allies. On 
14 March 1952, Peurifoy warned that a return to simple proportional representation 
would have 'disastrous effects' on the supply of American aid. He described the 
initiative for the re-introduction of simple proportional representation as 'palace 
intrigue' aiming at pen-nitting King Paul to rule through unstable coalitions. Peake 
agreed with his colleague's exasperation with the Greek political situation. According to 
his own reports to the Foreign Office he had sided with the American as 'for good or ill 
the United States Government have now committed themselves to a definite and overt 
53 interference in the internal affairs of the country'. The Americans supported the 
majority system because the Centre experiments had failed to provide parliamentary 
strong c abinets. 54 In an undisguised intervention in domestic politics Peurifoy openly 
55 
advocated a change in the electoral system to a simple majority one. 
extent, brought the downfall of the government, but this downfall coupled with the instability of all 
coalitions demonstrates that the electoral system allowed the dissolution of the cabinets. 
53 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101799 R1017/12, Peake to Eden, 19 March 1952. 
Linardatos believes that the Palace together with the 'English' did not favour the majority system because 
they preferred coalition cabinets, which offered them more space for intervention. Both the Palace and the 
British were afraid of Papagos' Premiership and the total American 'guardianship' in Greece. Linardatos, 
From Civil War- A7ro rov EpqbAzo, p. 37 1. W. H. McNeill gives a more realistic account and writes that 
the American embassy and Missions continued to pay for Greece provided the establishment of 'stable 
government', which the majority system would provide. In W. H. McNeill, The Metamorphosis of Greece 
since WWII (Oxford, 1978), p. 48. Orthodox historians of Greek history tend to believe that the Foreign 
Office supported a priori the Palace and the Americans preferred any right-wing formations. Markezinis, 
Political History-HoAmK4 Iaropia, pp. 295-300. This incident, however, is one of the cases that 
discredited these beliefs. 
54 Clogg, A Short History qfModern Greece, p. 167. 55 J. Carey and A. Carey, The Web qfModern Greek Politics, p. 153. 
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The Rally Wins the Election 
Plastiras tabled a proposal for a new electoral system. On 12 September 1952, it 
gained the approval of Parliament by a narrow majority. The American intervention 
played a decisive role in creating this new system. Without this stick it would have been 
unlikely that the necessary votes in favour of change could have been found. It was 
obvious to all that the majority system would favour Papagos who had been the victor of 
the previous elections. 56 Those not aligned with Papagos would lose out. 
57 The biggest 
loser, of course, was the King. In September 1951 he had been threatened by political 
impotence. Instead the Papagos threat had been averted and a new constitution had 
reiterated his position at the heart of political life. Now the Americans had forced the 
Greek political elite to reverse that decision. Paul wildly declared that he split the Rally 
by appealing to royalists and rule through a new series of royal minority governments. 
Peake quite understood why Peurifoy had finally lost patience and effectively committed 
the United States to a Papagos government. Yet because Britain had not had the power 
to engineer this crisis themselves they were at least able to wield a calming influence at 
a time that anti-Americah sentiment ran high. It was left to the British to remind the 
King how unrealistic he was being. 58 
56 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101800/1017/3 1, J. Galsworthy to Foreign Off"ice, 
27 August 1952; History of the Greek Nation4aropla rov E. UtIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 18 1. 
57 The American support of Papagos and the majority electoral system in the elections of November 1952 
is a matter of controversy in Greek historiography. Linardatos, ftorn a rather 'conspiracy' point of view, 
notes that Plastiras voted for the new system solely as a result of American 'blackmail' over reducing 
American financial support. In Linardatos, From Civil War- A; ro Tov Ep(pQo, pp. 495-496. Valinakes 
gives a more rounded account and justifies the American 'intervention' in order to support Papagos and 
stability between government and army. In Valinakes, Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy-Ewaycoy4 
oTqv EUqvixý E&rcpxý HoAnipý, p. 44. Giannoulopoulos, emphasising the domestic factor, notes that 
the change of the electoral system came as a result of a Greek need to form a strong parliamentary 
majority. In Giannoulopoulos, Post- War World-0 M6Ta7r0ACU1K6q K6apog, p. 294. Papagiannopoulos, in a 
totally pro-Papagos interpretation, notes no relation between the new electoral law and Papagos' 
Premiership, which would have occurred regardless the system. Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A. 
Papagos-Erpar6px? 1,; AMýavbpoq l7a7rdyoq, pp. 480-484. This system would subsequently back a strong 
single-party cabinet. 
58 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101800 RIO 17/37, Peake to Harrison, 2 September 
1952; FO 371/101800 RIO 17/40, Peake to Strang, 17 September 1952. 
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On the basis of a deal between the government and the Rally, the majority 
system was finally enacted into a new electoral law on 4 October 1952. The deal also 
promised further advantages for the Right. Voters would need to return to their home 
town and villages in order to vote. The place where a man could vote was determined by 
the 1940 census rather than by the incomplete 1951 census. Voting based on this 
traditional basis was easier for the anti-communist local police forces to monitor and 
control. In theory women were to be allowed to vote and to stand as candidates. In 
practice, however, few were registered to vote. 
59 The Army was, of course, encouraged 
to vote. 
On 10 0 ctober 1952, t he P lastiras g ovenunent r esigned tobes ucceeded bya 
caretaker government headed by the Public Prosecutor in the Supreme Court of Justice 
Dimitrios Kiousopoulos. Kiousopoulos proceeded to dissolve the Parliament and 
60 
proclaim elections for the 16 November 1952 . 
Even more so than in September 1951 the appeal of Papagos - now being made 
under an electoral system favourable to him - forced the other parties to reorganise 
themselves. A number of prominent Centre politicians, including George Papandreou 
and Emmanouel Tsouderos, had already aligned themselves with Papagos. In an attempt 
to withstand the impact of the Papagos' bandwagon the National Progressive Centre 
Union (EPEK) headed by Plastiras, the Liberals headed by Venizelos and the small 
Socialist Party headed by Svolos decided to enter the elections on a joint slate. This so- 
called Union of the Parties also included a small number of left-wing personalities. The 
59 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101803 RIOI 14/4, Galsworthy to Barnes, 8 
October 1952; Nikolopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6ppara Kai BovIEDTIKk pp. 194- 
195. 
60 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101800 R1017/42, Lambert to Southern 
Department, 'The Record of the Plastiras Government', 22 October 1952; History of the Greek Nation- 
IoTopla rov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 182. The Greek left-wing historian Linardatos attributed the fall 
of Plastiras government to the American intervention. Linardatos, From Civil War- A; rO Tov EUV6110, P. 
414. The execution of the communists, Plastiras' bad health and the re-organisation of the political world 
coupled with the western preference to Papagos, also contributed to Plastiras' fall. The main drawback, 
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campaign strategy of the centre-leftist world was two-fold. They wished to point to the 
government's achievements during its year in office. Even more, however, they tried to 
whip up fears of a 'white terror' by arguing that Papagos' movement was merely a front 
for right-wing authoritarians backed by the Army. Yet, in truth, Plastiras had very little 
with which to appeal to the electorate. His attempts to extend leniency to former 
communists had, of necessity, been half-hearted. They had called into question his 
reliability without addressing in any real way the bitterness left over from the civil war. 
Neither had his much vaunted social reform programmes amounted to much. Legislation 
allowing the expropriation of land and its redistribution to landless peasants had been 
enacted but no land transfers had yet taken place. 61 
The elections of 16 November 1952 returned the Rally with a majority of 
unprecedented proportions in Greek electoral history. The Union of the Parties failed in 
its last ditch attempt to deny Papagos a majority. Reaping the benefits of the ma ority j 
system Papagos' party won a crushing parliamentary majority. Out of the 300 seats 
being contested the Rally won 247. This landslide was based on winning 49.22 per cent 
of the vote. Support for Papagos had increased by one-third over a year. 
Notwithstanding this, however, the effects of the new system are clear. Papagos had 
received less than half of the total vote but over four-fifth of the seats. The obverse of 
this was that the Union of the Parties secured only 51 seats with 34.22 per cent of the 
votes. The vote for Union was less than that garnered by its individual partners the 
previous year. Yet an alliance commanding over one-third of the votes had been left 
with less than one sixth of the seats. EDA polled 9.55 per cent of the vote but failed to 
secure the election of any of its candidates. The Populist Party won only 1.05 per cent of 
however, was that the existence of the government was based on coalitions of the centre powers and that 
left the cabinet exposed to making and unmaking of alliances. See also f. 52. 61 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO/10 1803 R101 14/9, Peake to Eden, 2 December 1952; 
Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K61. ipara Kai BovAcvTiKtq, pp. 108-109. 
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the votes and no seats. The Parliament was rounded out by two deputies from minor 
parties. 
62 
The new electoral law had achieved its stated purpose. It had produced a 
government with clear parliamentary majority. Papagos' triumph paved the way towards 
the formation of the first post-war stable, single-party, government. Papagos had 
managed to appeal to all n on-communist f orces. T he R ally w as i ndeed w orthy ofi ts 
name. It was to go on to enjoy eleven uninterrupted years of rule. Greek politics after 
November 1952 was quite different to that in the post-war years. Papagos would stay in 
power until his death in 1955. Yet even the passing of the Rally's charismatic founder 
did not dent its electoral prospects. Renamed the National Radical Union (ERE) it 
remained the party of government under Papagos' successor, Konstantine KaramanliS. 
63 
Papagos' victory came about because of changes in Greek politics. The 
communists and their surrogates had lost all but a hard core of support. The politicians 
of the Right, Centre and soft Left had discredited themselves by their behaviour during 
and after the civil war. The King had been unable to rally a royal party. Papagos, 
however, was a royalist whatever his disagreements with Paul. At least the victory of the 
Rally can be said to have secured respect and a degree of influence for the Palace. The 
62 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO/101800 R1017/49, Galsworthy to Bames, 26 November 
1952. Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6, upara Kai Bov)xvTiKtq, pp. 108-109; 
Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, p. 3 1. 
63 The establishment of the Rally's majority became a matter of controversy. Papagiamopoulos, notes 
that it was the result of Papagos himself and his strong administrative capacities. Papagiannopoulos, Field 
Marshal A. Papagos-XTpaT6pvqq AU&v6poq Hardyoc, pp. 480-486; Left-wing historian Dafnis, writes 
that Papagos brought totalitarianism by supporting exclusively the new post-war bourgeois. Dafnis quoted 
in Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov Eyýp6Ato, p. 524. Another pro left-wing Greek historian 
Linardatos writes that Papagos enjoyed the support of the Americans, who brought him to power. 
Linardatos, From Civil War- A7rO TOv Ep(p0io, p. 524. Stefanidis also supports that Papagos was the result 
of American 'overt intervention'. In Stefanidis, The United States, Great Britain and Greece, p. 229. 
Giannoulopoulos suggests that Papagos succeeded because he managed to change the political scenery of 
the Right since the elections of September 195 1. In Giannoulopoulos, Post- War World-0 Mera7ro)xu1K6q 
K6apoq, p. 300. It has been supported that the Rally's success lay in supporting the agrarian population. 
History of the Greek Nation-Io-ropid TovWqv=6 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 183. In fact, one can not ignore 
that the prominent characteristic of the majority system is the security of strong government in terms of 
parliamentary majority and stable single party formations. In this light, the case of the Rally was the 
typical consequence following the new law. The Rally's administration fitted the allies' policy in that it 
secured a strong, right-wing cabinet to govern a four-year term and make Greece part of the system of 
Western security and integrated member of NATO. 
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one institution of state that had enhanced its reputation was the Anny. It had provided 
Papagos' springboard into power. It benefited greatly from his elevation. The IDEA 
officers who had been demobilised as a result of the coup of 30 May 1951 were 
reinstated in their offices. Some were appointed to key positions in the Greek 
government. A. Natsinas, a prominent IDEA officer, for instance, became the head of 
the newly created Greek Government Information Service (KYP). 64 The final piece in 
the p olitical j igsaw, itis true, had been put in place by the United States. Peurifoy's 
decisive intervention had undermined resistance to the electoral law. Even under the 
previous electoral law, however, the Rally would have emerged as overwhelmingly the 
strongest party. The new system that the Americans had insisted on nevertheless was a 
key element in the system's enduring stability. This is a long way from saying that the 
Rally was the creation or even the puppet of the western allies. After the elections Sir 
Charles Peake wrote that he and Peurifoy were 'delighted' by the result. Yet both they 
and their predecessors had attempted to use their influence to obviate the need for the 
Papagos solution. Their preferred solution had been always been a stable coalition 
goverranent of the Centre. But the Centre would not hold; things repeatedly fell apart. 
The Anglo-American influence on Papagos' victory was of decisive importance. They 
had merely made it clear that they would no longer help either politicians or the Palace 
in their attempts to thwart the clear will of the Greek people. Eventually, it was the new 
electoral law, which made the allies' expectations true. 
"History ofthe Greek Nation-IoTopid Tov WIIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 184; Th. Veremis, ' The 
Military', Featherston, Katsoudas (eds), Political Change in Greece, pp. 218-219. 
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VI Greece's Accession to NATO: 1952 
Greece and NATO's Southern Flank 
One result of the Korean War was that measures to secure Europe and the 
Middle East against Communism became even more important to the western allies. 
According to a NSC paper dated 6 February 1951 Greece constituted 'a symbol of the 
ability of the United States to effectively assist nations threatened with communist 
domination'. ' George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South 
Asia and Africa wrote to Acheson that if the West was to make wartime use of the 
Middle East oil, bases and manpower, further political and military action was 
required. 2 In consequence, thoughts turned to ways in which both Greece and Turkey, 
with whom it had been twinned in such deliberations since the Truman doctrine, might 
be strengthened. 3 In the American conception Greece constituted the linchpin between 
Europe and the Middle East. These two areas the Americans regarded as being 
1 FRUS (1951): 5,451-461: NSC 103, 'The Position of the US with Respect to Greece', 6 February 1951; 
Documents of the NSC 1947-1977, NSC 103, 'The Position of the US with Respect to Greece', 6 
February 195 1, Reel 3, Frame 005 5. This also coupled with the American Foreign policy for raising 
military expenditures by January 1950 and NSC 68 later on in September. In December 1950 as a result of 
the Korean War, the rearmament efforts and the US reinforcements to Europe, D. Eisenhower was 
appointed as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). On 2 April 1951 Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was created in Paris, under Eisenhower within the context 
of the employment of American troops in Europe. 
2 McGhee, The US-Turkish-NA TO, p. 79. McGhee was American Assistant Secretary of State for the Near 
East, South Asia and Africa since 8 June 1949 and American Ambassador to Turkey and Chief of the 
United States Aim Mission (T) from December 1951 to 19 June 1953. 
' According to some historians Turkey was the key issue in bringing the Americans closer to the south- 
eastern Mediterranean area. McGhee suggests that the Americans wanted to expand American control to 
the Straits. McGhee, The US-Turkish-NA TO Middle East Connection, pp. 74-76; M. P. Leffler, 'Strategy, 
Diplomacy and the Cold War: the United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952', Journal ofAmerican 
History, vol. 7 1, no 4 (1985), 823. Leffler emphasises the American interest in including Turkey and 
Greece into NATO as a result of the rise of nationalism in the Middle East and Turkey's fear of neutrality 
in case of general Soviet attack. Leffler, A Preponderance, p. 425. Couloumbis attributes the inclusion 
into NATO to the rapid American global ascendancy. Coulournbis, Greek Political Reaction to Americans 
and NATO, p. 19. Kuniholm. estimates that the invitation to Turkey and Greece to join NATO was not the 
effect of the Korean War, but the struggle for power in the Near East policies against Soviet ventures, as 
outlined by 1946. Kunihohn, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 425. Nevertheless, despite 
the fear of Turkish neutrality, the actual treaty of Turkish and Greek admission into NATO was vague on 
that point. So the use of Turkey's land and manpower seemed to be more realistic motivation. 
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interdependent in both peacetime and war. 4 Greek governments had long wanted Greece 
to become fully-fledged member of NATO. The prime objective of the Greek 
governments' foreign policy had always been the securing of western military 
assistance. In spring 195 1, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, made a petition for 
extending Greece's role to a full NATO member. The reason for this call was the 
protection of Greece against a probable Soviet attack. The experience of the civil war 
and the escalation of the Cold War had made the communist threat a vivid danger. 5 In 
1951 their requests began to be taken seriously. Nevertheless the internal politics of 
NATO meant that the road to Greek membership was not entirely straightforward. 
In February 1951 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff began lobbying for 
enhanced Greek military strength. They suggested that the manpower ceiling for the 
Greek armed forces should be raised by one-third to 164,000 men. These increases and 
more general support for the Greek army would be financed by increased American aid. 6 
On 8 March 195 1, Admiral Carney, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in 
Southern Europe, suggested that all the countries of the Northern Mediterranean should 
be considered as parts of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's right flank. Dwight 
Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) also favoured the 
enlargement of his European Command. As a result, on 30A pril 195 1, T ruman a nd 
Acheson agreed that the accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO should become the 
openly-expressed policy of the American administration. 7 
4 FRUS (1951): 5,451-461: S. Everett Gleason (Acting Executive Secretary of the NSQNCS report, 6 
February 195 1; Documents of the NSC 1947-1977, NSC ION 1, 'The Position of the US With Respect to 
Greece', 14 February 195 1, Reel 3, Frame 0070. 
5FRUS (1951): 3,508-510: Peurifoy to Acheson, 13 April 1951. 
6 FRUS (1951): 5,50-60,70: Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, 14-21 February, 
195 1; Documents of the Joint Chief of Staff (thereafter JCS), JCS 1798/58, Additional Military Aid to 
Greece, 15 February 1951, Reel 4, Frame 0015; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East 
Connection, pp. 78-85. 7 FRUS (1951): 3,479485: Carney to Eisenhower, 8 March 195 1; FRUS (1951): 3,501-505: Acheson to 
Marshall, 24 March 195 1. Eisenhower in early 195 0 had become Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR). The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had its political headquarters in Paris. The regional southern European command headquarters in Naples was directly subordinate to the 
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The British were also interested in incorporating Greece and Turkey into NATO. 
On 17 May 1951 British policy, as outlined by the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, 
was targeted at associating Turkey with the defence of Middle East. 
8 This association 
would, it was hoped, extend American military commitments into the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Britain saw NATO's enlargement to include Greece and Turkey as a 
possible means to deal with the Anglo-Egyptian impasse of British rights over Suez. 
The Middle East Command that the British had long wanted to form might prove more 
palatable to the British if it was linked to NATO. Consequently Morrison was inclined 
to support Greece's application for NATO membership. 
9 The British Minister of 
Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell, came to much the same conclusion. Shinwell emphasised 
the strategic importance of Greece against 'enemy forces' and the importance of the 
American commitment to defend the area. The military presence of NATO, he argued, 
would deter the Soviet threat from entering the Eastern Mediterranean. 
' 0 
When the Cabinet discussed the proposals presented by Morrison and Shinwell 
their major concern was no longer the principle of Greek membership into NATO - its 
desirability was conceded. What really concerned the British was the question of 
command arrangements in the Mediterranean. The Chiefs of Staff argued that Greece 
and Turkey should not be a part of Eisenhower's command but instead should join a 
British Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME). Ideally the putative Middle 
East Command would be linked to NATO and the American Sixth Fleet Commander 
SACEUR. The expansion of the regional planning groups with supreme allied commands showed the 
massive defence structure undertaken by the American military aid by early 1950. 
8 FRUS (1951): 5,104-106: informal United States-United Kingdom discussions, 2 April 195 1; PUBLIC 
RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/45, CP (51) 130, memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, 17 May 195 1. 
9 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/45, CP (51) 132, 'Strategic Importance of Greece 
and Turkey', 17 May 195 1; HC Deb, 195 1, vol. 488, col. 198,30 May 195 1; E. Athanassopoulou, 
Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952 (London, 2000), pp. 207-211. 
10 PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 21/1967, CP (51) 132, note by the Minister of 
Defence, 'Turkey and Greece and NATO', 17 May 195 1; CAB 129/45, CP (51) 132, 'Strategic 
Importance of Greece and Turkey', 17 May 195 1. 
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would be under SACME. 11 
This plan faced obvious difficulties. Neither Greece nor Turkey was willing to 
place their forces under British command either in the Mediterranean or the Middle 
East. Both countries wanted their forces to report to a United States general and be part 
of the NATO European army. 12 Their primary thought was of American beneficence. 
Political leaders were convinced that in order to support their general in Europe the 
United States would loosen the purse strings. Although Marshall Aid was drawing to a 
close Greece could expect new ports and airports as the first stage of an American 
reconstruction of their infrastructure! 3 The Greek military too were keen to prioritise 
the American connection. A round of military talks was held in Athens and Ankara 
under General Bradley (Joint Chiefs of Stafo, Field Marshal Slim (Commander of the 
hnperial General Stafo and their colleague French General Licheres in October 1951. 
According to Bradley's report the Greek Chiefs of General Staff wanted to place their 
forces under Eisenhower's command. They believed that the inclusion of Greek ground 
forces in SACEUR's southern command would turn Greece into the master in the 
Balkan theatre in terms of military power and prestige. The Royal Hellenic Navy, the 
Greeks argued, should be under the command of the Sixth Fleet. 14 They opposed the 
alternatives favoured by the British - the inclusion of the Aegean and the islands within 
the Middle East Command, the Greek Navy under the control of the British Supreme 
Commander for the Middle East and a separate command for the Greek and Turkish 
" PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/43, COS (51) 84, COS Committee meeting, 21 
May 1951; DEFE 5/31, COS (51) 309, COS Committee meeting, 28 May 1951. For an account of the 
culmination and failure of MEC see Devereux, The Formulation ofBritish Defence, pp. 55-64. 12 Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 42-46. On these lines it also supported that Turkey was willing to play 
the Middle Eastern role asked by the West as soon as Turkey became a NATO member. In, F. Ahmad, 
The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (London, 1977), p. 392. Nevertheless, neither Turkey 
nor Greece did join such an organisation of collective security as Middle East Defence Organisation or 
Middle East Command, which anyway was shelved by 1953 in the light of NATO and the Baghdad Pact, 
ratified two years later. 
13 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128 23/19, CC 5(51), 8 November 195 1. G. McGhee, 
Envoy to the Middle World (New York, 1983), p. 218. 14 FRUS (1951): 3,594-595: Peurifoy to Acheson, 12 October 195 1; Grigoropoulos, Field Marshal A. 
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forces under a British general. 15 
Neither would the Americans accept British predominance in an area where the 
main naval and air strength was provided by the USAF and the USN. Carney was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Forces in the Eastern 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean to support Eisenhower not to divide American power in 
the Mediterranean and Europe. 16 The most that the Americans were willing to concede 
was a suggestion, never acted on, that Turkey might co-operate in the defence of the 
Middle E ast S upreme Command under a British Supreme Commander whilst Greece 
would come under SACEUR's command but be linked with Middle East Command 
headquafters. 17 
In reality the manoeuvres surrounding Greece and Turkey's relationship to 
NATO increasingly tended towards the extrusion of British interests. The British might 
applaud the overall concept but when they expressed concerns about details they were 
overruled. 18 The decision to accept Greece and Turkey into NATO was finally taken at 
Papagos-Erpar6pXIq AM&v6poq ffax6yoq, pp. 475-477. 
15 FRUS (1951): 3,713-714: Middle East Command and Place of Turkey and Greece in the NATO 
Command Set-up, 23 November 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95129 
RI 051/3, Eden to Peake, 14 December 195 1. 
15FRUS (1951): 3,613-616: Peurifoy to Acheson, 28 December 1951. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, 
KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/33, COS (51) 567, Field Marshal W. Slim, 4 October 1951; FRUS (1951): 3,594- 
595: Peurifoy to Acheson, 12 October 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128, 
23/19, CC (51) 5, Conclusions of Cabinet meeting, 8 November 195 1; From n-dd-October, the Egyptian 
Parliament voted bills to evacuate the British troops from Egypt and abolish the British rule in Sudan, 
which acknowledged its unity with Egypt. Cyprus was the site of the British Middle East command 
headquarters in Middle East. Devereux gives a detail analysis of the MEC plans, however, he omits the 
European dimension of British security considerations. 
16 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129, CP (51) 130, Memorandum by Morrison, 
'Admission of Greece and Turkey to the NAT', 17 May 195 1. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), 
CAB 13 1/10, DO (51) 18, Cabinet Defence Committee, 2 July 195 1; FRUS (1951): 3,475-486: 8 March 
1951; FRUS (1951): 3,551-552: Draft Memorandum Prepared by John Ferguson of the Policy Planning 
Staff, 6 July 1951. 
17 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 13 1 /10, DO (51) 18, Minutes of the Cabinet Defence 
Committee, 2 July 1951; FRUS (1951): 3,551-554: Command in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East, 6 July 195 1. 
18 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/11923 R262, Wright, British Embassy in London, 
to G. W. Harrison, Northern Department-Foreign Office, Admission of Greece and Turkey, 3 September 
195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128,29/54, CM60 (5 1), minutes of Cabinet 
meeting, 27 September 195 1. 
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the Ottawa conference on 22 October 1951.19 The Greek liberal and conservative world 
welcomed the news. Advantages of Greece's inclusion into NATO revolved around the 
military and economic benefits. It was also estimated that public expenses for defence 
would be decreased by approximately fifty per cent whereas financial assistance would 
increase by $ 100-200 million per year. There were drawbacks involved as well 
including fear from all perspectives of political circles of high expenditure on 
armaments to be imposed to Greece. Naturally, however, advantages compensated for 
all disadvantages. 20 
Despite agreements, the new Conservative government of Winston Churchill 
kept plugging away at the command issue. 21 They enjoyed little more success than their 
Labour predecessors. The formal inclusion of Greece in NATO was ratified at the 
Lisbon meeting in February 1952. On 15 February 1952, the Military Committee of the 
19 Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands expressed reservations on NATO's enlargement to non- 
Northern countries on conditions of geographical proximity, political organisation, culture and religion in 
the case of Turkey. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/11923 R262, Wright, British 
Embassy in London, to G. W. Harrison, Northern Department-Foreign Office, Admission of Greece and 
Turkey, 3 September 1951 
20 Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill- A7ro r1v KopvV4 Tov A6rov, pp. 514,521-522; The Left, as 
expected, came out against NATO alliance for the latter deliberately dissuaded Greece from smoothing or 
enlarging its relations with Bulgaria and Albania, which led to maintaining tension in the Balkans. 
Couloumbis, Greek Political Reactions to American and NA TO Influences, pp. 34-4 1; Valinakis, 
Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy-Eiaaycoy4 oTIv EUqviký E&rcplKý 17011TIKý , p. 50. Major 
General Andrew Siapkaras, Greek Army, 'The Importance of Greece to NATO', Military Review, August 
(1961), 90-97. The author notes that Greece was accepted into NATO because it suited western standards. 
Siapkaras' argument should be treated with caution because he overestimates Greece's importance on a 
national and international level, especially vis a vis Turkey. Siapkaras' report, however, is important 
because it is one of the few documents of Greek officials on Greece's perceptions towards NATO. The 
archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on NATO are still restricted for research. From another 
point of view, Lt. Col. Edward R. Wainhouse, writes that the only valuable element Greece possessed for 
a foreign power was its geographic position. Wainhouse, 'Guerrilla War in Greece', in Osanka (ed. ), 
Modern Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 217-227. Both authors, however, have presented the two opposite sides of 
the matter. In practice, a series of bilateral policies and necessities had brought all parts together. 
21 FRUS (1952-1954): 9,168-170: 'Middle East Command', 4 January 1952; FRUS (1952-1954): 6,774- 
777: Third formal meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, 8 January 1952; PUBLIC 
RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/36, COS (52) 11,3 January 1952. FRUS (1951): 5,257-264: 
NSC r eport, 27D ecernber 195 1; The Greek historians tend to acquire an American point of view and 
support that 'Churchill's government marked the disintegration oft he e rnpire', L inardatos, From Civil 
War- A7ro rov Ep(pQo, p. 353. Accordingly, 1947 and thereafter signified the 'change of guard' from 
Britain to the US in sustaining the lifeline of pro-Western Greece, whereas the formation of NATO was 
the vivid proof of American predominance. Th. Veremis, 'The Military', in Featherestone and Katsoudas 
(eds. ), Political Change in Greece, p. 217; Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969), p. 109. 
However, Britain deserves to be given credits for putting the foundations of American assistance. 
Moreover, Britain had a secondary but important role in NATO command arrangements. 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Standing Group agreed to include Greek and 
Turkish ground armed forces in Eisenhower's general command and specifically under 
Admiral Carney's (CINCSOUTH) command. A Greek and a Turkish general would 
control their countries' respective land forces. Each would report directly to Carney. The 
air forces of both Greece and Turkey would be placed under an American commander, 
who w ould bea ppointed byA dmiral C amey. 22 The British could do little other than 
consent to this arrangement. The only concession they won was a promise to link the 
Greek and Turkish navies to the British naval commander in the Mediterranean in his 
Middle East Command role. Yet even this promise was fairly meaningless. The exact 
nature of this linkage was not clarified. It most certainly did not mean direct command. 
In any case Middle East Command did not yet exist and no one could accurately predict 
when it would. NATO was the real game. In the end a compromise was devised to 
create a separate Eastern Mediterranean Command under Admiral Carney. This new 
Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean (CINCMED) would have his headquarters 
in Malta. On 18 December 1952, the naval forces of Greece and Turkey were placed 
under the authority of Admiral Louis Mountbatten, who was serving under Carney's 
command and the Sixth Fleet. 23 
The British did not fare much better when it came to the details of Greek 
military affairs. Greece's inclusion in NATO made a rethink of the size, shape and role 
of its anned forces inevitable. During the fiscal year 1952-1953 the Greeks tate was 
estimated to be devoting forty-nine per cent of its budget to defence, as opposed to the 
22 FRUS (1952-1954): 5,178-179: North Atlantic Committee session, Lisbon, 26 February 1952; 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 R1192/12, communiqut by HMG to the Royal Hellenic Government, 29 February 1952; Cmd. 8489 Protocol Regarding the Accession of Greece 
and Turkey into NATO (London, 1952); McGhee, The US-Turkey, p. 102; Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 44. 
23 FRUS (1952-1954): 5,352: Acheson to Truman, 17 December 1952; McGhee, The VS-Turkish-NA TO, 
p. 102. Command Arrangements as well as naval British presence in the Mediterranean are also discussed in E. J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident (London, 1987), pp. 104,153-164. G. Tsitsopoulos, 'Oi 
EUjvoTovPKtKtq Agi)vTuctq I: Xtact; 1945-1987' (The Greek-Turkish Defence Relations 1945-1987) in 
A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P. Kasakos, V. Koufoudalds, Ch. Rasakis, G. Tsitsopoulos (eds. ) Greek- 
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thirty per cent spent by Britain. Moreover in March 1952 Greece was estimated to have 
numerically the largest army in relation to its population of all NATO member-states. 24 
As a result a debate about the so-called 'defence burden' arose between the Greeks, the 
British and the Americans. Like the discussions over command arrangements the 
defence burden issue suggested that the Greeks were looking to the Americans rather 
than the British to shape the future. Yet the efforts the British made to influence these 
discussions highlights the fact that they had not lost an interest in Greek affairs. 25 
The Defence Burden Debate 
Kartalis, the Greek Minister of Co-ordination was detennined to extract further 
allocations of cash from the Americans to cover the disproportionate amount of 
government expenditure dedicated to defence. During the civil war military expenditure 
had doubled from its pre-war levels. By 1952, however, the civil war had been over for 
three years and there was little danger of a recrudescence of a Communist military 
threat. Officials in Washington began to suggest that the bloated Greek defence 
establishment could be reduced without endangering either Greece's stability or its role 
in the Western alliance. These proposals were met with fierce resistance in Greece itself. 
Not only did the Greek government object to its loss of subsidies but so too did the US 
embassy and the economic mission. 26 
In May 1952 formal discussions on the defence burden were launched in Athens. 
George Mavros, the Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Admiral Carney 
and the American Commanding Officers in Greece. The Americans proposed cuts in the 
Turkish Relations 1923-1987- Oi EUjV0T0VPK1Kýq EX&SIq 1923-1987, (Athens, 1988), p. 182. " Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro rov Eyrblzo, pp. 455-457. 
25 For an account of the left-wing historiography of Greece in N. Koulouris, Greek Bibliography of the 
Civil War-EUqvwý BiflAioyparia Tov EuVvAiov HoAtpov; D. Haralampes, Army and Political Power- 
F-rpaT6q Kai HoAiriq Eýovaia (Athens, 1985). 
26 B. Sweet-Escott, Greece: A Political and Economic Survey (Oxford, 1954), p. 158; FRUS (1952-1954): 1,546-547: On Military Assistance and Defence Support to Greece, 18 August 1952; McNeill, The 
Metamorphosis of Greece since WWII, p. 232; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 
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Greek defence budget. The Greek negotiators responded with the warning that any 
reduction in the size of the armed forces would undermine morale. A discontented army 
would threaten the new-found domestic and international stability that the two countries 
had been working to achieve. Lieutenant General Grigoropoulos, the Chief of the Greek 
General Staff, persistently resisted every attempt of the government to curtail the 
military budget, let alone the size of the Greek national forces. Carney was not 
impressed. He thought that the Greeks' insistence on maintaining all their military 
programmes was tantamount to graft. The Greeks were gold-plating every military 
request for their own glorification. Little military or political damage would be done, in 
Carney's view, if the Greek military was reduced to a realistic establishment. 
Ambassador Peurifoy, however, sided with the Greek point of view. He was not as 
sanguine as the NATO commander about the underlying stability in Greece. Carney saw 
an oversized and inefficient military. Peurifoy with his intimate knowledge of recent 
events knew how important it was to keep the Greek generals sweet - even at the cost of 
some expensive military toys. Faced with Peurifoy's opposition Carney proposed a 
compromise: the tables of establishment of the Greek forces should be kept the same but 
units should be reduced to smaller regular cadres that could be reinforced at times of 
criSiS. 
27 
The Americans, however, were not the only ones interested in the defence 
burden issue. There were Anglo-Greek talks on the same issue. As a result of the 
Mediterranean command arrangement discussions a number of high-ranking British 
delegations visited Athens during the course of 1952. Each discussed expenditure as 
well as command. In May 1952 Admiral Carney was not the only NATO commander in 
Athens. The Deputy Supreme Commander, Lord Montgomery, arrived also. 
371/101816 RI 102/5, Peake to Eden, 2 September 1952. 
27 Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro Tov EyrUio, pp. 456-457. 
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Montgomery was typically outspoken. He thought it ridiculous that Greece was 
spending forty-five per cent of its national budget on defence and said so, openly. His 
solution was the same as Camey's: the Greeks should aim to create small but well- 
equipped armed forces with a well-trained reserve ready for emergencies. Montgomery, 
of course, went further in his criticisms than his NATO colleague. He said directly what 
many British, American and NATO officials thought: Greece was playing on a now 
non-existent Communist threat to justify over-expenditure and an unnecessary 
repressive political system. He argued that Plastiras was on the right lines: leniency 
rather than repression was the'route to long-term stability. As Montgomery put it 'the 
true bulwark against Communism was an affluent citizen who trusted their leaders 
rather than prison bars'. 29 
Lord Mountbatten, operating as a dual-hatted NATO and British Commander, 
visited Athens in July 1952. He too supported Carney and Montgomery's call for 
smaller armed forces. Mountbatten argued that since war was not imminent the NATO 
countries should concentrate on safeguarding their economic and political stability. 
Montgomery himself returned to the charge in September 1952 in a memorandum that 
suggested present levels of expenditure on Greek armed forces were wasteful of both 
NATO and Greece's limited resources. 29 
The fact is that it was a British Field Marshal, albeit one operating in a NATO 
role, who was the least diplomatic critic of Greek policy, antagonised the Greek 
government and created afroideur in relations. The right-wing press were particularly 
outraged that Montgomery had gone out of his way to praise Plastiras rather than 
Papagos. Grigoropoulos, the Chief of the Greek General Staff, complained that 
Montgomery's suggestions caused confusion and undermined the efforts of the Greek 
28 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101794 RIO 13/11, Peake to Foreign Office, 21 
May 1952; Grigiropoulos, From the Top of the Hill- A= Tjv Kopv(p4 rov A6ýpov, pp. 517-518. 29 Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill- A= vIv Kopv(p4 Tou A6(pov, pp. 518-519. 
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General Staff to improve its performance. The American embassy was worried enough 
to persuade Montgomery to 'clarify' his remarks in a fashion that was less offensive to 
Greek sensibilities. 30 
Montgomery and the other British, American and NATO commanders were only 
speaking the truth, however. The financial situation of Greece w as i ndccd p oor. T he 
nation remained an underdeveloped country with limited productive capacity. Despite 
infusions of American aid the unstable and weak Greek governments of the post-civil 
war period had shown little aptitude for economic management. On 4 April 1952, for 
instance, Kartalis drew a gloomy picture of the Greek economy. Inflation was a constant 
problem in the financial sphere. Yet this was merely the symptom of underlying 
structural weaknesses. Industrial investment was dangerously low. Even more 
fundamentally agricultural productivity was very poor. Wages remained at roughly the 
same levels as in 1951, national income increased by only 1.5 percent and counter- 
inflationary measures in 1951 had brought a marginal monetary stabilisation. 3 1 The 
Greeks were not very good at their core economic activities. 
Plastiras made a limited attempt to deal with these criticisms. In September 1952 
he announced that compulsory military service would be reduced in length by one-third, 
from thirty-six to twenty-four months. This change would bring Greece into line with 
the other European members of NATO most of whom maintained a two-year term of 
military conscription. The reduction of the length of military service was - supposedly - 
designed to alleviate the problems of the government's finances by saving an estimated 
500 million drachmae. In fact this was a sleight of hand. The expected military 
expenditure for the fiscal year 1952-1953 remained at the same levels of approximately 
two and a half billion drachmae as the previous year. 32 The Greek government wanted to. 
30 Linardatos, From Civil War- A= Tov Ep(p6Aio, p. 455. 31 Ibid., p. 448; B. Sweet Escott, Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, p. 48. 32 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101816 R1102/5, Peakc to Eden, 2 September 
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give the impression that they were responding to allied demands. In reality they were 
planning to continue to spend beyond their means in the expectation that the Americans 
would finance their spendthrift plans under the cover of NATO solidarity. Plastiras also 
had a more pressing political rationale for this announcement - he hoped it would boost 
his popularity in the forthcoming general elections. His gambit failed utterly. It remains 
true, however, that there was now a consensus amongst the Greek political and military 
elite. They regarded Greece's entry into NATO as a triumph. It was a victory that 
obviated structural reforms in the economy or indeed rational economic management of 
any kind. NATO for the Greeks was a valuable constant. 
The British Military Mission and the NA TO Framework 
At the highest levels of command the British were losing out. Once the 
Communist threat had receded politico-military relations were reduced much more to a 
simple financial transaction. This was the kind of transaction in which the British could 
not hope to compete with the Americans. At a lower level, however, there was a period 
of transition. British military personnel were still embedded within the Greek system. 
Following the end of the civil war both the British Military Mission and the Joint 
United States Aid to Greece (JUSMAG) had decided to reduce their presence in Greece. 
The official task of both missions was to advise and assist the Greek General Staff in 
33 maintaining the national forces as an effective westernised army. Both the British and 
1952. 
33 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/904, Report by Brigadier G. D Browne, BMM in 
Athens, November 1950-June 1951. Within this context, the JCS decided to provide additional military 
aid to Greece. In fact, as a result of the Korean War and the American policy of containing the 
communists, the ceiling strength for the Greek military establishment was set to 94,700 to be attained by 
31 December 1950; with the distribution of personnel: 80,000 Army, 8,500 Navy, 6,200 Air Force. On 15 
September 1950, the JCS approved a fiu-ther ceiling increase for the Greek armed force of 164,400: 
147,000 for the Army, 10,000 Navy, 7,400 for the Greek Air Force. Similarly, on 15 February 1951 the 
NSC approved that the United States should undertake to maintain internal security in Greece, repelling 
any attempt of communist attack and finally bear an increasing percentage of the Greek economic burden. 
Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, US Military Assistance, JCS 1798/58,29 
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the Americans engaged, however, in more direct aid. They continued to lead 
'intelligence gathering' patrols in the border areas. 
The post-civil war objectives of the British Military Missions in Greece had been 
set out on 13 June 1950. Their first task of 'clearing the ground" was all but 
accomplished with the end of the civil war. The emphasis shifted therefore to the second 
task - 'building the house' as it was called. This involved the creation of self-sufficient 
armed forces, which in future, would be able to operate without constant guidance from 
British and American military advisers. For the British this transformation was to come 
about as much through professionalisation as it was through re-equipment. 34 The British 
set up Basic Training Centres all over the country, Training Establishments in Staff 
College, Specialist Training Centres, Army Schools, Corps Schools. These centres 
functioned under joint British and Greek command. The training centres replaced the 
old method of training whereby conscripts were called up directly into units. In the 
aftermath of the civil war, therefore, the average Greek soldier was much more likely to 
come into direct contact with British soldiers and British training methods. The British 
also introduced a more formal system for officer selection and promotion. This 
'scientific' method was to replace the haphazard 'patronage' system that had operated 
up until then. It is remarkably important that from the 1950s onwards the majority of 
officers were academy graduates. 35 
At the apex of the new system were two institutions. The War College prepared 
a small cadre of the most effective officers for future high military command. War 
September 195 1, Reel IV, Frame 003 8. 
34 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 32/15547, Report on The Work of the BMM (Greece), by Major General C. D. Packard, 13 June 1950; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908, 
A History of the BMM 1945-1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 
RI 192/23, A History of the BMM(G) 1945-1952. 35 PU13LIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 32/15547, History of the BMM(G) 1945-1952,13 June 1950; Greek Amy Headquarters, IoTopia Opyavcbmm; rov EUIVIK06 ETparo6 -History of the Organisation of the Greek Amy (Athens, Dept. of Army History Publication, 1957) cited from Kourvetaris, 'The Greek Army Officer Corps Its Professionalism and Political Interventionism', in Janowitz, Van Doom (eds. ), On Military Intervention, pp. 170-190. 
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College graduates were eligible to attend the National Defence School, which brought 
them together with civil servants and politicians. Here a future nexus for civil-military 
relations and national leadership was to be created. The products of these institutions 
came to dominate military affairs in the post-civil war period. British officers were 
involved in setting up this higher training system. The Americans were also influential 
at this level. Selective officers were also trained at training courses in the United States 
within the JUSMAPG context. Nevertheless it can be seen that British procedures and 
patterns of thought had been inculcated in the Greek military at all levels. 36 By the very 
nature of a hierarchical military establishment these influences, once implanted, would 
last for a generation. 
The success of the joint British and American undertaking to re-organise the 
Greek Army consisted not only in the final defeat of the insurgents but also in the 
introduction of military professional education and training of the national forces. This 
was reflected in the acceptance of the status of Greek officers arnong their fellow NATO 
members. 37 After 1949 the Greek armed forces became, relative to their past, a less 
politicised organisation modelled on other western armies. 38 This transformation should 
36 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/ 895, Major General E. E. Down report, June 
1947-November 1949; WO 32/15547, History of the BMM 1945-1952. Table of the Army General Staff, 
3 rd Office of Education of the Officers, Athens, cited in Kourvetaris, 'The Greek Army Officer Corps', in 
Janowitz, Van Doom (eds. ), On Military Intervention, p. 17 1. The training of the local national armies 
with the aim to make them capable of defending their nation was a typical task undertaken by both the 
BMM and JUSMAG. Training centres and training officers operated in particular areas of interests world 
wide as well as one of the most critical aspects of foreign involvement in a country. An American mission 
operated in Vietnam from the beginning of 1954 to support United States involvement in Southeast Asia. 
See: J. L. Collins (ed. ), The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Amy 1950-1972 
(Washington, 1986). 
37 Greek Army Headquarters, IoTopla OMavcbacco; Tov E. UlvIK06 ZTparo6 -History of the Organisation 
of the Greek Amy (Athens, Dept. of Army History Publication, 1957) cited from Kourvetaris, 'The Greek 
Army Officer Corps Its Professionalism and Political Interventionism', in Janowitz, Van Doom (eds. ), On 
Military Intervention, pp. 155-201. 
3' The Greek army was a highly politicised corps, which from the inter-war years had attempted a number 
of coups and counter-coups: 1922,1926,1933,1935 and 1943. After the end of the civil war, not only did 
it develop professional self-image, but also a coherent ideological identity: keep itself out of politics, 
defend stability and peace in Greece and prevent communists from seizing power again. There is also the 
view that the Greek officers began to stage autonomous coup d'itats between the two great wars-a period 
of a general parliamentary crisis in Greece. Most inter-war coups, however, sought to replace one civilian 
order with another rather than permanently hand over the government to the army. In this light, only the 
coup of April 1967 constituted a direct intervention of the army into politics, when the military flite 
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not be overstated, of course. As the American historian William McNeill observed 'a 
professional corps of officers', approximately 15,000 strong, had become, in their own 
eyes, the 'special guardian' of Greece. 39 A certain metastasis (transformation) did occur. 
Yet this is not to say that the Greek forces became a depersonalised and non-politicised 
corps. Western norms were present in the dominant value system but they were often 
relegated to a second or subsidiary level . 
40 Nevertheless, the British Military Mission 
and Joint United States Military Advisory Group did give the Greek national forces a 
more professional self-image. 
British influence was far from negligible during the transitional period between 
the end of the civil war and Greece's entry into NATO. Nevertheless, Greece's inclusion 
into NATO resulted in the British decision to withdraw its Air, Army and Police 
missions . 
41 D. F. Murray of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, explained 
that if Greece joined NATO under Admiral Carney's command, 'there would seem to be 
little purpose in retaining dwindling British Missions' in Greece. 42 According to the Air 
Commander, British Military Mission to Greece, the RAF Mission 'will be negligible 
and barely worth considering'. He concluded that the mission should be run down and 
its duties handed over to the Americans. 43 The Americans themselves were happy with 
this arrangement. The Chief of the JUSMAG to Greece Major General Frederick (who 
managed a dominant state apparatus. For a general account of the role of the military in Greek politics, 
see Th. Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics (London, 1997). The author suggests that the change of 
military attitude occurred in the 1980s with the prevalence of populism under the socialist government. 
39 McNeill, The Metamorphosis of Greece since WWII, pp. 97-98. 
40 According to the eminent statesman, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, who served as Minister of Defence in 
several post-war cabinets, IDEA members succeeded promotions and vital appointments through the 
1950s and 1960s. The most important of these appointments was the choice of General Kardamakis as 
Head of the General Staff. P. Kanellopoulos, Historical Essays-IaropiKj&, d0K1Pia (Athens, 1975), pp. 26- 
44. 
41 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95157 RI 64 1, minute by Murray, 8 November 
1951,21 December 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, Report on'Future 
of British Service Missions in Greece', 21 November 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), 
WO 216/473, Notes from General Perowne, 25 March 1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), 
WO 216/473, W. S. Slim report, 18 April 1952. 
42 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 RI 192/15, D. F Murray, 15 August 195 1. 
43 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 RI 192/15, memorandum by R. Barnes, 23 
August 195 1; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), AIR 20/8439, D. G Lewis- Commanding RAF 
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had succeeded Jenkins in May 195 1) believed that the British Military Mission in 
Greece had outlived its usefulness and should be dissolved by mutual agreement. The 
American Ambassador in Greece, Peurifoy, saw no advantages in retaining the British 
Military Mission. He noted that the British should 'withdraw voluntarily at the time of 
final adjustment of command relationship in Eastern Mediterranean'. The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff concluded that the withdrawal of the! British military mission would have no 
adverse impact on the efficiency of the Greek armed forces. They noted that those 
functions not taken over by the Americans would be filled by a small number British 
liaison-advisor officers left behind. 44 In early January 1952, thirteen British police 
officers, for instance, would remain at Gendarmerie training schools. 45 The strength of 
the RAF Mission was reduced to 3 junior officers: one Air Attacht and two assistants, 
one of ýv hom w ould bec oncerned s olely w ith q uestions ofs upply f or t he G reek A ir 
Force and detached permanently to work with the American Mission. The other would 
be appointed to the British embassy in Athens. 46 Army officers would remain affiliated 
to JUSMAG(G) that remained in Greece under Major General Charles Hart. The 
executive responsibility for the remaining British officers would also be transferred to 
the Chief of JUSMAG. 47 On 29 February 1952, General Perowne announced formally 
that the missions would cease to exist on 30 April 1952 'having accomplished' their 
duties and being replaced by NATO's services. 48 
Mission in Greece, 7 September 195 1. 
44 Records of the JCS, Part 2, Strategic Issues: Section 1, US Military Assistance, JCS 1798/59,23 August 
195 1, Reel IV, Frame 0038; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/96551 Wul 1923/272, 
Ottawa Meeting, 17 September 195 1. 
45 PUBLIC p 'ECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101830 WG 1643/1, Report by J. C. A Roper, 
British Embassy to Athens, 5 January 1952. 
46 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 WG 1192/2, D. F. Murray, 10 January 
1952. 
47 PUBLIC RECOp 'D OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/906, Major General Commander LECM Perowne, 
29 February 1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216/473, S. Venizelos to General 
Perowne, 26 April 1952. Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, Noel Baker Papers, 4/350,12 May 
1952, press cutting without title. 
48 Brigadier G. P. Hobbs is a typical intelligence officer, who worked in Greece as Chief Staff Officer, 
BMM(G) 1942-1947, Colonel of Liaison 1947-1949, Military Attacht in Athens 1954-1957. Major 
General H. L. Boatner, JUSMAG (G) on 18 January 1955 noted Hobbs as 'leading figure' in the British 
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The British Naval Mission, however, proved an exception. Britain intended to 
remain a significant naval power in the Mediterranean. 'Showing the Rag' in the 
Mediterranean was the symbol of British naval power. In the purely Greek context they 
took a close and continuing interest in naval conununications between Cyprus and the 
Greek mainland . 
49The British Naval Mission was to continue to 'assist in the defence of 
the Middle East and fight alongside the British Mediterranean Fleet' despite the 
50 
presence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Aegean and the Mediterranean basin. 
The British Naval Mission only came to end on 15 October 1955, when it was decided 
that its head Admiral Selby would not be replaced. According to the official statement 
the reason for the withdrawal of the Mission was financial . 
51 Admiral Selbyhimself 
noted, however, that other considerations lay behind the decision to 'wind up' the 
mission and turn its functions to a lower ranking British Naval Attacht. By 1955 the 
Greek government was no longer subordinating the question of Cyprus to the need to 
integrate in the western alliance. Instead they were consciously whipping up anti-British 
feeling over Cyprus. In addition a new American Commander in the Mediterranean, 
Espionage Service with the aim to maintain Greece under the British influence. King's College London 
Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Brig. G. P. Hobbs Papers, 16/1-13 NID. 
49 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/237 15, Report of Head of British Naval Mission, 
1-5/1952; FO 371/95141 RI 192/15, memorandum by D. F Murray, 28 August 195 1. 
50 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141 RI 192/15, minute by Cheetman-Foreign 
Office, 20 September 195 1; FO 371/95141 RI 192/2 1, minute by Morrison, 22 November 195 1. PUBLIC 
RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23538, M0193/52,22 January 1952; FO 371/95141 RI 192/15, 
meeting in Foreign Office on Service Missions, 28 August 1952; ADM 116/6330,24 October 1955. 
National Library of Scotland, Rear Admiral Robert Kirk Dickson Papers, Head of the BNM in Athens 
1949-1951, MS 13587 (207-214), 30 September 1949,13 October 1951. Accordingly, it was claimed that 
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through a British Allied Naval Commander for the Mediterranean. In Stefanidis, The United States, Great 
Britain and Greece, p. 10 1. This latter version, however, does not explain the timing the Mission 
withdrew in October 1955 when both Greece and Turkey were already under NATO's command. 
Moreover the missions were not so numerous to be an unbearable cost. 51 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23538, M0193/52, Report of Head of BNM(G) 
Rear Admiral Smith (1951-1953), 22 January 1952; The Times, 15 October 1955; PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, Ward-Head of Southern Department 1955- to H. Caccia-Private 
Secretary, 24 October 1955; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 116/6330, M370/18/55, 
Report on Future of BNM (G), 25 October 1955. 
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s 52 Admiral Fechteler 'did not want us [the British] . According to the agreement 
between 
the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Greek authorities the Mission would remain 
on a 'dormant basis' to 'keep an eye" on the Mediterranean area and provide Britain 
with a naval listening post. 53 
UNSCOB and Balkan Cold War Policy 
It should be noted in passing that a further symbol of residual British influence 
was disbanded in 1952. As far back as January 1947 an ad hoc United Nations 
Committee had arrived in Greece to investigate the accusations of the Greek 
government that its northern neighbours were assisting the Communists, by providing 
shelter, supplies, military equipment and economic assistance. 
54 The Committee 
consisted of eleven members of whom Britain was one. The Committee was succeeded 
by UNSCOB (United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans) whose formation was 
55 
mandated by the General Assembly on 21 October 1947. Its base was Salonika and its 
mission was to mediating and reconciling between the four neighbouring countries of 
Greece; Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania that directly supported the Greek 
communis s. 
56 
52 King's College London Archives, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Rear Admiral Selby 
Papers, GB 99 KCLMA Selby. Rear Admiral Selby was Head of BNM(G) 1953-1955. Of all the 
alternatives the most convincing seem to be the strengthening of the presence of NATO and Americas' 
wedominance. 
3 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 116/6330, Rear Admiral W. H. Selby, 18 October 
1955,24 October 1955,30 December 1955; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914, 
24 October 1955. 
54 The driving force behind America's motivation to send the UN committee was the typical Cold War 
suspicion of Soviet expansionism. The British had hoped by 1945 that the UN would reinforce their role 
in the area. DBPO: 1,102, Sargent, II July 1945. 
55 FRUS (1947): 5,865-889: Marshall to Austin (US Representative at the United Nations), June- 
September 1947; A. Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations 
Special Committee on the Balkans. 1947-1952 (New York, 1990); The conunittee consisted of Britain, 
US, Soviet Union, France, China, Belgium, Syria, Poland, Colombia, Australia and Brazil. UNSCOB was 
a western product. An unarmed observer operation rather than a peacekeeping force of the type 
subsequently deployed by the United Nations in the Sinai, Gaza Strip, Congo, Cyprus, Golan Heights, 
Lebanon and elsewhere to serve western intelligence needs. H. N. Howard, 'Greece and its Balkan 
Neighbours (1948-1949): The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation', Balkan Studies 7 (1966), 3. 
56 United Nations Resolution, Security Council, Series 11,1946-1947, Reports on Communist Activities, p. 
3 8. United Nations Resolution, General Assembly, Series I, Reports on 30 September, 21 October, 3 
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Greece's inclusion into NATO called the necessity of the United Nations Special 
Committee on the Balkans into question. UNSCOB's mandate had been renewed since 
the end of the civil war because it had some marginal usefulness in intelligence 
gathering. During 1951 it was called on to counter Cominform propaganda in the 
Balkans. On many occasions the committee had undertaken to repudiate Cominfonn 
propaganda in the Balkans. The governments of Albania and Yugoslavia accommodated 
the large number of Greek armed communist refugees, who had escaped to these 
countries in 1949. The Greek Communist 'Free Greece' radio station continued to 
operate from Romanian territory, transmitting instructions to the so-called 'fighters' of 
the movement. The Special Committee assembled evidence to demonstrate that 
Communist states were continuing to aid the KKE. The committee's annual report to the 
sixth United Nations general assembly claimed that tension persisted in the Balkans 
fermented by former 'guerrillas' who threatened 'the political and territorial integrity of 
Greece'. 57 However, UNSCOB's Cold War functions changed with NATO's 
enlargement. Although the Western Allies were still concerned about Soviet intentions 
the Americans reckoned that the admission of Greece into NATO provided a deterrent 
much stronger than any body of observers. As a result, in October 1951 they proposed 
the dissolution of UNSCOB. The intelligence part of its mission would be performed by 
an ad hoc sub-commission of the Peace Observation Committee (POC) under the 
United Nations auspices. A small observer group of 10-15 persons would be located in 
58 Greece to keep a watch on the Greek borders with Albania and Bulgaria. The British 
supported the Peace Observation Committee proposal. The Greek government accepted 
November 1947, pp. 203-205; YearBook of the United Nations, 1947-1948,21 October 1947, pp. 298- 
302; YearBook of the United Nations, 1948-1949, October 1948-July 1949, pp. 245-256; Howard, 
'Greece and its Balkan Neighbours 1948-1949: The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation', Balkan 
Studies 7 (1966), 1-26. 
57 FRUS (1951): 5,453: Staff Study by the NSC 'The Position of the US With Respect to Greece', 6 
February 195 1; FRUS (1951): 5,493-498: Report of the UNSCOB, 'Conclusions', 15 August 195 1. 58 FRUS (1951): 5,515-516: Memorandum by the director of the office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian 
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59 it in November 195 1. UNSCOB was dissolved in February 1952. 
It was Greece's entry into NATO in 1952 rather than the Truman Doctrine of 
1947 that marked a turning point in Anglo-Greek relations. In the period between 1947 
and 1952 Britain remained an important player in Greek political and military affairs. 
The British provided ag reat d eal ofp ractical h elp tot he G reeks inm ilitary m atters. 
Even in politics the British retained some influence, not least because of their 
relationship with the monarchy. In theory it benefited the Greek government to have two 
rather than one friendly power working with it. Yet, since the British almost always 
sided with the Americans, this advantage seemed by 1952 to be a wasting practical 
asset. It made little sense for the Greeks to align themselves with the British in debates 
about NATO command arrangements. As the Communist menace faded so too did fears 
of American hegemony. The Greeks wanted American money rather than British brains. 
Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 
(McGhee), 19 October 195 1; FRUS (1951): 2,514: Acheson to Truman, 21 November 195 1. 
59 FRUS (1951): 5,516: note 2 without name, 20 November 195 1. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, pp. 
184-187; Details on the negotiations on the Balkan alliance are to be found in John Iatrides, Balkan 
Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries (The Hague, 1968). 
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Conclusion 
This study has attempted to deconstruct a number of myths connected with 
Anglo-Greek relations in the 1940s and early 1950s. Both the traditional and revisionist 
historiography on Greek history tends to assume that 1947 brought about a British 
withdrawal from Greece that resulted from Britain's post-war financial difficulties. In 
fact both countries sought to maintain close bilateral relations for five years after the 
British note of February 1947 signalled the end of military aid. The British army did not 
withdraw from Greece until 1951. The British Military Mission remained involved with 
the National Army until 1952. In the short-term the American take-over of the Greek 
financial burden did not undermine British policy towards Greece. On the contrary, 
Britain's position was strengthened by America's backing. 
The subject of Anglo-Greek relations in the late 1940s is a complex one. It was 
deeply affected by the Second World War, the Greek civil war and the Cold War. Each 
tended to push the British and the Greeks together rather than apart. The relationship of 
the two countries was based on common interests and bilateral security concerns. It was 
the relationship of a great power and a small and relatively poor country. The Greek 
governments looked to Britain as the power with the long-term traditional policy in the 
region and a well-established objective to keep Greece within a British sphere of 
influence. The British governments sought to maintain Greece as a buffer state to secure 
their routes to the Middle East, and later on, to secure Europe's borders from possible 
Soviet expansion. 
The KKE thought of the British 'monarcho-fascists' as its main enemies and the 
main obstacle to its seizure of power. The Party accused the British of provoking the 
civil war in Greece by supporting undemocratic Greek governments and theirwhite 
terror'. In their turn the British were convinced that the KKE intended to use EAM as a 
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springboard for seizing power and subjugating Greece to Stalinism. British policy on 
Greece was strongly influenced by the mounting evidence of Soviet expansionism in the 
Balkans and the Middle East. 
British policy towards Greece was formulated on the premise that it was 
necessary to have a regime in power that would accommodate British interests in the 
area. The first prerequisite for the establishment of such regime was the defeat of the 
insurgency. The second objective was the establishment of a broad-based government 
that would be acceptable to the majority of the Greek population. British aims during 
the years under examination remained relatively constant. 
The implementation of British policy, however, revolved around a complicated 
policy of intervention. Bevin blended intervention and non-intervention throughout the 
years under examination. The Labour foreign policy enjoyed a high degree of bipartisan 
support. Professional diplomats too understood that the Labour Foreign Secretary was 
pursuing traditional British interests. The Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, Sir Orme Sargent, asserted in November 1945, for instance, that the new 
government would maintain the Greek commitment but by 'other and more discreet 
methods'. The Labour cabinet was committed to the ideals of 'anti-imperial' policy and 
'non-intervention'. ' They had to modulate the rhetoric surrounding their policy rather 
than its reality, however. The most spectacular British intervention in the civil war had 
occurred under the wartime coalition when, during the 'December Events', Churchill 
had ordered that British troops treat Athens as a 'conquered city'. 2 As a result of 
Churchill's decisive action his successors could afford to be more discreet. The British 
Army guaranteed Greece's territorial integrity rather than engaging in combat 
operations. The British troops who did go into combat were involved in directing and 
1 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/276/GRE/45/10: Sargent Papers, Sargent to Leepcr, 
9 November 1945. 
2 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, p. 252. 
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assisting Greek counter-insurgency operations. These operations by their very nature 
tended to cloud the degree of British involvement not least because they took place in 
remote areas where few journalists could be found. The Labour government followed 
the pattern of intervention as 'oscillating' intervention. If at all possible Britain would 
stand at one remove from the civil struggle. It would, however, intervene both militarily 
and politically at times of crisis only to withdraw once more once the crisis had passed. 
The trust that the Greek government put in the guarantee of its survival, provided by 
Britain, was underlined by the right-wing Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Tsaldaris, even as the Truman Doctrine was promulgated. 
It would be correct to characterise British and American policy towards Greece 
as moving along parallel paths. Even before the crisis of February and March 1947 the 
United States had decided that it needed to become more militarily involved in the 
Mediterranean region. The British did not lure the Americans in. Rather they provided a 
good opportunity for the Truman administration to launch their new policy in public. 
This parallel development of policy explains why, on the whole, Anglo-American co- 
operation in Greece was so amicable. Neither side felt it was being 'used'. 
During the course of 1948, however, with the appointment of General James 
Van Fleet, the United States consolidated their supremacy over the British in Greece. 
This does not imply that the British presence was not important, but that the Americans 
became the leading power in this collaboration. Each power maintained its own military 
missions acting in Greece with separate roles. In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the 
White House to maintain its 'predominant position' and to be nothing less than the 
4senior partner' in a 4senior-junior' arrangement with Britain. The Americans wanted to 
maintain control over military assistance and 'hold in predominant position on all 
3 YrIHPEY. IA Il: TOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 1947, 
46.1,21502, Avagopdrou TcyakSdpq iipo; To rEY,, 18 MaPTIOU 1947 (Tsaldaris' Report to GES, 18 
March 1947). 
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fronts'. 4 This, however, does not suggest that there were serious clashes between the 
two allies in Greece. Whatever the surface disagreements might be, the correlation of 
interests between Britain and the United States ran deep, and, in the end, the two 
countries were always prepared to support each other. 
The Greek civil war was a complex military struggle. During its final two years 
the nature of the armed struggle itself was transformed from guerrilla to semi- 
conventional warfare. Guerrilla activities in the mountains were combined with 
conventional operations aimed at capturing cities. It was never a purely military 
struggle. Both sides were fighting for the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population. 
The KKE used its yiajka network to organise the Party's activities whilst the Greek 
government created a number of civil guard organisations to fight the Democratic Army 
defenders. This type of warfare demanded sophisticated counter-insurgency operations 
from the National Army. They were not well prepared to carry out such operations. They 
lacked strategic imagination, tactical savvy and the willingness to engage the enemy 
more closely. Each of the missing components had to be inculcated by foreign military 
advisers. In the end, however, the war was one between Greeks. The British and the 
Americans could teach the National Army how to win the war but the government 
forces themselves had to win the victory. It says much for the skill and diplomacy of 
these advisers that they were able to motivate the Greek armed forces to the point where 
they could fight the war so competently. It is pointless to characterise the government 
forces as 'puppets' of foreign powers, whether Britain or America. If they had deserved 
this epithet then the war would never have been won. 5 
The British Military Mission comprised of army, air, navy and police divisions 
to train forces in its respective areas of interests. The British counter-insurgency role in 
4 FRUS (1949): 6,453,455: Van Fleet to Department of Army, 7 November 1949. 
5 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/892, WO 
Instructions for the formation of the National Army, June 1945; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 189. 
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Greece remained active throughout the civil war until the final defeat of the Democratic 
Army in October 1949. After 1947 American formations further reinforced the National 
Army's fight against the insurgents. JUSMAPG too was divided into three divisions - 
army, air, and navy. Tasks were divided between the BMM and JUSMAPG. The British 
Military Mission continued its training duties; JUSMAPG provided operational advice 
and supplies. Naturally the relationship between the two allied missions was not always 
easy. Yet the Anglo-American partnership not only trained the National Army to a state 
in which it could defeat the Communists, but made it a full and effective part of NATO. 
The Greek counter-insurgency operations symbolised the determination of the 
West to contain communism. Britain's counter-insurgency effort in Greece was crucial. 
It was the British Chiefs of Staff who first introduced the three-stage strategy of 'clear- 
and-hold' in January 1947. This strategy called for and established a framework for 
military, political and intelligence co-operation that lay at the root of future successeS. 6 
The strategy necessitated the retraining and re-organisation of the security forces by 
British units, instruction teams, and intelligence officers. The American 'staggered 
offence' strategy applied after Van Fleet's arrival involved these political and military 
practises. Moreover the British role was crucial in terms of air power. Air supplies and 
equipment, RAF personnel and RHAF training improved the RHAF's levels of 
performance. Air raids were of decisive importance against the Democratic Army 
defenders, who lacked any air cover. 7 Many of the techniques developed by the British 
in Greece were applied elsewhere by both the British themselves and by the Americans! 
' The fist stage was the reorganisation of security forces. The second was propaganda organisation to 
counter balance yiaika and the third militarily 'clear' areas. Papagos, 'Guerrilla warfare' in Osank-a (ed. ), 
Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 236; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 261/637, BMM (G), 
On New Training Team, 30 January 1947. 
7 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/8, COS (48) 129,22 October 1948; rENIK0 
EnITEAEIO ETPATOY/AIEYGYNEH ILTOPIAL XTPATOY-GENERAL STAFF/ DIRECTORATE 
OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS ( rEVAII), 10 12/A/6, Avaqopdrou AvTtaTpdqyou 
rc(opyiou nanaycwpytou, 27 Oicrwpptou 1948 (Report by Lt. Gen. G. Papageorgiou, 27 October 1948). 
a Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 23 5. 
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The British role in Greek politics was equally creative. British diplomats 
consistently aimed at the creation of a stable coalition of the Centre. In politics Britain 
backed a coalition of the Centre with the aim of creating a stable government. In one 
sense the British were as successful in politics as they were in war. They managed to 
keep the whole democratic show on the road. The KKE and its front organisations could 
never gain enough purchase on the political system to fatally undermine the governance 
of Greece. In the end, however, British policy was undennined by unreliability of all the 
anti-communist p oliticians a nd p arties. T he d ream ofas table c oalition o, f the Centre 
was undermined by their inability to co-operate. 
For Greece itself, the negative effects of the civil war were evident for years to 
follow. Political rivalry between the Right and the Left, between monarchists and 
republicans continued to divide the people. Concentration carnps and political seclusion 
followed the communist identity during the decades that followed. The KKE remained 
illegal for almost thirty-five years. 
The King and the royal Court were a constant destabilising factor in politics. The 
Palace exploited, for its own political interests, the fragmentation of Greek political 
forces and the willingness of certain politicians - such as Sofocles Venizelos - to bow 
to royal demands for parliamentary support. By 1950, IDEA had gradually establishcd 
its loyalty to Papagos and had become the rallying point of officers whose professional 
ambitions were frustrated by the clients of the Court. The British tried to steer and 
restrain King Paul. British representatives treated the emergence of Papagos into politics 
with s ome s cepticism. Itw as o nly w hen itb ecame c lear t hat Papagos did not plan a 
dictatorship that they swung their support behind him. The triumph of Papagos suggests 
that just as in military affairs Greek politicians went their own way. They too were to a 
great extend independent of the Allied powers. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Principal Characters 
A. I Main Participants 
Acheson Dean, US Secretary of State, 1949-1953. 
Agnidis Th. Greek Ambassador in London, acting in 1947-1949. 
Alexander A. V., S ecretary ofS tate for D efence int he B ritish L abour Cabinet, 1946- 
1950. 
Attlee Clement, Prime Minister of the British Labour government 1945-1951. 
Bernes J. F, US Secretary of State until 1947. 
Bevin Ernest, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Labour administration, 
1945-1950. 
Browne G. D., Brigadier, Commander BMM(G) November 195 O-June 195 1. 
Churchill Winston Spencer, British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1940- 
1945; Prime Minister October 195 1 -April 195 5. 
Crawford, General Kenneth, Commander, British Land Forces, Greece, 1946-1947. 
Cripps Stafford, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Labour cabinet, 1947-1950. 
Dalton Hugh, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Labour cabinet, 1945-1947. 
Dendrournis Vassilis, Greek Ambassador to Washington from 1950. 
Dickson R. K., Rear Admiral, Head of the BNM(G), 1949-195 1. 
Down Ernest E., Major General, Commander BMM(G) 1948-1949. 
Eden Anthony, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British National 
Government, 1940-1945; Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Conservative cabinet, 195 1. 
1955. 
Eisenhower Dwight D., General Secretary of the Army, Supreme Commander, Allicd 
Powers, Europe (SACEUR). 
Forrestal James, Secretary of Defence, 1947-1949. 
Frederick, Major General Robert, Chief of the JUSMAG (G) from May 195 1. 
George II, King of the Hellenes, Succeeded to throne, 1922; Abdicated, 1924; Recalled 
by plebiscite, 1935; Fled from Greece after German invasion, 1941; Recalled by 
plebiscite, 1946. Died in I April 1947. Succeeded by his brother Paul. 
Gonatas Stylianos, General, Member of the Revolutionary Committee and Premier, 
1922; Founded National Liberal Party, 1945; Minister of Public Works and 
Reconstruction in Cabinet of Tsaldaris, Apr. 1946-Jan. 1947. 
Grady Henry, US Ambassador to Greece, July 1948- March 1951; Chief US Mission 
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(G). 
Grigoropoulos, Lieutenant, General Theodoros, Chief of the Greek General Staff, 
March-May 195 1; Head of Greek National Defence Council from June 195 1. 
Griswold Dwight, Chief of US Mission in Greece 1947-1948. 
Hobbs Godfrey, Lieutenant-Colonel, October 1944-February 1945 served in Greece in 
the BMM. March 1947-December 1949, as Colonel, served as associate between Greek 
General Staff and the BMM. During 1954-1957, Brigadier, was appointed military 
attacht during negotiations over Cyprus. 
Ioannidis Ioannis, Member of the KKE Politburo. 
Jenkins, Major General Reuben E., Chief of the JUSMAG (G), 1950. 
Kanellopoulos Panayiotis, Professor of Sociology, Prime Minister November 1945; 
Leader of the National Radical Union, acting Minister in all cabinets, joined Papagos's 
Greek Rally on 6 August 195 1. 
Kiousopoulos Dimitris, Public Prosecutor, PM of the caretaker government October 
1952- November 1952. 
Kirk Alexander, US Ambassador to Greece, 1941-1943. 
Kopr616 Fuad, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Lascelles Daniel, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Athens, 1945-1947. 
Leeper Rex, British Ambassador to Greece, 1941-1946. 
Lovett Robert A., Deputy secretary of Defence until Sept. 195 1; Secretary of Defence. 
Livesay William, General, Director of USAGG June 1947; JUSMAPG late 1947. 
Macmillan Harold, British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters in North-Wcst 
Africa, accompanied the Allied Headquarters to Italy as Acting President of the Allied 
Commission in Italy, mediator between parties in Greece in the Greek civil war. 
MacVeagh Lincoln, US Ambassador to Greece, 1933-1941,1943-1948. 
Marshall George, US Secretary of State, 1947-1949. 
Maximos Dimitrios, Governor of National Bank of Greece; Prime Minister, January 
August 1947. 
Melas Leo, Greek Ambassador in London 195 1. 
McGhee George, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, S. Asian, and African 
Affairs from October 1949; Ambassador to Turkey from December 195 1. 
Montgomery B ernard, F ield M arshal, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1946-1948, 
Chairman of Western European Committee 1948-1951, Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 1951-1958. 
Morrison Herbert, British Minister of Foreign Affairs 1951 
Mountbatten Louis, Admiral (British Navy), Commander-in-Chief for Eastcm 
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Mediterranean. 
Myers Edward C. W., 'Eddie', Colonel, Brigadier, Commander BMM (G) 1942-1943. 
Norton Sir Clifford, Succeeded Leeper as British Ambassador in Athens, March 1946- 
October 1951. 
Papagos Field Marshal Alexandros, Greek C-in-C of the armed forces, 1941,1949. 
Premier November 1952-1955. 
Papandreou George, Joined Venizelist movement in Thessaloniki (Salonika), 1916; 
Prime Minister, Apr. -Dec. 1944; Minister of the Interior in Cabinet of Maximos, 
January 1947; Deputy PM, Minister of Co-ordination and Minister of Religion and 
National Education, until July 1951. 
Packard, Major General Sir Charles Douglas, Commander BMM 1949-1951; Chief of 
Staff, General Headquarters, Middle East Land Forces, 1951-1953. 
Patterson Jefferson, US Representative on the UN Special Committee on the Balkans. 
Partsalidis Dimitrios, Member of the KKE Politburo. 
Peake Charles, British Ambassador in Athens from 195 1. 
Perowne LECM, Major General Commander BMM(G) June 195 1 -April 1952. 
Peurifoy John E., US Ambassador to Greece and Chief of American Mission for Aid to 
Greece from March 1951 
Plastiras Nicolaos, General, President of the Revolutionary Committee, 1922-1923; 
Launched abortive coup d' itat, 1933; Premier, Jan- Apr 1945, April 1950-August 1950, 
Sept. 1951- October 1952. 
Politis Athanasios G., Greek Ambassador to the US. 
Porter William J., Office of Greek, Turkish, Iranian Affairs, Department of State. 
Rawlins, Major General Steward, Head of the BMM in Athens, 1945-1948. 
Sakellariou, Vice Admiral Alexander, Greek Minister of National Defencc from 
Oct. 195 1. 
Sargent Sir Orme, Under-Secretary of the Southern Department of the British Foreign 
Office until 1946; Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1946-1949. 
Scobie Ronald, Lieutenant-General, Commander BMM (G) 1944-1945. 
Siantos Georgios, Member of the KKE Politburo. 
Sofoulis Themistocles, Leader of the Liberal Party-, PM November 1945-March 1946, 
September 1947- June 1949. 
Selby W. H., Admiral, Head of the BNM(G), 1951-1955. 
Truman Harry, Succeeded Roosevelt as President of the US, 1945-1952. 
Tsaldaris Konstantine, co-leader of the Populist Party, 1945-1946; Leader of the 
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Populist Party, 1946; Premier and Foreign Minister 1946-1947; Deputy Premier and 
Foreign Minister 1947-1949; Vice-President in Venizelos's cabinet Sept. 1950. 
Tsakalotos Thrasyvoulos, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Greek General Staff, from 
June 1951. 
Tsouderos Emmanuel, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 1931-1939; Premier of 
government in exile, 1941-1944; Minister of Co-ordination in Cabinet of Sofoulis. 
Vafeiadis Marcos, Member of the KKE Central Committee, 1942; Chief ELAS 
Commander inM acedonia d uring t he S econd W orld W ar; 0 rganised t he D emocratic 
Army 1947; Commander of the Democratic Army December 1947 to January 1949. 
VanFleet, Lieutenant General James A., USA former Director, Joint US Military 
Advisory and Planning Group in Greece, 1948-1950. 
Venizelos Sofocles, Son of Eleflierios Venizelos; Premier, Apr 1944; Founded Liberal 
Party, 1946; Vice-Premier in Cabinet of Maximos, January 1947; Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs October 195 1- October 1952. 
Ventiris, Lieutenant General Konstantine, Chief of the Greek General Staff February 
1947; Inspector General of the NA February 1948; Commander of SHDM May 1949. 
Woodhouse Chris, Major, Commander BMM(G) 1943-1944; Second Secretary in 
embassy in Athens, 1945. 
Yost Charles W., Minister at the American embassy in Athens. 1951-1954. 
Zahariadis Nicolaos, Installed by Comintern as Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the KKE, 1931; General Secretary, 1935; Leader of KKE after 1945; Expelled from the 
Party, 1956. 
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Appendix B: Greek Governments 1944-1952 
B. I Chronological Table of Goverrunents 
October 1944- January 1945: George Papandreou. 
January 1945- April 1945: Nicolaos Plastiras. 
April 1945-Octobcr 1945: Petros Voulgaris. 
November 1945-Novcmbcr 1945: Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. 
November 1945-March 1946: Themistocles Sofoulis. 
Elections 31 March 1946 (proportional representation) 
March 1946- January 1947: Panayis Tsaldaris. 
January 1947- September 1947: Dimitrios Maximos. 
September 1947-June 1949: Themistocles Sofoulis. (Sofoulis died. ) 
June 1949-January 1950: Alexander Diomidis caretaker government. 
January 1950-March 1950: John Theotokis caretaker government. 
Elections 5 March 1950 (proportional representation) 
March 1950-April 1950: Sofocles Venizelos. 
April 1950-August 1950: Nicolaos Plastiras. 
August 1950-September 1951: Sofocles Venizelos. 
Elections 9 September 1951 (reinforced proportional representation) 
September 1951-October 1952: Nicolaos Plastiras. 
October 1952-November 1952: caretaker Dimitrios Kiousopoulos. 
Elections 16 November 1952 (majority system) 
November 1952: Alexander Papagos 
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Appendix C: The Electoral Systems 
C. 1 The Electoral Systems 
The first two post-war elections in Greece on 31 March 1946 and 5 March 1950 
were held under the system of proportional representation similarly to the electoral 
system of 1936. The 1946 election, due to the decision of the KKE to abstain, had 
produced the closest correlation between the number of votes cast for a given party and 
its proportion of seats in Parliament and a relatively stable and strong majority to 
govem. The system was tested in 1950, with greater number of parties to participate. It 
resulted in weak correspondence between the share of votes cast and the share of scats 
received. No party managed to receive a strong majority to govern and coalitions of the 
Centre were formed. 
As a result of the unstable coalitions during 1950 and 1951 new election would 
be conducted under a new electoral system of reinforced proportional representation on 
9 September 195 1. The aim was to limit the number of parties elected in Parliament and 
form stronger coalitions or alliances. Participation in Parliament was restricted to the 
three parties with the largest share of votes, subject to a seventeen per cent minimum for 
single parties and a twenty per cent minimum for parties in alliance. Only nine partics 
contested the 1951 election. Yet, no single party managed to win a workable majority of 
seats. Therefore, still weak coalitions of the Centre were formed, which wcre vulncrable 
to making and dissolving alliances. 
The lesson to draw so far was that a further change in the electoral systcm was 
needed if a strong cabinet was at last to be formed. This was a debate between the right 
and left-wing parties. The right-wing parties supported the new simple majority system, 
which coupled with the American will; whereas Prime Minister Plastiras publicly sidcd 
against. Nonetheless, the majority system was adopted on 12 September 1952 to be 
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applied to the election on 16 November 1952. Only two parties were now represented in 
Parliament, the Greek Rally and the Union of the Parties, which was a coalition of the 
three Centre parties. The majority system gave a strong majority to Papagos' Party. The 
Greek Rally with 49 per cent share of votes resulted in and 82 per cent share of seats in 
the House and thus a single party formed a government. 
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Appendix D: Maps 
D. 1 Map of Greece 
Source: O'Ballance, Yhe Greek Civil War, 1944-1949, London: Faber and Faber, 1966. 
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D. 2 The Map of Athens during the December Events 
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Appendix E: Table 
E. 1 Democratic Army Combatant Strength in Greece, 1946-1949 
Date Total 
March 1946 2,500 
June 1946 3,000 
July 1946 4,000 
August 5,500 
1946 
October 6,000 
1946 
December 9,285 
1946 
Early 1947 11,390 
March 1947 13,000 
April 1947 14,250 
Summer 18,000 
1947 
September 
1947 13,610 
October 17,000 
1947 
November 
1947 19,420 
December 
1947 20,350 
January 22,250 
1948 
February 24,140 
1948 
March 1948 25,000 
April 1948 26,210 
May 1948 25,610 
June 1948 23,300 
July 1948 24,180 
August 21,100 
1948 
September 
1948 23,720 
October 25,480 
1948 
November 
1948 25,000 
December 
Central 
Greece, 
Peloponnes Crete, 
e Islands 
400 8,140 
3,000 
1,000 9,450 
3,000 8,800 
2,500 4,940 
3,300 1,720 
Epirus Eastern 
Western Macedonia 
Macedonia Western 
Thrace 
1,700 
8,500 
1,150 
5,000 
9,450 5,100 
10,400 4,010 
10,490 6,250 
13,080 6,900 
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1948 24,000 3,300 1,620 11,080 8,000 
January 23,210 3,000 2,020 10,390 7,800 
1949 
February 24,090 1,600 5,370 11,120 6,000 
1949 
March 1949 21,810 1,000 7,780 7,250 5,780 
April 1949 19,820 100 4,830 9,750 5,140 
May 1949 20,240 50 5,650 9,880 4,660 
June 1949 18,270 130 2,840 11,280 4,660 
July 1949 17,635 80 1,270 12,855 3,430 
August 10,105 0 1,735 5,610 2,760 
1949 
September 
1949 3,580 0 1,490 590 1,500 
October 1,910 
1949 
Source: Based on JUSMAPG, Greek General Staff, and US Military Attacht-Greece 
reports and other sources. Cited in Shrader, The Withered Vine, p. 111. 
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